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‘Why did some protest movements turn to force when others did not in times of 
austerity? How has it influenced political structures of the Eurozone states? In 
this empirically rich, methodologically advanced, and theoretically innovative 
book, Joanna Rak open-mindedly addresses important research problems of the 
sources and consequences of differences and similarities across cultures of politi-
cal violence formed by the post-2008 anti-austerity movements in Europe. Not 
only does Rak’s study contribute to our understanding of what happened in aus-
terity-driven societies, but it also makes an important contribution to the Social 
Sciences by creating and applying a compelling non-traditional research design 
that allows a researcher to verify methodological correctness and analytical effec-
tiveness of theoretical frameworks. Those who are interested in how to analyze 
contentious politics now have an excellent work to read!’
Roman Bäcker, The former President of Polish Political Science Association
‘Joanna Rak has written an admirably clear, rigorously designed and conducted 
comparative study of European anti-austerity movements. This book does more 
than challenge the students of contention to think critically about conceptual and 
explanatory frameworks of cultures of political violence. By formulating and 
testing new analytical tools, the study pushes us to reconsider a traditional 
research process and the use of theoretical categories in comparative politics and 
social movement studies.’
Adam Wielomski, The President of Political and Legal Theory Association
‘This timely and innovative research allows us to understand how broad civil his-
torical contexts shaped placid, hector-led, and militant cultures of political vio-
lence in austerity-driven Europe. Drawing upon the pieces of data in 14 languages 
and a comprehensive literature review, Joanna Rak creates entirely new databases 
for anti-austerity movements. In skillfully combining qualitative and quantitative 
comparative techniques, she achieves both theory-verification and theory-genera-
tion aims. The analysis makes significant methodological and theoretical 
advances as Rak devises a gradable theoretical category of a culture of political 
violence. Her original theoretical framework introduces a refreshingly new way 
to bring together accomplishments in the study of contentious politics and 
history. Rak paves the way for further research and discussion about a nature of 
contemporary cultures of political violence.’
José Luis Orella Martínez, Professor of History and Political Sciences, 
CEU San Pablo, Spain

Theorizing Cultures of Political 
Violence in Times of Austerity
After the multidimensional financial crisis of 2008, the member states of the 
Eurozone imposed a set of economic policies to save their economies. Socially 
unpopular cuts contributed to the occurrence of violent movements that both 
opposed austerity policies and created animosity towards the politicians who 
implemented them.
 Combining qualitative and quantitative comparative analyses from anti- 
austerity movements in 14 Eurozone states from 2007 to 2015, Joanna Rak 
develops an original typology of patterns of a culture of political violence to 
explain why some anti- austerity movements turned to violence and others did 
not, despite having shared goals and political values. She uncovers the very 
nature of the differences and similarities between cultures of political violence, 
identifies their sources, and determines their differing results. Simultaneously, 
she opens a discussion on the exploratory and explanatory utility of the category 
of a culture of political violence in the Social Sciences.
 Theorizing Cultures of Political Violence in Times of Austerity casts new light 
on the scholarly debate on cultures of political violence and anti- austerity violent 
behavior, making it a compelling read for scholars of political sociology, polit-
ical behavior, comparative politics, European politics, and sociology.
Joanna Rak is an assistant professor of Political Science and Journalism and the 
Chair of Political Culture at Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland. In 
2016 and 2017, she was a visiting researcher at CEU San Pablo University in 
Madrid. Her research interests are cultures of political violence, dynamics of 
radicalization, anti- austerity movements, political epistemic apparatuses, social 
mobilization, and cultural security. Her current research is on the culture of 
political violence dynamics of anti- austerity movements in Europe and con-
temporary Russian authoritarianism and totalitarianism.
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Introduction
Towards an Explanation for the Violent Behavior of  
Anti- Austerity Movements
After 2008, European governments were relentlessly undertaking austerity meas-
ures to come out of the global financial crisis and recover from its effects (Fuma-
galli and Lucarelli 2015; Hayes 2017; Kotz 2009). Austerity measures in the 
form of the deliberate deflation of domestic wages and prices through cuts to 
public spending were imposed to reduce the states’ debts and deficits, increase 
their economic competitiveness and restore what is called “business confidence” 
(Blyth 2013a; 2013b). Inevitably, the results of their implementation were 
socially noticeable (della Porta 2015; Grasso and Giugni 2015; Ventriss 2013) 
and contributed heavily to the occurrence of new social movements (Braun 
2013; McMenamin et al. 2015; Quaranta 2016; Seymour 2014) which swiftly 
became an influential player on a political scene.
 Anti- austerity movements proved to be more or less violent in different Euro-
pean states, and it was not clear why some of them turned to force, and others did 
not despite the shared experience with austerity policies, political values, and goals. 
The existing studies on anti- austerity movements have concentrated mainly on the 
relations between structural changes and the transpositions of social conflict pat-
terns (Cristancho 2015; Kriesi 2016; Perugorría et al. 2016; Ross 2016), the role of 
cultural and political representations in social conflict (Andretta et al. 2015; Freire 
et al. 2014; Karyotis et al. 2014), the mechanisms of the transpositions of interests 
and ideas into collective behavior (Saunders et al. 2015), the influence of social, 
political, and cultural conflict on anti- austerity movements’ effectiveness (Clarke 
and Newman 2012, 300; della Porta, 2012, 2015; Giugni and Grasso 2015a; 
Guzman- Concha 2015; Hylmö and Wennerhag 2015; Ketelaars 2015; Kriesi 2015), 
political economy- based interpretation of social mobilization (Císař and Navrátil 
2017), and the channels of diffusion of the ideas which constitute anti- austerity 
movements (della Porta and Mattoni 2015; Oikonomakis and Roos 2016; Smith 
2016; Teixeira et al. 2014). Those works contributed to our knowledge of why anti- 
austerity movements came into being, how the idea of their continuance spread over 
and far beyond Europe, and why they were relatively unique while comparing it 
with predecessors (Cinalli and Vasilopoulos 2015; Giugni and Grasso 2015b).
DOI: 10.4324/9781351205757-1
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 No research, however, has sought to explain why the initially self- described 
peaceful anti- austerity movements used mental and physical political violence in 
a public sphere and why they did it in richly varied ways (della Porta et al. 2017; 
Wearden 2012). Although it has been on the street because of world news that 
the attitudes towards the usage of force differed in Europe, we have not known 
why Slovaks and Estonians preferred to sing their way through hardship rather 
than fight bitterly like Greeks, Belgians, or Spaniards (Velmet 2014). Another 
puzzle has been the modes of the legitimation of turning to political violence by 
social movements. Not only has it been unclear to what extent and how they dif-
fered in the paradigms of violent behavior but also what exactly contributed to 
their very nature and those differences. In general, little has been done to shed 
light on the use of political violence by those movements.
 Current specialist literature has offered no comparative studies that identified 
dissimilarities and similarities between the violent behavior of particular move-
ments. It incentivized us to formulate a research question of how and to what 
extent the behavior was different and similar in the particular European states. 
Apart from explaining some violent incidents, the literature has not proposed 
explanations for general patterns of violent behavior that entered Europe. It 
aroused a next question of why the patterns had some features in common and 
differed in others. Although post- 2008 anti- austerity movements are a fairly new 
phenomenon, it was also appealing to learn if those various patterns of violent 
behavior resulted in either broadly based or same political consequences. On the 
one hand, looking for instant results seemed to be a slick way because of a 
limited and relatively short time perspective to assess the courses of action. It 
did not allow us to see the contention from a valuable historical perspective and 
prompted us to pose a question if it is possible at all to capture the immediate 
aftermaths of the activity of anti- austerity movements. On the other hand, it was 
tempting to resort to a rich and vast body of literature on political violence to 
test the explanatory power of models it offers on this particular research field 
involving recent events in the age of austerity. In fact, potentially useful theories 
have undergone testing no more than once, and thus they have not held out the 
promise of being something more than a description of a given political reality. 
Bearing in mind a threat of bias in the form of a self- fulfilling prophecy, it was 
of tremendous cognitive risk to choose one theory and build an explanation 
around it. Nonetheless, it did not counsel us against inquiring of what the reper-
cussions of anti- austerity violent activities were and how the repercussions dif-
fered in the states.
 The research questions inspired another review of the specialist literature. 
Whereas the first one had concentrated directly on state of the art of studies on 
anti- austerity movements, the second aimed to strike theories which would be 
forceful and comprehensive enough to identify similarities and dissimilarities 
between the violent behavior of social movements and explain their sources and 
results. Although the review found no theory of both exploratory and explan-
atory values, it finished with chasing down a poorly established category of a 
culture of political violence whose meaning and analytical value met general 
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searching criteria. The existing literature has contained several definitions, clas-
sifications, and explanatory models that made use of the category as either an 
explaining factor or a factor to be explained. Admittedly, no work has formu-
lated and implemented a holistic approach, but their elements have not been at 
odds, which implied that their careful elaboration might have resulted in a prom-
ising theoretical framework.
 Although different in many ways, the definitions of a culture of political viol-
ence have some essential features in common (An- na’im 2006; Ayele 2011; 
Kling 1963; Taylor 1981; Siniawer 2008). They put emphasis on a context in 
which political subjects use violence to achieve their goals within social struc-
tures. The subjects are shown in relationships of power and as legitimating and 
delegitimating themselves and others to perform political roles and to take 
advantage of violence by employing diversified strategies. The commitment of 
political violence is introduced as the measure that may take the variety of forms 
ranging from physical force to mental influence. Additionally, the intensity of 
violence is characterized as gradable and changeable. Those defining features 
arm a culture of political violence with a conceptual framework applicable to 
identify the details of violent behavior. The lenses of the category allow us to 
look at the relationships between anti- austerity movements and makers of auster-
ity measures. It involves going beyond a culture of political violence of anti- 
austerity movements and drifting towards observing a culture of political 
violence of stakeholders of anti- austerity movements. The stakeholders are polit-
ical subjects in relations with movements. They are the people who participate in 
their structures, take part in anti- austerity protests and other forms of move-
ments’ collective activities. This approach counts representatives of the state 
apparatus, mainly politicians, police officers, firefighters, employees of a public 
sector, government officials, and public media journalists who act as loyal sup-
porters of politicians or are perceived by movement participants as doing so. 
Although firefighters usually do not occupy politically relevant roles, they are 
figured in the category of the political subjects because movement participants 
linked them closely with state apparatuses and attacked over clashes in times of 
tensions on this account. The analytical relational perspective that embraces rela-
tions between the political subjects is indeed of higher exploratory power than a 
one- subject view as long as it shows the content of interactions between those 
who create contention (Alimi et al. 2015, 10). The content is the use of political 
violence, legitimation and delegitimation of its deployment and fulfilling polit-
ical roles, and reactions to the very activities.
 The literature review has also revealed the competing ways of applying the 
category of a culture of political violence as an explaining factor or a thing to be 
explained. They seemed to be more or less convincing but, thus far, none of 
them has analyzed social movements, which inhibited the chances to predict how 
they work while investigating the violent behavior of anti- austerity movements. 
The possible criteria for selection of the theories to be employed to drive hypo-
theses and a theoretical framework of the research were the extent of the plausi-
bility of frameworks and their theoretical elaboration. However, in those cases, 
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the research choices of likely explanatory power were limited and limited the 
potential of future research because the solutions breaking forth were unaccept-
ably discretionary and blatantly subjective to approach the understudied phe-
nomenon. There also appeared an urgent need not to follow out own research 
inclination, a citation index of the pieces of work, and opinions about their 
impact in the field. Additionally, it was not obvious how the theories compete in 
their methodological correctness and empirical effectiveness which is how well 
they perform while exploring and explaining what happens in political reality. In 
other words, it was much more riveting to test them all, including seemingly the 
least compelling theories, rather than only some favorites so as not to lose a 
chance for carrying out a comprehensive analysis. It resembled a quest for enjoy-
ing horse racing by watching all the runners rather than the one we gambled on. 
This approach, however, demanded to abstract methodically a set of theories to 
be tested from an existing body of specialist literature in order to avoid a 
selection bias.
Non- Traditional Research Design
In facing the methodological difficulties, at the research planning stage after the 
second literature review, a decision was made to propose and implement a non- 
traditional research design. Design engineering commenced with a thesis that a 
culture of political violence is a forceful theoretical category to explore and 
explain violent behavior in austerity- driven Europe. A presumption of the links 
between theory and reality guided the next methodological choices. The unique-
ness of the approach consists in employing methodological premises to the 
process of reviewing the existing literature instead of discussing just the high- 
ranking and the newest works in the field. Strictly speaking, the research begins 
with the literature review that is carried out according to a scrupulously deter-
mined set of methodological assumptions. The idea is to identify all the theoret-
ical frameworks of a culture of political violence that function in scientific 
circulation to discuss their methodological correctness and, most importantly, to 
test them empirically by working with case studies of the post- 2008 anti- 
austerity movements. It means that the research does not advantage any theoret-
ical approach but takes care over the verification of every relevant one. 
Anti- austerity movements are indeed a qualitatively new phenomenon, and as 
such, it is advisable to analyze them with the observance of due methodological 
diligence.
 This approach required setting a text corpus of academic works released in 
specialist books and journals to show the qualitative variety of theoretical 
approaches towards a culture of political violence. Although there is no univer-
sally accepted system of ranking for book and journal publishers, the most influ-
ential, meaningful for the research subject, and substantial for the development 
of science ones from among them are indexed in major academic databases and 
search engines. That is why this literature review includes the works in social 
sciences and humanities indexed in 47 of the largest databases and search 
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engines. It adopts two additional sources selection criteria to minimize a selec-
tion bias and the likelihood of omission of essential papers and to conduct a 
comprehensive review. The first one relates to books and makes use of the 
Socio- Economic and Natural Sciences of the Environment Research School’s 
(SENSE 2009) broad- based list which contains book publishers frequently con-
sidered by professionals in rankings. The literature review discusses works clas-
sified as refereed book publications by the world’s top of publishers. This class 
contains 11 publishing companies. The second criterion concerns scholarly jour-
nals and takes advantage of the International Scientific Institute’s (ISP 2016) top 
international publisher list formulated by a number of academic journals released 
by a company which embraces the most influential and led by experienced edit-
orial boards of publishing houses. The quantitative indicator allowed us to rank 
them, but a position on the list did not have an impact on the ranking of the 
papers under review. The literature review covers the first 20 publishers that put 
out journals devoted to social sciences and humanities. Then, the study applies a 
phrase searching technique to search for the studies containing the exact search-
ing phrase “culture of political violence” in each from among the mentioned 
sources. It analyzes the first 50 search results, arranged in order of relevance, out 
of all the search results in relation to the use of the category of a culture of polit-
ical violence. The works which just mention but neither define nor give it a func-
tion in the analysis are excepted from the further steps of the review because 
they fail to make a contribution to a theoretical framework of the category.
 The next step was to collate the search results according to a criterion of the 
function the category has in theories. The selection of four functions was con-
sistent with the research goals and, thereby, the review scrutinized definitions 
potentially useful to determine (i) the essential features of a culture of political 
violence, (ii) explanatory frameworks using the category as a thing to be 
explained to account for what contributes to cultures of political violence, (iii) 
explanatory frameworks employing a culture of political violence as a thing 
explaining other things for the purpose of accounting for the result of its emer-
gence, and (iv) classification models to detect the criteria for the distinction of 
cultures of political violence.
 Then, the construction of four sets of criteria for methodological correctness, 
applicable to critically evaluate the elements of theories under review, provided a 
framework for a discussion on the search results collated into four sections. The 
first section gathers and analyzes those works which introduce the semantic fields 
of a culture of political violence by stating what it is and how researchers under-
stand it. It exclusively focuses on definitions and distinctive features of this cat-
egory. The following problems explore the semantic fields: what types of meanings 
are attached to a culture of political violence? By what criteria are these types dis-
tinguishable? To what extent are definitions of a culture of political violence 
correct? What is the extent of their applicability to empirical analyses as the ana-
lytical tools? It is of vital importance to assess whether definitions have the capa-
bility to work above and beyond the scope of concrete papers and how they 
contribute to an operationalizable definition and a conceptual framework of the 
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category. Every single conceptual construction of a culture of political violence 
undergoes a critical scrutiny according to the same set of criteria elaborated espe-
cially for this study. This part of the review seeks to inform theoretically an empir-
ical study of the characteristics of cultures of political violence that entered Europe 
in the scope of the identification properties expressed by similarities and dissimi-
larities among their patterns.
 The second section of the review takes into consideration the explanatory 
frameworks based on the assumption that an indicator or a set of indicators 
accounts for a culture of political violence. An explanatory framework is under-
stood as a description and explanation of why a being, phenomenon, process, 
configuration of those, or lack thereof is the way it is or how and why it works. 
It stands in for the full explanation of an issue in question unless a full and 
effective explanation exists. The following problems structure the scrutiny of 
this subject field: what types of explanatory frameworks are employed to explain 
sources of a culture of political violence? To what extent are explanatory frame-
works formulated correctly? What is the extent of their applicability to empirical 
analyses? Every single work identified in the process of searching literature, 
which offers a model for explaining how cultures of political violence come 
about, is critically analyzed according to the same original set of criteria formu-
lated especially for this analysis. The goal of this section is to discover what may 
make for cultures of political violence in Europe, particularly what qualities they 
have in common and how they differ. At this stage of the research process, the 
study did not adopt or reject models because of their extent of methodological 
correctness or estimated explanatory effectiveness. Instead, the next part of the 
research coping with this type of explanatory frameworks tested the models 
empirically in their current or modified forms with respect to the correctness cri-
teria if needed.
 The third section of the literature review draws attention to the explanatory 
frameworks that capture unambiguously a culture of political violence presented 
as an explaining indicator of other things. The following problems address this 
subject field: what does a culture of political violence explain? To what extent 
are explanatory frameworks phrased correctly? What is an extent of their applic-
ability to empirical analyses? Let us emphasize, the difference between the 
second and the third section consists in the role of the category in the analyses 
striving for providing an explanation. Whereas the second concerns possible 
sources of cultures of political violence, the third deals with their feasible con-
sequences. Once again, every single theoretical contribution aspiring to build a 
model involving the category as an explaining factor of a being, phenomenon, 
process, configuration of those, or lack thereof is analyzed by the same original 
set of criteria elaborated especially for this analysis. This section aims to set 
what the outcomes of cultures of political violence may be and how those out-
comes mirror the similarities and dissimilarities between the cultures. In the later 
part of the research which relates to this type of explanatory frameworks, the 
models that use a culture of political violence as an explaining factor are tested 
empirically in their existing or amended shapes with respect to methodological 
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correctness if necessary. Here, just as in the second section, the models are dis-
cussed critically, but no framework is disdained or taken for granted. Instead, 
their explanatory effectiveness is to be verified afterward by working with case 
studies.
 Finally, the fourth section approaches classification schemes of a culture of 
political violence. The following problems organize the analysis of this subject 
field: what types of classification schemes of a culture of political violence are in 
the literature? Under what rules do researchers outline them? To what extent are 
they correct? What is the extent of their applicability to empirical analyses? 
Every single classification framework identified while searching the literature is 
scrutinized by the same set of criteria proposed especially for this study. The 
purpose of this section is to recognize how and to what extent cultures of polit-
ical violence may vary in what criteria. It fortifies the results of the first section’s 
analysis with an insight into the differences between the cultures, and it has an 
exploratory potential to boost the analysis of distinctive features of cultures of 
political violence in Europe.
 All the works under review are analyzed sternly and strictly in the line of the 
standardized sets of criteria. It shows the theoretical frameworks in the light of 
their methodological correctness but tells little about empirical effectiveness. An 
empirical analysis following the literature review evaluates their effectiveness. It 
does, however, double duty as it tests theories as well as explores and explains 
political reality. Accordingly, the further step of the research was to advance 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological perspectives, research prob-
lems, hypotheses, field, methods, techniques, and tools to state what and how the 
study addresses. Generally speaking, those methodological assumptions for 
empirical analysis were of vital importance to design a way for verifying an 
empirical effectiveness of the theories on the next step. The last step was the 
evaluation of research results.
Methodological Assumptions for Empirical Tests
The analysis draws upon a pragmatic rather than a paradigm- driven approach, so 
it states the research problems that need answers and then chooses methods for 
answering them (Punch 2014, 17). The structure of the problems guides the 
design and implementation of the methodological and theoretical premises 
(Evans et al. 2011). Ontological, epistemological, and methodological choices 
follow this assumption. First, ontology concerns the very nature of reality. The 
pragmatic ontological perspective enables us to see the political reality as inces-
santly negotiated and renegotiated more than constant and fixed. Second, epis-
temology relates to what the relationship between the researcher and the reality 
is and how she can generate acceptable knowledge (Punch 2014, 15). The prag-
matic epistemological point of view drives the researcher into trying to achieve 
intersubjectively the verifiable research conclusions by proposing and following 
methodological assumptions. The researcher cognizes the political reality with 
scientific methods, techniques, and devices because the objective recognition is 
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impossible and the subjective one does not provide her with exact results. Third, 
methodology concerns what methods can be employed for studying the reality. 
The pragmatic methodological perspective is free from the potentially biasing 
premise that there is a method being the only game in town applicable to 
approach social movements productively. Instead, the researcher eventually 
selects those qualitative, and quantitative in a pinch, methods which she esteems 
being the most appropriate and effective to solve particular research problems. 
In doing so, she is not confined to any paradigm- driven assumptions and gets 
away from a “methodolatry” trap.
 The analysis is, however, theory- driven throughout each stage of the research 
process. The use of the term “theory” ought not to be taken to mean that it 
applies to denote a unified theory due to the absence of such one in the field. 
Instead, the term is the framework or the set of concepts that have a descriptive, 
organizational, and explanatory value (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016, 21). The liter-
ature review and existing substantive theoretical approaches inform and inspire 
the research problems, hypotheses, conceptual frameworks, and explanations.
 The goals of the study are of both theory- verification and theory- generation 
nature. The first objective is to set down cultures of political violence of the 
stakeholders of the anti- austerity movements which entered Europe in the times 
of austerity in a way capturing similarities and differences between them. The 
similarities and differences that the clusters of European cases have in common 
are crucial for distinguishing between patterns because their particular configu-
ration creates the types of a culture of political violence. Second, the research 
aims at explaining the sources of the types. Third, it aims to account for the 
results of the types. The point is to investigate to what extent the sources and the 
results of the cultures of political violence are explainable by existing explan-
atory frameworks. Most importantly, to inquire into the roots of differences 
between the cultures and the meaning of those differences for the repercussions 
of the cultures.
 The research solves the three research problems to fulfill the aims: what pat-
terns of a culture of political violence did stakeholders of the post- 2008 anti- 
austerity movements have? To what extent do current explanatory frameworks 
explain why stakeholders of the post- 2008 anti- austerity movements had par-
ticular patterns of a culture of political violence? To what extent do current 
explanatory frameworks account for the results of patterns of a culture of polit-
ical violence had by stakeholders of the post- 2008 anti- austerity movements? 
The research questions that motivated this study inspired the research problems.
 Although one may look at the formulation of hypotheses in qualitative 
research as walking on thin ice (Punch 2014, 66), the research proposes hypo-
theses to organize a research process. Those involved are, however, general 
enough not to enforce an interpretation- orientation on the researcher and rigor-
ous sufficiently to delineate an analysis direction. Predicted answers to the 
research problems draw upon an extensive literature review and empirical data 
recognition. Research hypotheses are consistent with the problems: stakeholders 
of the post- 2008 anti- austerity movements might have had patterns of a culture 
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of political violence diversified with respect to the values of its essential fea-
tures: political subjects that deployed political violence, their mutual legitima-
tion to the deployment, modes of the legitimation of the use, an intensity of the 
use of physical political violence, and forms of political violence. Current 
explanatory frameworks probably to a low extent explain why stakeholders of 
the post- 2008 anti- austerity movements had particular patterns of a culture of 
political violence. Current explanatory frameworks probably to a low extent 
account for the results of patterns of a culture of political violence had by stake-
holders of the post- 2008 anti- austerity movements. Then, specific hypotheses 
deriving from given theories are introduced directly before their empirical tests. 
They examine a research field according to the theoretical and methodological 
premises.
 A research field indicates what exactly a subject of research interest is. Let us 
begin by defining an anti- austerity movement to throw light on the subject scope 
of the examination. Social movements are understood as conscious, collective, 
and organized efforts at a social change (Edwards 2014, 4), here, at the abandon-
ment of austerity measures, removing their results, and providing or restoring 
social well- being. They are not one- off events. Instead, they exist over some 
span of time by engaging in a conflictual issue with a particularly powerful 
opponent (Edwards 2014; Tilly 1999), here, the makers of austerity policies are 
mainly the European Union and governments. Movement participants work 
together to carry out, resist, or undo a social change. They share a collective 
identity and actively strive for an amendment of their social situation often by 
employing protest (Edwards 2014). Movements differ from other forms of con-
tentious politics in their configuration of sustained campaigns of claim- making, 
an exceptional set of claim- making performances, and concerted displays of sup-
porters’ worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (Tilly 2006, 182). In many 
states, but not in every single case, the activity of the post- 2008 anti- austerity 
movements indeed took the shape of political protests (Peterson et al. 2015; 
Sabucedo et al. 2017) organized to manifest opposition to austerity policies and 
solidarity with those who suffered from their establishment. The repertoire of 
collective action was, nonetheless, broader (McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly 2003). 
Apart from demonstrations, it embraced the creation of special- purpose associ-
ations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, marches, vigils, 
rallies, strikes, petition drives, attacks on the public and private property as well 
as on representatives of the chief opponent, statements to and in public media, 
activities in commercial and social media, performances, charivaris (also “shiv-
aree” or “rough music”), and pamphleteering (Tarrow 2013, 13). Yet, the 
research takes into account all the forms of political action undertaken not just 
exactly by anti- austerity movements (della Porta and Tarrow 2005; della Porta 
and Rucht 2015) but by all their stakeholders, with the object of discovering the 
paradigms of violent behavior which entered European states in the times of aus-
terity in the relational perspective. It seeks to find how the behavior was pro-
duced within the relations between the political subjects engaged in the 
collective action due to their roles in a political structure.
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 Let us move on towards temporal boundaries of the research field which were 
of relevance while gathering empirical material. The analysis covers political 
behavior initiated by the stakeholders of anti- austerity movements that acted in 
Europe between December 1, 2007, and December 31, 2015, and came out 
against government and European Union austerity programs more than once. 
December 1, 2007, is the initial caesura of the research field because then the 
recession triggered by the European debt crisis began (Canterbery 2015; Thomp-
son 2016). The crisis was an indirect underlying cause of a massive wave of 
public protests organized by the newly arisen anti- austerity movements in 
Europe. Government austerity measures imposed to battle the debt crisis threat-
ening common currency were the direct reason for those protests and the incep-
tion of the movements (della Porta 2015; Lucarelli 2012; Zamponi and González 
2017). Notably, the implementation did not take place at the exact moment in all 
the European states, which gave reasons to pitch on the more remote but 
common caesura. The research settles a broad temporal perspective just not to 
omit any event of consequence for the continuance of anti- austerity movements.
 The closing caesura is December 31, 2015, although many of the movements 
faded before (Genovese et al. 2016) and many awakened or reawakened over 
time (DW 2016; Fulton 2016; Kamdar 2016). Nevertheless, it was the first year 
when the economic situation of European states improved after the recession, 
i.e., an extent of fluctuation of international financial flow declined, an extent of 
real GDP increased, a lending rate of bonds decreased, and government austerity 
programs were quenched (Copelovitch et al. 2016). Therefore, the direct justi-
fication for the continuance of anti- austerity movements, which opposed to the 
consequences of austerity policies, lapsed. Thereby, the reason for their stake-
holders’ existence simply vanished as well. The caesurae are the time boundaries 
of the research field. In turn, its territorial scope involves the epicenter of the 
crisis (Genovese et al. 2016), the European states where anti- austerity move-
ments occurred. The subject matter research field is established by violent activ-
ities of relevant stakeholders of anti- austerity movements. The involved people 
form, therefore, the subject research field. Political violence ranging from a 
mental to physical kind is an indicator of violent behavior.
 Before delving analytically into the research field, preliminary research con-
tributed to the estimation of the availability and quality of the sources necessary 
and sufficient to solve the research problems, selection of research methods, 
techniques, and tools, and descriptive determination of case selection. The rela-
tional qualitative content analysis of specialist literature indicated that in one 
state, one movement existed because a collective identity was consistent within 
each anti- austerity movement in each state (Ancelovici 2015). Also, the analysis 
of all the 46 European states would be both uneconomic and ineffective. Hence, 
the research encompasses those observation entities which satisfy the following 
critical criteria: euro area states where anti- austerity movements were function-
ing between December 1, 2007, and December 31, 2015, and opposed to auster-
ity measures more than once. Significantly, the analysis embraces stakeholders 
of anti- austerity movements which were acting in the state whose markets were 
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directly stricken by the results of the European debt crisis. In the member states 
of the Eurozone, austerity measures were imposed by the European Union and 
governments, which created a common ground of experience for political sub-
jects. It was of vital importance to control the analysis for confounding factors. 
Thus, even if anti- austerity movements acted in some other states such as 
England where austerity policy was not EU- imposed, they were not included in 
the set of cases. Fourteen cases meet the selection criteria: Austria, Belgium, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Por-
tugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Italy. It means that the research covers all the pop-
ulace of the member states of the Eurozone where the new social movements 
made an appearance.
 The mode of the analysis is a result of research methods, techniques, and tools 
selection. The preliminary analysis of the sources prevented us from conducting 
surveys because this method would be ineffective as the past issues constitute the 
research field. A less expensive but also reliable method of secondary sources ana-
lysis proved to be useful to collect raw data needed to solve the research problems. 
Although it is time consuming because of a number, quality, and disparate loca-
tions of the pieces of secondary data, it is forceful enough to accelerate the dis-
covery process. Thereby, the research makes use of a qualitative method of written 
sources analysis. The need for conceptual qualitative content analysis follows this 
methodological decision. The pieces of data come from various sources because 
there is no comprehensive and credible database which encompasses crucial 
information on anti- austerity movements and indicators relevant for the theoretical 
framework established in the literature review (della Porta 2014; Lindekilde 2014; 
Mosca 2014a). The research techniques of data collection are the following: an 
analysis of secondary data gathered in the state police databases, reports, and 
records, the Eurostat, the Freedom House reports, the Global Gender Gap Reports, 
non- government organization databases; secondary literature on the stakeholders 
of anti- austerity movements and indicators involved in explanatory frameworks; 
and articles and visual materials published in public, commercial, and social 
media. The sources triangulation aims to generate as reliable data as possible.
 The major criterion for sources selection is their utility to verify the hypo-
theses effectively. Hence, the whole process of gathering the pieces of data is 
first and foremost purpose driven. According to the principle of theoretical sam-
pling, the theoretical developments that occurred in an analysis of the previously 
gathered data lead the following stages of data collection. The cycle of alterna-
tion between data collection and analysis does not stop at two repetitions. Rather, 
it stands until theoretical saturation is reached. In other words, until the new 
pieces of data are not introducing the exemplifications of new theoretical ele-
ments but instead are confirming what has already been discovered (Punch 2014, 
134). The attempts concentrate on gathering the data sets necessary and suffi-
cient to solve the research problems (Spangler 2016, 42). This procedure aims to 
provide us with data for verifying all the hypotheses.
 The research tools are: literature review instruction, sets of correctness cri-
teria of definitions, explanatory frameworks, and classification frameworks, 
12  Introduction
matrix of raw data, data- set observations, categorization key to content analysis, 
scales to interpret the research results, algebraic expressions to compute the 
values of time indicators, instruction to review the media of secondary data, 
typology of political subjects that used political violence, continuum of mutual 
legitimation to the use, model of the modes of the legitimation of the use, con-
tinuum of the intensity of physical political violence, and continuum of forms of 
political violence.
 The research makes use of a statistical analysis method to verify the specific 
theory- driven hypotheses. The Pearson correlation technique determines the type 
and strength of linear correlations between the explaining indicators and the 
indicators to be explained. There is also conducted a two- tail test to compute the 
statistical significance of the correlations. In turn, when there is no need to calcu-
late, the causal- process observations and critical discussion evaluate relations 
between indicators (Beck 2010; Brady and Collier 2004; Brady et al. 2006; 
Collier 2011; Collier et al. 2010). Choice of a set of methods, techniques, and 
tools heavily depends on a type of data either qualitative or quantitative as well 
as on a quest for research process optimization. Specific methodological assump-
tions are introduced in the following chapters directly before empirical tests.
 Let us link the discussion on the non- traditional research design and its meth-
odological basis. The first part of the research introduces the literature review 
which points out and methodologically assesses the theories of a culture of polit-
ical violence. This part of the research contributes to social sciences by propos-
ing how to create a new non- traditional research design built around a 
methodologically structured literature review. It allows a researcher to find the 
theories of potential exploratory and explanatory power while projecting a study 
of an understudied research field. Note should be taken, the problems that inform 
the literature review have a universal value and may be effectively applied to 
other studies as well. Although the four sets of correctness criteria for defini-
tions, two types of explanatory frameworks, and classification schemes aim here 
directly to analyze theories concerning cultures of political violence, their 
general applicability to assess the methodological correctness of theoretical 
approaches is much broader. In general, they are useful to analyze theories in 
social sciences, but they must not take the place of an empirical test because they 
are invulnerable to evaluate an empirical effectiveness. The particular sets of cri-
teria may be employed separately to analyze the respective elements of theories, 
but a researcher has to make a judgment what function some piece of model or 
model performs in a study and then to choose a set to analyze it. Accordingly, 
the problems and the four sets of correctness criteria make a contribution to 
social sciences by introducing an intersubjective, standardized, and a methodo-
logically founded way for critical evaluation of both theories and their selected 
components. Finally, the literature review is the first attempt to analyze compre-
hensively, systematically, and critically the current body of specialist literature 
concerning a culture of political violence.
 Critical discussion of definitions and classification frameworks paves the way 
for solving the three research problems. The second part of the research provides 
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the semantic universe of a culture of political violence and its types and 
addresses the empirical problem. Here, by drawing on state of the art, a culture 
of political violence is defined as a paradigm of using political violence in a 
political structure, set by the temporal, subject, and subject matter indicators. 
This paradigm indicates who takes advantage of the use of political violence, 
what their mutual legitimation to the usage is, how they justify and explain the 
deployment, what forms of political violence they employ, and what the intensity 
of physical political violence is. By drawing upon empirical material, the ana-
lysis identifies the patterns of cultures of political violence of stakeholders of the 
post- 2008 anti- austerity movements, determines similarities and dissimilarities 
between them, and formulates a typology. This part of the research contributes 
to political sociology by developing an operationalizable definition and a con-
ceptual framework of a culture of political violence. It employs them to conduct 
a qualitative comparative analysis of cultures of political violence that entered 
European states. The analysis shows the category as a variable that takes on the 
values that range from placid, through hector- led to militant patterns. It is a first 
endeavor to create a typology of cultures of political violence in the times of 
austerity.
 The next part of the research addresses the second problem by testing all the 
explanatory frameworks which recognize a culture of political violence as a 
thing to be explained. Those models under empirical evaluation come from the 
methodologically- structured literature review and show the ways for possible 
explanations. On the one hand, the study contributes to our knowledge of what 
triggered off particular patterns of a culture of political violence. On the other, it 
makes a contribution to studies on cultures of political violence in general by 
assessing an empirical effectiveness of the existing explanatory frameworks and 
by introducing new ways of testing theories. The added value of the study is a 
set of original databases presenting the theory- driven indicators for the states 
involved in the research.
 The last part of the research deals with the third research problem and also 
makes use of theories discussed in the literature review but focuses on those 
explanatory frameworks that treat a culture of political violence as a thing 
explaining other things. The analysis contributes to our knowledge of results of 
cultures of political violence. It also introduces an empirical effectiveness of 
current models for the Eurozone case studies.
 Indeed, this research is the first attempt to describe and systematically explain 
the movement stakeholders’ violent behavior in various state contexts, identify 
similarities and differences between them, and determine the sources and results 
of those critical features. Let us move on towards the structure of the book that 
shows how the research process spreads out over the subsequent chapters.
Structure of the Book
This volume is organized into an introduction, four chapters divided into 
subchapters, and conclusions. The introduction presents a non- traditional 
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research design and puts forward the methodological assumptions for the 
research. In particular, it reveals the research goals, temporal, territorial, subject, 
and subject matter field, problems, hypotheses, methods, techniques, and tools. 
The methodological choices that structure, organize, and fuel the discovery 
process are discussed and justified.
 The first chapter presents a comprehensive methodologically structured liter-
ature review of theoretical approaches towards a culture of political violence. 
Drawing on an original extensive set of methodological assumptions, it system-
atically and critically analyses current specialist literature concerning this cat-
egory: its semantic fields in the shape of definitions of the theoretical category, 
theories using a culture of political violence as a thing to be explained, theories 
treating a culture of political violence as a thing explaining other things, and 
classification schemes of the category. In other words, it sets a corpus of aca-
demic works released in specialist books and journals and then analyzes them in 
terms of methodological correctness. It allows us to evaluate to what extent the 
existing theoretical frameworks are correct and how they establish the scientific 
perception of the very nature of a culture of political violence. The discussion 
finishes with recommendations for the construction of a theoretical framework 
of the category.
 The review of substantive literature locates the research against the background 
of the body of studies on a culture of political violence. It is followed by three 
empirical chapters which are to contribute to the field empirically. The second 
chapter sheds light on the post- 2008 patterns of a culture of political violence in 
the member states of the Eurozone. It defines the core category as a paradigm of 
using political violence in a political structure, which is determined by the tem-
poral, subject, and subject matter indicators. Then, it formulates a conceptual 
framework of a culture of political violence that encompasses five critical indi-
cators: the political subjects that made use of political violence, mutual legitima-
tion to the use, modes of the legitimation of the use, intensity of physical political 
violence, and forms of political violence. The model is designed to uphold the 
validity of identification and comparisons between the states. Additionally, by 
working with the case studies of the post- 2008 violent behavior of stakeholders of 
14 anti- austerity movements, the framework undergoes a test. In establishing 
similarities and dissimilarities between the paradigms of using political violence, it 
elaborates the typology introducing values taken on by cultures of political viol-
ence of stakeholders of anti- austerity movements that entered the Eurozone. As a 
result, it solves the first research problem of what patterns of a culture of political 
violence stakeholders of the post- 2008 anti- austerity movements had.
 The third chapter fulfills an explanatory goal. It tests current explanatory 
frameworks of a culture of political violence by analyzing the post- 2008 inci-
dents in which anti- austerity movements’ stakeholders participated. There, the 
models which categorize a culture of political violence as a phenomenon to be 
accounted for are under scrutiny. The test is done for a theory- verification 
purpose to develop theories and for a theory- generation purpose to verify if and 
to what extent they explain why particular patterns of a culture of political 
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 violence emerged in the Eurozone of the age of austerity. Meanwhile, the ana-
lysis suggests adjustments to the existing models discussed within the literature. 
This chapter handles the second research problem of to what extent current 
explanatory frameworks explain why stakeholders of the post- 2008 anti- austerity 
movements had particular patterns of a culture of political violence.
 The last part of the empirical study checks for another aspect of a culture of 
political violence. The fourth chapter aims directly at verifying an empirical 
effectiveness of the current explanatory frameworks which put forward a culture 
of political violence as an explaining indicator of beings, phenomena, processes, 
and their configurations. It leads us to the modification and extensions of exist-
ing models identified in the literature review. The empirical study contributes to 
the field by mainly theory- verification attempts. This chapter addresses the last 
research problem of to what extent current explanatory frameworks account for 
the results of patterns of a culture of political violence had by stakeholders of the 
post- 2008 anti- austerity movements.
 The summary reveals the research results and introduces avenues for future 
studies of the research field. In particular, it weighs an extent of the hypotheses 
verification by discussing and summarizing arguments for and against the validity 
and plausibility of the final conclusions. It pays close attention to the courses and 
properties of modifications made within the current theoretical approaches towards 
the analytical category over empirical tests. Importantly, it shows the theoretical 
framework elaborated in the research process as a result of the theory- verification 
and theory- generation efforts. Last but not least, it comments on the nature of 
diversity and similarities between the cultures of political violence that entered the 
austerity- stricken member states of the Eurozone and identifies their sources and 
results. Simultaneously, it opens the discussion on the exploratory and explanatory 
utility of the category of a culture of political violence in social sciences.
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1 Theoretical Approaches towards 
Cultures of Political Violence
Methodological Assumptions for a Literature Review
The goal of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive review of theoretical and 
methodological approaches towards a culture of political violence. It establishes 
a text corpus of academic works released in the specialist books and journals 
which apply the category to scrutinize a social reality, and then it systematically 
and critically analyzes their theoretical frameworks by employing methodo-
logical assumptions. In doing so, it assesses to what extent the existing 
approaches are formally correct and how they contribute to our understanding of 
the nature, sources, and consequences of cultures of political violence.
 The uniqueness of the approach consists in applying methodological premises 
to the process of reviewing the existing literature and then making use of the 
results in an empirical part of the research. The idea is to identify all the theoret-
ical frameworks of a culture of political violence that function in scientific circu-
lation, to discuss their correctness, and to test their empirical effectiveness by 
working with the case studies of post- 2008 anti- austerity movements. It means 
that the research does not advantage any theoretical approach but takes care over 
the verification of every one. Anti- austerity movements are a qualitatively new 
phenomenon and as such they have to be analyzed with the observance of due 
methodological diligence. A quick overview of definitions of a culture of political 
violence shows that although they identify a symptomatic phenomenon, they fail 
to provide us with a comprehensive view of relevant and operationalizable fea-
tures of the movement’s violent behavior. Also, it would be a tremendous 
research risk to apply an explanatory framework that is currently fashionable, just 
seems to be the most appropriate, or is the most cited. As this chapter argues, it is 
important to see how well the existing approaches work and compete on the field 
of explanation. It allows us to observe the results of an application of the variety 
of theoretical frameworks and assess their exploratory and explanatory potential.
 First and foremost, the review establishes a text corpus to provide material for 
the literature review. Admittedly, there is no universally accepted system of 
ranking for book and journal publishers, but major academic databases and search 
engines contain papers that are the most influential, significant for the research 
subject, and contribute to the development of science (Krause 2001; McGinn et al. 
DOI: 10.4324/9781351205757-2
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2016). Hence, the review considers the works in social sciences and humanities 
indexed in the largest databases and search engines: Academic Search Complete, 
Anthropological Index Online, Anthropological Literature, APA PsycNET, ATLA 
Religion Database, AULIMP: Air University Library’s Index to Military Periodi-
cals, BASE: Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Current Contents, EconBiz, 
EconLit, ERIC: Educational Resource Information Center, GENESIS, Google 
Scholar, IngentaConnect, International Directory of Philosophy, Isidore, Jour-
nalSeek, JSTOR: Journal Storage, Jurn, LexisNexis, Lingbuzz, Mendeley, Micro-
soft Academic Search, NBER: National Bureau of Economic Research, OAIster, 
OpenSIGLE, Philosophy Documentation Center eCollection, Philosophy Research 
Index, PhilPapers, POIESIS: Philosophy Online Serials, POPLINE, Project 
MUSE, PsycINFO, Pubget, PubPsych, Questia: Online Research Library, RePEc: 
Research Papers in Economics, SafetyLit, ScienceOpen, Scopus, Socol@r: 
Socolar, SSRN: Social Science Research Network, SpringerLink, VET- Bib, Web 
of Science, WorldCat, and WorldWideScience.
 The review adopts two additional criteria for sources selection to minimize 
the likelihood of the omission of substantial works. The first one relates to books 
and makes use of Socio- Economic and Natural Sciences of the Environment 
Research School’s (SENSE 2009) broad- based list which embraces book pub-
lishers frequently placed by professionals in rankings. The list is divided into (1) 
refereed book publications published by (A) the world top of publishers, (B) the 
world’s semi- top of publishers, (C) other publishers and (2) non- refereed book 
publications published for (D) an academic public (professional publications) 
and (E) a non- academic general public. The studies published by the 2-category 
companies are of a relatively lower academic value and relevance than the 
1-category because of not being refereed (Torraco 2016), so, they are beyond the 
text corpus. The B- and C- publishers are also excluded from the corpus on 
the grounds of their lower academic meaning and extent of influence on the devel-
opment of disciplines. Additionally, the 1-category publishers which release 
studies falling outside the scope of social sciences and humanities are excluded 
from the corpus. Ultimately, the literature review includes studies in refereed 
books printed by the following A- publishers: Cambridge University Press, 
Columbia University Press, Harvard University Press, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, MIT Press, Oxford University Press, Princeton University Press, Stanford 
University Press, University of Chicago Press, and Yale University Press.
 The second criterion concerns scholarly journals and takes advantage of Inter-
national Scientific Institute’s (ISP 2016) top international publisher list formu-
lated by a number of academic journals released by the most influential 
companies and led by experienced editorial boards of publishing houses. The 
quantitative indicator allowed us to rank them, but a position in the list did not 
have an impact on the papers under review. The literature review covers the first 
20 publishers releasing journals devoted to social sciences and humanities. They 
are as follows: Elsevier, Springer- Verlag, Taylor and Francis, John Wiley and 
Sons, Sage Publications, Walter de Gruyter, Redalyc, Inderscience Publishers, 
Hindawi Publishing Corporation, Project MUSE, Cambridge Journals, Oxford 
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Journals, Revues.org, Emerald, African Journals Online, Scientific Research 
Publishing, Sabinet Online Ltd, SpringerOpen, Brill Academic Publishers, and 
IGI Global.
 Then, the review applies a phrase searching technique to search for the studies 
containing the searching phrase “culture of political violence” rather than any 
other phrases comprising a set of keywords “culture,” “political,” “of,” and 
“violence” put in random order. Finally, the analysis counts the first 50 phrases 
out of all the search results arranged in order of relevance. For the sake of 
clarity, it means that 50 search results are analyzed in the case of each database, 
search engine, and publishing house extracted for the review. Rarely was a 
number of searched results higher than 50 because a culture of political violence 
is an understudied phenomenon.
 The analysis deals with conceptual and, more broadly, theoretical dimensions 
of the category (Fawcett 2013, 285; Rak 2016). It collates the identified uses of 
the category according to a criterion of a function of a culture of political viol-
ence in a theoretical framework. Therefore, the review consists of four main 
parts from among each and concentrates on a different component of a theory in 
terms of a component’s function. They are a culture of political violence as a 
theoretical category, the category as a thing to be explained by other things, the 
category as a thing explaining other things, and the types of the category.
 The first part gathers and analyzes those works which present the semantic 
fields of a culture of political violence by describing what it is and how research-
ers understand it. It exclusively focuses on definitions and distinctive features of 
this category. The following problems explore the semantic fields: what types of 
meanings are attached to a culture of political violence? By what criteria are 
these types distinguishable? To what extent are definitions of a culture of polit-
ical violence correct? What is the extent of their applicability to empirical ana-
lyses as analytical tools? The review assesses whether definitions have the 
capability to work above and beyond the scope of concrete papers and how they 
contribute to an operationalizable definition and conceptual framework of the 
category. Every single conceptual construction of a culture of political violence 
undergoes a critical scrutiny according to the same set of criteria elaborated 
especially for this study.
 The second part of the review takes into consideration the explanatory frame-
works based on the assumption that an indicator or a set of indicators accounts 
for a culture of political violence. An explanatory framework is a description and 
explanation of why a being, phenomenon, process, configuration of those, or 
lack thereof is the way it is or how and why it works. It stands in for the full 
explanation of an issue in question unless the full and effective explanation 
exists. The following problems structure the scrutiny of this subject field: what 
types of explanatory frameworks are employed to explain sources of a culture of 
political violence? To what extent are explanatory frameworks correct? What is 
an extent of their applicability to empirical analyses?
 The third part of the review pays close attention to the explanatory frame-
works capturing unambiguously a culture of political violence presented as an 
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explaining indicator of other things. The following problems address this subject 
field: what does a culture of political violence explain? To what extent are 
explanatory frameworks phrased correctly? What is an extent of their applic-
ability to empirical analyses? Let us emphasize, the difference between the 
second and the third part consists in the role of the category in the analyses striv-
ing for providing an explanation. Whereas the second concerns possible sources 
of cultures of political violence, the third is about their likely consequences.
 Finally, the fourth part approaches classification schemes of a culture of polit-
ical violence. The following problems organize the analysis of this subject field: 
what types of classification schemes of a culture of political violence are in the 
literature? Under what rules do researchers outline them? To what extent are 
they correct? What is the extent of their applicability to empirical analyses?
 Those works that just mention a culture of political violence but do not offer 
any references to its meaning (e.g., Knight and Narozhna 2005; Ncube and 
Okeke- Uzodike 2015) are beyond the analysis because they fail to formulate 
definitions or explanatory and classification frameworks for scrutiny.
Semantic Fields of Cultures of Political Violence
The first part of the analysis deals with the semantic fields of a culture of polit-
ical violence expressed by definitions and distinctive features of the category. A 
definition is a specification of a meaning of the term that is neither true nor false 
(Opp 2009, 31). The review analyzes this subject field with the five problems 
head- on. The first one pertains to the senses given to the category in the liter-
ature, and it investigates what types of meanings are attached to a culture of 
political violence. To do so, it collects the definientia of “culture of political 
violence”. Each definition consists of the definiens (plural: definientia) and the 
definiendum (plural: definienda). The definiens is the word or words serving to 
define another word or expression. So, it is a defining part of a definition. The 
definiendum is a word or expression that is being defined. Each definiens consti-
tutes a semantic field of the definiendum by stating the designata (singular: des-
ignatum) (Rodriguez- Priego et al. 2013). The designatum means a property 
contributing to the meaning of the category. The designata indicate the types of 
meanings attached to a culture of political violence.
 The second problem addresses on the basis of what criteria those types are 
distinguishable. To solve this problem, the review puts the meanings in typologi-
cal generality order and identifies the essential and distinctive features of the 
given meanings. If the meaning has mutated, it may be advisable to establish the 
chronological order of approaches towards the distinctive features of a culture of 
political violence to capture how they have evolved.
 The third problem concentrates on the correctness of definitions and tests to 
what extent are definitions of a culture of political violence correct? A definition 
is correct if it meets the following set of criteria: (1) it determines the designata 
which are necessary and sufficient to count the thing which is characterized 
by these designata among the meaning scope of a culture of political violence 
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(Podsakoff et al. 2016, 11); (2) it is operationalizable, namely, it is feasible to 
translate a culture of political violence into measurable variables (Meter et al. 
1987) because it has empirical content (Opp 2009, 13); (3) it is not contextual, 
i.e., the definiens is independent of time and space contexts; (4) the definiens is 
not replaced by examples but it has a precisely stated meaning; (5) the designata 
are not in contradiction with the reverse of a culture of political violence; (6) it is 
not value- laden; (7) it is not normative, i.e., it involves neither demand for 
making the world a better place in a particular way nor an answer to a question 
of how it should be (Ackermann 1964, 522); and (8) it is internally consistent. 
The higher the extent of the criteria fulfillment by a definition is, the higher the 
extent of its correctness is.
 The fourth problem relates to the applicability of definitions to studies and 
focuses on to what extent definitions of a culture of political violence are applic-
able to empirical analyses as the analytical tools. Hence, on the grounds of the 
correctness of particular definitions, the review assesses whether and under what 
conditions they apply to obtain research results in an intersubjective and diligent 
way. When the conditions are under evaluation, a definition locates on a contin-
uum set by the extreme points of generalness and contextuality. When a defini-
tion is contextual, the continuum serves as a scale to assess to what extent this 
feature is firmly attached to a semantic field of the category. The review also 
examines definitions in terms of properties of research fields and analytical 
levels they may explore. It enables us to determine a current range of explora-
tory of potential a culture of political violence.
 Application of the methodological assumptions to a search process resulted in 
discovering five analytical attempts to formulate definitions of a culture of polit-
ical violence and to construct its conceptual frameworks (An- na’im 2006; Ayele 
2011; Kling 1963; Siniawer 2008, 2012; Taylor 1981). Each of them draws on 
the assumption that acceptance of the use of violence or political violence in the 
past, in the here and now, or acquiescence to it in the future followed by the 
deployment allows a researcher to verify the occurrence of a culture of political 
violence. It undermines, however, the validity of building the term of culture 
into the semantic field of the category because it rules out the possibility of the 
existence of the continuum of stances towards the use of violence. In the line of 
the authors, a culture of political violence occurs or not everywhere, and it is the 
same everywhere. Nevertheless, empirical research provides the evidence for the 
existence of the more or less violent societies representing different patterns of a 
culture of political violence (Karstedt 2012; Steenkamp 2014; 2009). We 
premise that, first, expressions of a culture of political violence differ in an 
extent of acceptance, and, second, non- acceptance of the employment of viol-
ence indicates a different culture of political violence than the one based on a 
full acceptance. The existing approaches (An- na’im 2006; Ayele 2011; Kling 
1963; Siniawer 2008, 2012; Taylor 1981) miss the first part of the premise and 
close the door on comparing diversified phenomena. Indeed, the researchers who 
stand for the application of a culture of political violence to comparative studies 
might want to consider formulating some antinomic category, such as a culture 
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of political non- violence. However, it is important to assume that these cat-
egories are of gradable nature when we aim at identifying similarities and dis-
similarities between the expressions of the categories.
 The definitions offer a relational understanding of public power. It means that 
political subjects of violent behavior – if introduced – are those functioning in 
the relation of public power: the ruling, the aiming at the ruling, and the ruled. 
The attitudes towards violence or political violence are the subject matter. They 
are, however, undefined in the existing theoretical approaches to a culture of 
political violence. Similarly, the subject matter of these attitudes, violence or 
political violence respectively, also remain puzzling. Overall, the crucial com-
ponents of the definitions have unspecified semantic fields, which obscures how 
the category is understood. Their essential features should be determined to 
specify what criteria are sufficient and necessary to recognize something as an 
empirical expression of the category and to contribute to the operationalization 
of definitions. An exploratory potential of the approaches is considerably 
reduced because they omit a role of forms of aggressive behavior, the threat, 
abandonment of the use, and mental political violence. It hinders a researcher 
from seeing the paradigms of deploying violence comprehensively.
 Let us take a closer look at the definitions by analyzing them with the already 
introduced problems. The first by Merle Kling describes a culture of political 
violence as political behavior which is manifestly violent and acceptance of viol-
ence as a legitimate means for the pursuit of power (Kling 1963, 121). Kling 
determines the subject matter semantic field of a culture of political violence 
with its three essential features. The designatum is in contradiction with the 
reverse of a culture of political violence. First, Kling identifies a culture of polit-
ical violence with the political behavior which may be ex definitione one- time. 
Maintaining that the behavior is a culture is, therefore, unjustified in terms of the 
methodological and theoretical effectiveness of the approach. Furthermore, the 
location of a culture of political violence in a behavioral sphere by making it an 
equivalent of political behavior calls the use of the category of culture into ques-
tion. Thus, the definition is not consistent internally.
 Second, Kling assumes that the acceptance of violence as a legitimate tool to 
come to power is an essential feature of a culture of political violence (Kling 
1963, 121). The mechanism of acceptance is located in an awareness sphere as a 
result of its very nature. The theoretical model under scrutiny does not introduce, 
however, whose awareness should be evaluated to reach conclusions on the key 
category. The definition avoids establishing unambiguously who accepts the use 
of violence by whom. In assuming the consistency of the subjects in the 
approach, one may state that a perpetrator is a person who strives for being a 
ruling subject and simultaneously this person accepts political violence as a 
device. Nevertheless, it is unjustifiable to remove from the meaning scope of the 
category of a political subject matter its essence – the relation between the ruling 
and the ruled. The relationship indicates the political dimension of violence. The 
role of society in creation, consolidation, and decline of a culture of political 
violence is neither circumscribed nor considered by Kling. This part of the 
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 definition demands to have specified the relationship between the subjects that 
deploy and approve political violence.
 Third, in making up his model, Kling separately captures behavior and acqui-
escence to behavior in the category’s semantic field (Kling 1963, 121). Never-
theless, a culture has a broader meaning than the behavior and encompasses it 
(della Porta 1995; Patterson 2014). The essential features of Kling’s category are 
not entirely separate (Kling 1963, 121) because the acquiescence to the employ-
ment of violence precedes the act of violence and, simultaneously, it is neither 
the element, the indicator, nor the type of the use of political violence (Bell et al. 
2013). Those who seek to be the ruling subjects and the setting of the relation of 
power have indeed separate semantic fields. The extent of the definition’s preci-
sion is also reduced by the ontologization of power and not introducing a type of 
power. Kling avoids determining the subject field of his approach and thus 
undermines the extent of its applicability to empirical research. According to the 
criteria, the approach is of low extent of correctness and applicability in its 
existing form.
 In the next of the approaches, Stan Taylor entirely equates a culture of polit-
ical violence with a tradition of violence (Taylor 1981, 170). Just like Kling’s 
approach, the designatum is in contradiction with the reverse of a culture of 
political violence and the definition is internally inconsistent. Taylor makes 
equal the two qualitatively and semantically different theoretical categories. In 
doing so, Taylor does not detail the essential features of the one being, the defin-
iens. Besides, the limitation of a culture’s semantic field to one of its elements – 
a tradition – is amply unjustified. This is as unjustified as the semantic reduction 
of a tradition’s predicate, i.e., violence, consisting in putting political violence in 
the definiendum and locating violence in the defining expression. This definition 
is worth rethinking and reformulating because it does not meet the correctness 
criteria. Finally, the definiens is immeasurable, which imposes a considerable 
limitation on the approach’s applicability to studies on a culture of political 
violence.
 In turn, Abdullahi Ahmed An- na’im defines a culture of political violence as 
the capacity of perpetrators to use terrorist acts and the willingness of the wider 
population to tolerate such violent behavior. He claims that it indicates the dis-
regard for the safety and well- being of others (An- na’im 2006, 796). There, in 
contrast to Kling’s and Taylor’s approaches, the designatum is not in contradic-
tion with the reverse of a culture of political violence and the definition is inter-
nally consistent.
 An- na’im’s assumes that the analysis of a culture of political violence demands 
to delve into an awareness sphere. The first part of the definiens concentrates on 
the ability to initiate and carry out violent behavior. The ability constitutes, 
however, purely and simply some predisposition that is its potential hallmark. 
Having this competence does not mean, and does not have to lead to, the use of 
violence in tandem. Worth stressing is that the meaning scope of political violence 
is there narrowed down to terrorist acts (Armborst 2010). The other types of polit-
ical violence are thereby excluded from the approach on no evidence.
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 The second part of the defining expression of An- na’im’s definition focuses 
on the identifiable readiness to accept terrorist acts (An- na’im 2006, 796). In 
pointing out passive acceptance as an essential feature of the category, the author 
excludes from its semantic field the possibility and consequence of political 
mobilization. In fact, An- na’im’s does not take into consideration the popula-
tion’s active political participation in initiating and carrying out a contentious 
collective action. In doing so, he unwarrantably rejects the assumption about the 
transposition potential of the tolerance of political violence as an essential 
feature of a culture of political violence (Kalmoe 2014). Yet, unlike Kling, An- 
na’-im considers a social indicator.
 The last part of An- na’im’s definiens introduces two types of the indications 
of the occurrence of a culture of political violence that are neglecting security 
and the well- being of only this part of the population which disapproves of ter-
rorist acts (An- na’im 2006, 796). It means indeed that the results of the occur-
rence of a culture of political violence for commonality, including this part of 
the population which accepts terrorist acts, their perpetrators, and those who are 
able and prone to be perpetrators are disregarded. Overall, the limitations of the 
approach reduce its correctness and applicability to empirical research.
 Then, Eiko Maruko Siniawer defines a culture of political violence as a 
context in which the use of physical force is viewed by political actors as 
a viable and acceptable strategy. It is dynamic and altering but helps perpetuate 
a violent brand of politics (Siniawer 2008, 2, 75, 2012, 629). There, just as in 
An- na’im’s definition, the designatum is not in contradiction with the reverse of 
a culture of political violence and the definition is internally consistent. In line 
with this approach, a context in which political actors consider the use of phys-
ical violence to be an acceptable game plan is a culture of political violence. The 
nature of the strategy, the game plan, determines the analytical level of the polit-
ical process which is the content of the category of a culture of political violence 
(Wood 2016). The absence of any predicate of the strategy contributes to the 
extension of the category’s semantic field to a vague content and size. It is a 
result of not circumscribing its boundaries. Siniawer clarifies neither what 
strategy has a high extent of relevance for the definiendum nor what the essential 
features of the context are. Instead, he sets the context forth as dynamic and 
changing but helping maintain politics which is marked by the use of violence 
(Siniawer 2008, 2, 75, 2012, 629). Nevertheless, in focusing entirely on the pro-
ductive violence, Siniawer does not take into account the destructive violence, a 
result of relations between political violence and politics in general (Ayyash 
2013), which reduces the scope of the category’s applicability to studies. Sini-
awer also avoids offering the model of context dynamics and the trajectory of 
changes.
 In keeping with Siniawer, the context is the condition of politics, in which 
violence is employed to achieve political goals. The relations of power between 
the ruling subjects, between the ruled subjects, and between the ruling and the 
ruled subjects draw upon violent behavior. Violence is the instrument for deter-
mining the scope of liberties and duties of political subjects and for creating, 
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protecting, and distributing public goods, including public security. As Siniawer 
shows, the identification of the use of physical violence as the object of percep-
tion of political subjects allows a researcher to verify the occurrence of a culture 
of political violence. The very use of violence does not determine, therefore, the 
trajectory of a continuance of a culture of political violence. It points out that the 
possibility of the use of Siniawer’s category in its current form to conduct empir-
ical research is considerably limited by its relatively low extent of formal 
correctness.
 The last of the identified definitions, as the only one, is contextual in terms of 
a territorial criterion (Ayele 2011, 226) because its definiens is not independent 
of a space context. Hence, it is marked by a lower extent of abstraction and 
theoretical generalization than the other approaches, which reduces its applic-
ability to empirical research (Floyd 2016). Negussay Ayele introduces a culture 
of political violence as an intrinsic and inevitable reality in Ethiopia. As Ayele 
reckons, it is the normative mode of exercising political power in the country’s 
history. In this case, the designatum is in contradiction with the reverse of a 
culture of political violence and the definition is inconsistent internally. The 
socially accepted employment of political violence to attain, use, and perpetuate 
power in the state is the distinctive feature of this mode. Moreover, the power 
seekers or power brokers avoid raising and discussing the question of the legiti-
macy of authority in this political context. According to Ayele’s approach, 
claimants to power are aware that they have to wrest power by force of arms and 
no one stints them or acknowledges the exercise of political violence as illegiti-
mate or immoral.
 After removing all the direct references to Ethiopia from Ayele’s approach, it 
becomes possible to isolate an array of essential features of a culture of political 
violence. Ayele identifies the category with, first, a reality. This feature is, 
however, neither necessary nor sufficient to verify the existence of a culture of 
political violence. It only points out that the author strives to underline the com-
monness of political violence in the Ethiopian context. Second, a culture of polit-
ical violence is a specific normative mode of ruling in the history of the state. 
Nevertheless, Ayele avoids discussing the implications of normativity in relation 
to a culture of political violence and thus the types of relationships between the 
category’s parts remain undetailed. One may merely suppose that the very nature 
of this mode of the ruling is establishing compulsory standards, falling within 
the standards, and being determined by them.
 Ayele, just like Kling (1963, 121), ontologizes power and totally abandons 
defining its type (Ayele 2011, 226–227). Power is situated in relation to power 
in the state. Indeed, this relation consists in generating the socially accepted use 
of political violence for the purpose of rising to power, wielding authority, and 
maintaining power in the state. Ayele, not unlike Siniawer (2008, 2; 75, 2012, 
629), builds the notion of context into the definition of a culture of political viol-
ence. In contrast to Siniawer, however, he does not identify it with a culture of 
political violence, and he limits the scope of its meaning strictly to its political 
dimension. According to Ayele, a political context is composed with the agency 
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of this relation which grows out of the social acceptance of violent behavior under-
taken to achieve political goals. Noteworthy, in the context, the political subjects 
taking part in the processes of political decision making exclude from public dis-
course the questions of legitimation, relegitimation, delegitimation, and redelegiti-
mation of power. The questions are beyond a political agenda setting.
 The next implications of the context are the established rules of political 
elites’ turnover. As Ayele emphasizes, those who make efforts to become the 
ruling subjects are aware of the necessity to employ physical violence to change 
their role in a political structure. The use of armed forces is unrestrained for 
those who deprive the ruling subjects of their role and take it over. Nevertheless, 
the reduction of the model in the scope of the means of violent behavior to 
armed forces is not theoretically informed because an array of means other than 
armed forces that may be applied to achieve this goal is broad (Hanneman 1985). 
The freedom of the use of armed forces consists in the lack of restrictions in the 
use of violence in the simultaneous widespread social acceptance and legitimiz-
ing the deployment of violence in a public sphere. Logically inconsistent is to 
bring the ruling subject to her role and to ontologize power in the definition 
because the first option means assuming taking part for the consequence of the 
existence of the relation of power, concretely for this facet of the relation of 
power which encompasses relationships between the ruling and the ruled. Ontol-
ogization, on the other hand, follows the assumption that power is a subject. The 
colloquial use of the notion of power is incompatible with a research need for 
considering its structural relational nature. Taking into account the arguments, 
one may state that Ayele’s analytical approach is of a relatively low extent of 
correctness and applicability to empirical research in its current form.
 The analysis of the literature has shown that the category of a culture of polit-
ical violence is determined by remarkably diverse semantic fields. Each attempt 
to construct the category consists in generating a completely different designa-
tum. They are the configuration of the use of political violence and the accept-
ance of violence as a legitimated means to take on the role of the ruling subject 
(Kling 1963), the tradition of violence (Taylor 1981), the configuration of per-
petrators’ abilities to organize terrorist acts, the readiness of the majority of a 
given population to accept those acts, and the disregard for security and wealth 
of those people who form the remaining part of the population (An- na’im 2006), 
the context in which the use of political violence is acceptable (Siniawer 2008; 
2012), and the involved and inevitable reality in Ethiopia and a normative mode 
of ruling in the history of the state (Ayele 2011).
 None of them defines closely a comprehensive set of designata which is 
necessary and sufficient to count what is characterized by these designata among 
the meaning scope of a culture of political violence. In addition, they are not 
operationalizable and it is feasible to translate a culture of political violence into 
measurable variables to a highly limited extent. Fortunately, however, examples 
restricting an exploratory value of definitions replace no definiens. It means that 
they may explore more and different examples than the ones investigated by the 
authors. They are also neither normative nor value- laden. Although an extent of 
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applicability of the five variants of the theoretical category in their current forms 
is low, they introduce an array of essential features relevant to identify a culture 
of political violence in a political reality. These are the types of relationships 
between political violence and the elements of a political structure and public 
goods as a subject matter of violent behavior. They also suggest linking the cat-
egory with the deployment of excessive political violence.
 Worth bearing in mind is that the number of definitions of a culture of polit-
ical violence which function in the specialist literature is extremely low. The 
semantic fields are authorial and usually intuitively outlined. The particular 
authors do not cite each other, and they develop their approaches independently. 
Putting the definitions in chronological order (Rocco and Plakhotnik 2009) 
would be then cognitively ineffective. Although the conceptual frameworks 
show some directions of thinking about the distinctive features of the category, 
they also indicate to what extent, and in what terms the research area is 
understudied.
Explaining Indicators of Cultures of Political Violence
This part of the analysis discusses the explanatory frameworks which aim 
directly to explain the sources of cultures of political violence. The four prob-
lems are utilized to study this subject field. The first one seeks to present what, 
according to the existing literature, explains the occurrence of a phenomenon. 
Thereby, it pays close attention to what types of explanatory frameworks are 
employed to explain the sources of a culture of political violence. A culture of 
political violence is the explanandum (plural: explananda) which is explicated 
through its explanans (plural: explanantia). Whereas the explanandum is a thing 
to be explained, and the explanans is an explaining thing. In other words, each 
explanans is a set of statements clarifying a property or an occurrence of a being, 
phenomenon, process, their configuration, or lack thereof in the explanandum 
(Nowak 2007, 352). The review sets down the sources of a culture of political 
violence stated in the literature, organizes them in subject order to determine the 
spectrum of a culture of political violence explanations, and recognizes the types 
of explanatory frameworks proposed by the authors.
 The second problem sheds considerable light on the structures of the 
explanantia, and it asks about to what extent are explanatory frameworks 
correct? An explanatory framework of a culture of political violence is entirely 
correct if it meets the following set of criteria: (1) it determines a cause and 
effect relationship between the explanandum and the explanans, i.e., it consists 
of general sentences expressible in the form of the zero or the first conditional 
sentences and its apodosis (the consequence) comprises a sentence declaring the 
occurrence of an event or phenomenon to be explained or describing a property 
being explained, (2) it contains the individual sentences which declare that the 
events designated by a protasis or protases (the condition) of general sentences 
happened (Nowak 2007, 352), (3) it is operationalizable and thus verifiable, (4) it 
is not value- laden, (5) it is not normative, (6) it does not offer the statements in 
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the form of the second, the third, and the mixed conditional (a mixture of the 
second and the third conditionals) sentences, and (7) it is internally consistent. 
The greater the extent of the criteria fulfillment by an explanatory framework is, 
the higher the extent of its correctness is.
 The third problem concerns the employment of explanatory frameworks to 
studies and asks about the extent of their applicability to empirical analyses. The 
review examines the essential features of the research fields and analytical levels 
they may explore, and it evaluates whether and under what conditions they may 
achieve research results intersubjectively and thoroughly. The highly applicable 
explanatory framework ought to, first, be capable of accounting for a relatively 
broad range of beings, phenomena, and processes. Second, it should explain 
which phenomenon from a given class of phenomena occurs as a result of the 
occurrence of particular factors (Opp 2009, 24). The more specific and detailed 
the description of causal relations between an explaining indicator or a set of 
explaining indicators and an issue to be explained is, leading to a high accuracy 
and precision of the explanation, the bigger the extent of applicability of the 
framework is (Risjord 2005). Also, the broader the range of the model applica-
tion is, the more informative the model is (Opp 2009, 25). When theories address 
specific groups or types of individuals, we lose the opportunity to learn anything 
about other groups or individuals (Opp 2009, 25). Therefore, the review scruti-
nizes explanatory frameworks employable to studies in terms of the possibility 
of driving their reach up.
 The literature offers 11 explanatory frameworks of a culture of political viol-
ence (Ayele 2011; Dexter and Guittet 2014; Eubank and Weinberg 2000; Ger-
warth 2011; Kling 1963; LaPorte and Worley 2008; Okwong 2012; Onslow 
2011; Pensado 2013; Theobald 1999; Waldman 2007). They compete for the 
ways of a culture of political violence explanation, but they do not claim to be 
full explanations (Daigneault and Béland 2015). Each of them starts with the 
premises that a culture of political violence is non- gradable and the acceptance 
of the use of violence points out its emergence. Moreover, they all draw on an 
unwritten assumption that unless an explaining indicator or a set of explaining 
indicators occurs, a culture of non- violence exists. They significantly differ, 
however, in their views on the indicators or the sets of indicators contributing to 
a culture of political violence.
 Negussay Ayele avoids formulating a universal theoretical framework of a 
culture of political violence (Ayele 2011, 216–217). Instead, he limits his 
approach to the Ethiopian political context by claiming that the basic defining 
dimensions of the persistent culture of political violence in Ethiopia (1769–2009) 
are intrastate, regional, and colonial indicators. Intrastate elements of political 
violence involve vicious struggles for the pinnacle of political power by aspir-
ants of collective political subjects such as ethnic groups or inhabitants of geo-
graphical entities. A rivalry between regions and colonization of the land 
determine the second and the third indicators respectively. All the indicators are 
operationalizable, and thus their existence is verifiable. The relations between 
the explaining indicators and a culture of political violence are operationalizable 
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and thereby verifiable as well. They constitute an internally consistent model. 
According to Ayele, if the configuration of the three indicators occurs, a culture 
of political violence emerges. Thus, the framework determines a cause and effect 
relationship between the explanandum and the explanans. It consists of the 
general sentences expressible in the form of the zero conditional sentences, and 
its apodosis comprises the sentences declaring the occurrence of the explaining 
phenomena. The in- depth outlined relation between the explaining indicators and 
a culture of political violence arms the framework with applicability to empirical 
research.
 On the grounds of the detailed analysis of rising to power, mode of rule, 
transfer of rule in Ethiopia in 1769–2009, Ayele stakes out the interplay of 
forces and indicators in the creation and consolidation of Ethiopia’s culture of 
political violence. The explanatory framework contains the individual sentences 
which declare that the events designated by the protasis of the general sentences 
happened. They are, however, the model’s limitation. According to Ayele, the 
sources of colonial violence which emerged on the subsequent analytical levels 
are the following: (1) rise to power: Tigre rebel became Emperor Yohannes IV 
with British support; Menyelek II of Shewa became Emperor Italians in Asmera; 
Benito Mussolini invaded and occupied Addis Abeba; the British escorted 
Emperor to Addis Ababa; Cold War drew USA/USSR to Ethiopia; the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF ) and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Move-
ment (TPLF ) occupied Addis Ababa and Asmera, supported by Sudan and the 
United States; (2) mode of rule: Somalia invaded Ethiopia; Meles Z. carried on 
ethnic- based reign of terror in Ethiopia TPLF invaded Somalia; and (3) transfer 
of rule: Sudanese dervishes behead Emperor Yohannes IV in Metemma; Ethio-
pian patriots defeated and ousted Italians with some British support; USSR and 
USA carried on proxy Cold War in Somalia/Ethiopia; Eritrea seceded EPLF vs. 
TPLF border war. Intrastate and regional political violence are treated altogether 
and thereby their joint sources are as follows: (1) rise to power: Mussolini 
invaded and occupied Addis Abeba; Military group (Derg) under Major Meng-
istu H.M. took over; and EPLF and TPLF occupied Addis Ababa and Asmera, 
supported by Sudan, the United States; (2) mode of rule: Ras Teferi and sup-
porters launched coup d’etat; semi- feudal, more centralized rule; brutal Italian 
fascist violence and protracted resistance by Ethiopians; H.S.I. restored central-
ized rule; centralized military rule, continuous internal wars; Somalia invaded 
Ethiopia; and Meles Z. carried on ethnic- based reign of terror in Ethiopia TPLF 
invaded Somalia; and (3) transfer of rule: Gonder rebel Kassa subdued warlords; 
British invasion of Ethiopia; suicide of Emperor Tewodros; violent overthrow of 
ruler by Kassa M; Sudanese dervishes behead Emperor Yohannes IV in 
Metemma; Lij Iyassu ousted, jailed; Ethiopian patriots defeated and ousted Ital-
ians with some British support; people’s revolution cum military mutiny toppled 
Emperor HIS; and Eritrea seceded EPLF vs. TPLF border war (Ayele 2011, 
221–222).
 Division of political violence into types is moderately useful for the study and 
empirical research in general. Admittedly, it allows us to identify the expressions 
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of diverse types of violence, but it fails to distinguish the interstate violence from 
the regional one. It is methodologically ineffective to differentiate them in the 
explanatory framework. Also, some expressions meet all the criteria of all of the 
types. It means that some pieces of data may be overrepresented in the research. 
This facet of the model is worth reformulating to improve a moderately high 
extent of the correctness of the framework. Although Ayele’s model applies to 
empirical research, a researcher should take into account the reservations about 
its structure before employing it to any methodological assumptions of empirical 
research so as to evade the already discussed difficulties.
 Robert Gerwarth indicates that a culture of political violence is a result of the 
noisy and turbulent politics of the street, the town square, and the factory, in which 
socioeconomic grievances, hostility to the state authority, and the new and recycled 
dreams of a purified community are expressed (Gerwarth 2011, 518). The author 
determines a cause- and-effect relationship between the explanandum and the 
explanans. The apodosis of the zero conditional sentences comprises the sentence 
declaring the occurrence of the explaining event. According to this model, a 
culture of political violence emerges if the three explaining indicators occur. Ger-
warth plausibly presents the individual sentences which prove that the events intro-
duced by the protasis of the general sentences took place. The relation between the 
apodosis and the protasis is verifiable, which makes the relation between the com-
ponents of the set of explaining indicators and a culture of political violence pos-
sible to verify. In short, the explanatory framework is correct because it fully meets 
the evaluation criteria. No essential feature limits its high extent of applicability to 
empirical research. Gerwarth indeed introduces the detailed description of the 
causal relations between the set of explaining indicators and the issue to be 
explained. It generates a high accuracy and precision of the explanation.
 Also, three, but qualitatively different, indicators account for a culture of 
political violence, according to the next model. Norman LaPorte and Matthew 
Worley state that German party militants’ seminal experiences of war, revolu-
tion, and civil war explain the emergence and the continued maintenance of a 
culture of political violence (2008, 246). This explanatory framework is encum-
bered with the reference to German history, which makes it highly contextual in 
terms of temporal and territorial dimensions. It considerably confines an extent 
of the model’s applicability to empirical research to the one state. After remov-
ing the reference from the semantic scope of the explanandum, the experiences 
of war, revolution, and civil war remain as the explaining indicators. The model 
is formally correct because it satisfies the correctness criteria handsomely. These 
features contribute to the applicability of LaPorte and Worley’s model to empiri-
cal studies. The description of the causal relations between the explaining indi-
cators and a culture of political violence is rather general. The hallmarks of the 
major category are unspecified. Thus, it may not lead a researcher to the highly 
accurate, insightful, and in- depth explanation. It does not mean, however, that 
the model is rigid. Rather, the critical futures of LaPorte and Worley’s approach 
are vulnerable, and thus a researcher may easily shape the model so as to 
perform research goals effectively.
34  Theoretical Approaches
 Robin Theobald strives to account for what contributes to the occurrence and 
perpetuation of an undefined culture of political violence. He emphasizes that 
the highly mobilized and urbanized civil societies in the developed Latin Amer-
ican states with strong democratic traditions, e.g., Argentina and Chile, were for 
many years threatened by the ruthless and determined military governments. 
According to Theobald’s framework, these states did not confine their militaries 
to the narrowly constitutional role this agency supposedly performs in the 
developed states (Theobald 1999, 153). Thereby, Theobald introduces the two 
explaining indicators and includes them in the two separate causal relations 
between an explaining indicator and an issue to be explained.
 Let us delve analytically deeper into Theobald’s model. First, if the highly 
mobilized and urbanized civil society, in the developed Latin Amer ican states 
with strong democratic traditions, identified with the state does not confine its 
militaries to the narrowly constitutional role, a culture of political violence 
occurs (Theobald 1999, 153). Second, if the ruthless and determined military 
governments threaten at length the civil society, a culture of political violence 
emerges. This framework is of contextual nature because of the references to the 
Latin Amer ican states in the explanandum, which narrows the scope of its 
applicability to this area. Additionally, it is employable to verify the occurrence 
of a culture of political violence in a particular type of society: civil, highly 
mobilized, and urbanized. Although the framework meets the correctness cri-
teria, the causal relations between the explaining indicators and the issue to be 
explained are biased. Theobald just names a culture of political violence, but he 
introduces its two explaining indicators in detail. The specificity of the depiction 
of the indicators does not redound to the presentation effectiveness of the rela-
tions. They are just two, and their nature is simplified by not delving conceptu-
ally into their essence, which largely confines Theobald’s model explanatory 
properties. They may not lead a researcher to a high accuracy and precision of 
the explanation.
 In contrast to Theobald, the next model is not context- laden. Thomas 
Waldman claims that the tribal and religious loyalties create a culture of political 
violence (2007, 70). So, if the tribal and religious loyalties exist, a culture of 
political violence occurs. This internally consistent model consists of two 
explaining indicators and determines two relations between the explanandum 
and the explanans. The framework is correct, and thus applicable to empirical 
research. Nevertheless, Waldman fails to provide an in- depth description of the 
causal relations between the explaining indicators and a culture of violence. The 
accuracy and precision of the explanation provided by the model are, therefore, 
to some extent limited. A researcher may develop them effectively by setting 
down the essential features of the explaining indicators and clarifying what 
exactly tribal and religious loyalties create a culture of political violence.
 Merle Kling provides an internally consistent explanatory framework of a 
culture of political violence. He assumes that the psychological capability for 
violence is used: directly to conduct acts of homicide and fights between indi-
viduals, indirectly by exhibitions of verbal aggression, or vicariously through 
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attendance at bullfights. Moreover, according to Kling, early socialization 
creates the tensions that look for resolution in violence, accepted social styles 
for males support combative behavior, participation in political violence may 
provide reassurance for those who glory in masculinity that is suspect, and pre-
vailing values condone acts of violence, including political violence. There-
fore, as Kling notices, an active minority involved in acts of political violence 
is not restrained by a political system that brands such acts as illegitimate or 
by the internalized values that censure the resort to violence to perform any 
tasks. Individuals may encourage their intellectual resources of aggression to 
participate in student riots, demonstrations, political terrorism, and revolution 
when the standards of society and conscience are influenced by outbreaks of 
political violence (Kling 1963, 129–130).
 Kling refers to Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba’s theory of political 
culture (1972) to show that the individuals’ induction into politics happens 
through the experience with violent revolution. Hence, as Kling sums up, the 
congruence between early socialization and the later modes of political action 
exists when the non- political agencies of socialization produce a culture of polit-
ical violence (Kling 1963, 129–130). In spite of being elaborated, the framework 
comprises one explaining indicator. Kling determines a cause- and-effect rela-
tionship between the explanandum and the explanans by formulating the zero 
conditional sentences: if particular non- political agencies of socialization take 
place, a culture of political violence exists. The particular agencies are the 
family, the Church [sic], and less formally organized institutions (Kling 1963, 
129) which engrain violent role models into people. The model is of utmost 
applicability to empirical research because it fulfills all the correctness require-
ments. The detailed presentation of the relation between the explanandum and 
the explanans contributes to the framework’s usefulness.
 Atte Enyenihi Okwong proposes a relatively narrow explanatory framework of a 
culture of political violence determined by one explaining indicator. He premises 
that youths’ engagement in electoral violence contributes to a substantial level of 
the existing culture of political violence in Nigeria, the country which is currently 
undermining people’s confidence in the electoral system, ascent democracy, and the 
rule of law (Okwong 2012, 129). This model determines a cause and effect relation-
ship between the explanandum and the explanans by assuming that if the young 
engage in electoral violence, a culture of political violence occurs. Okwong’s model 
meets most of the correctness criteria, and thus it applies to empirical research. 
Although the model is of a contextual nature because of the reference to Nigeria in 
the explanandum, it may be deprived of this feature by removing the reference. The 
model’s applicability is not high due to the lack of a detailed description of causal 
relations between the explaining indicator and a culture of political violence. Taking 
into consideration the features of just one relation may not guarantee a researcher a 
high accuracy and precision of the explanation.
 William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg reckon that the repeated expressions 
of political violence may lead to a culture of political violence and to the break-
down of the democratic rule itself (2000, 294). According to this model, if the 
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repeated expressions of political violence take place, a culture of political viol-
ence occurs. The zero conditional sentences set a cause and effect relationship 
between the explanandum and the explanans. Although the model is correct and 
thus applicable to empirical research, its extent of applicability is not very high 
due to the merely sketchily introduced causal relation. Providing that Eubank 
and Weinberg had offered a more detailed description of causal relations 
between the explaining indicator and a culture of political violence, the explan-
atory framework would have been of higher accuracy and precision. This aspect 
of the model still requires rethinking. First and foremost, a researcher should 
define a culture of political violence to foreclose the possibility that the explain-
ing phenomenon squares with the phenomenon to be explained and settle if the 
category is gradable or there are some antinomic cultures of political peace or 
non- violence. Second, one ought to elaborate the mechanism of “leading 
towards,” in particular in the scope of conditions under which it works, to deter-
mine the essential features of the relationships between the explanans and the 
explanandum.
 Helen Dexter and Emmanuel- Pierre Guittet assume that the fictions of polit-
ical violence may explain the occurrence of a culture of political violence. The 
fictions are the novels, short stories, plays, movies, or parts thereof, where polit-
ical processes and political views are reasonably close to the surface (2014, 380). 
The authors structure this internally consistent model by indicating that if the 
particular fictions of political violence make an appearance, an undefined culture 
of political violence emerges. The model is correct and highly applicable to 
empirical research, but its usefulness is relatively low because of the simple rela-
tion between the explaining indicator and a culture of political violence. 
Although Dexter and Guittet define and elaborate the category of the fictions of 
political violence, they just intimate the relationships between the indicators. 
Thus, the approach covers the limited part of a political reality which may con-
tribute to a culture of political violence. The accuracy and precision of the 
explanatory framework are not as high as they might have been if the authors 
had framed a more detailed set of relationships.
 Sue Onslow asserts that some structural indicators explain the enduring 
culture of political violence within the Zimbabwe African National Union – 
Patriotic Front, in the alliance between the army and the party that emerged in 
the 1970s. As Onslow indicates, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation 
Army cadres were brutalized in the liberation war to implement solidarity and 
discipline. Furthermore, during the liberation war, the use and range of violence 
to browbeat Shona- speaking ethnic groups inside Rhodesia were deliberately 
systematic and extreme, to the extent that it produced a political language. The 
post- independence state- directed violence in the continuing Zimbabwean civil 
war in Matabeleland against the Ndebele and Kalanga people did not spark any 
reaction from the international community, because Zimbabwe was needed as an 
international success story in the larger struggle against apartheid South Africa 
(Onslow 2011, 8). A high extent of generalness of the internally consistent 
explanatory framework shows that an extent of the model’s applicability to 
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empirical research is equally high. It relates directly to the macro- level analysis 
(Opp 2009, xv). Nevertheless, Onslow reduces the intrinsically broad category 
of structural indicators to the description of Zimbabwe’s politics in the particular 
period in its history. Territorial and time aspects make the framework 
contextual.
 As Onslow claims, if some structural indicators occur, a culture of political 
violence emerges. Although the model creates a cause- and-effect relationship 
between the explanandum and the explanans, it is rather obscure. The presenta-
tion of the model contains the individual sentences which declare that the events 
designated by the protases of the general sentences happened in Zimbabwean 
context. In its current form, the model is hardly applicable to empirical research. 
First, a researcher should deprive it of the contextual aspects to boost its utility 
in research. Second, one ought to conceptualize which structural indicators con-
tribute to a culture of political violence and how they do this because the phrase 
“some structural indicators” insufficiently determines the scope of the model. 
Third, before the application of the category of structural indicators to an explan-
atory framework, a researcher should build the operational definitions of a 
culture of political violence and its explaining indicators into the model. These 
changes would significantly improve the level of the verifiability of the frame-
work. Fortunately, the model is neither value- laden nor expressed in the form of 
the second, the third, and the mixed conditional sentences. The framework is 
correct, and its explanatory potential is relatively high, but it requires changes to 
become a powerful analytical tool, especially, it has to have the relationship 
between the explaining category and a culture of political violence established.
 The explanatory frameworks drawing on the vague beings, phenomena, and 
processes which cannot be captured by any social science category are to a low 
extent applicable to empirical studies. The analysis of the last explanantia pro-
vides us with a range of arguments to come out in favor of this statement. 
Jaime M. Pensado reckons that the internationalist spirit of the 1960s gave rise 
to a new culture of political violence (2013, 14). Although the framework 
determines a cause- and-effect relationship between the explanandum and the 
explanans, it does not contain the individual sentences which would declare 
that the events designated by the protasis of the general sentences happened. It 
fails to offer the detailed description of causal relations between the explaining 
indicator and a culture of political violence which would provide a high accu-
racy and precision of the explanation. Hence, the explanatory potential of the 
framework is scant. The explaining concept has no precise semantic field. Fur-
thermore, the time reference to the 1960s limits its extent of applicability to a 
historical context. It is also far from clear what new culture of political viol-
ence is and how it differs from the old one. Thus, the relation between the 
explanandum and the explanans is unverifiable. Admittedly, the approach is 
internally consistent, not value- laden, and not normative but in the light of the 
previously discussed flaws, these features do not contribute to its usefulness. 
Overall, this framework is of low applicability to empirical research because 
of its methodological incorrectness.
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 Let us sum up the arguments concerning the model correctness and research 
utility. In constructing the explanatory frameworks of a culture of political viol-
ence, the authors look for different sources of its occurrence. They consider the 
following indicators or sets of indicators as the sources of a culture of political 
violence: intrastate elements of political violence involving vicious struggles for 
the pinnacle of political power by aspirants of collective political subjects such 
as ethnic groups or inhabitants of geographical entities, rivalry between regions, 
and colonization of the land (Ayele 2011), noisy and turbulent politics of the 
street, the town square, and the factory, in which socioeconomic grievances, hos-
tility to the state authority, and the new and recycled dreams of a purified com-
munity are expressed (Gerwarth 2011), German party militants’ seminal 
experiences of war, revolution, and civil war (LaPorte and Worley 2008), highly 
mobilized and urbanized civil society, in the developed Latin Amer ican states 
with strong democratic traditions, identified with the state, does not confine its 
militaries to the narrowly constitutional role and the ruthless and determined 
military governments threatens at length the civil society (Theobald 1999), tribal 
and religious loyalties (Waldman 2007), non- political agencies of socialization 
(Kling 1963), youths’ engagement in electoral violence (Okwong 2012), 
repeated expressions of political violence (Eubank and Weinberg 2000), fictions 
of political violence defined as the novels, short stories, plays, movies, or parts 
thereof, where political processes and political views are reasonably close to the 
surface (Dexter and Guittet 2014), internationalist spirit of the 1960s (Pensado 
2013), and some structural indicators (Onslow 2011).
 The authors assume that if the explaining indicator or indicators make an 
appearance, a culture of political violence occurs. It spawns the assumption that 
some societies are cursed with the acceptance of the widespread use of political 
violence. However, we are far from claiming that either a culture of political 
violence or non- violence enters societies. Instead, we presume the category is 
gradable and useful to examine a social reality providing that a researcher makes 
use of a criterion of the extent of the acceptance of the use of political violence 
which varies. We are certain it is not the only underlying criterion to determine 
the differences and similarities between the patterns of a culture of political 
violence.
 We argue that time can remove the curse. Removing the curse is the process 
which has its dynamics stipulated by a range of indicators. Here, we would pose 
the questions of how much time has to intervene to say the curse was removed? 
And what periods do the stages of a culture of political violence determine? We 
assume that these periods are different for the specific indicators. But another 
puzzle is what are the dissimilarities and what contributes to them? Finally, do 
the explaining indicators truly matter in every single or most of cases? Does a 
national context matter (Dufour et al. 2016; Zamponi and Bosi 2016)? Do the 
explanatory frameworks work when different examples than the already tested 
ones are the research fields to be explored with them? Or, on the contrary, shall 
we look for an entirely new explanatory framework of a culture of political 
violence?
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Cultures of Political Violence as an Explaining Indicator of 
Other Things
In this part of the analysis, the explanatory frameworks treating a culture of 
political violence as an explaining indicator take center stage. Four problems 
investigate the subject field of the results of the phenomenon. The first one 
regards possible consequences of a culture of political violence and frames the 
question of what does a culture of political violence explain? Political beings, 
phenomena, processes, their configuration, or lack thereof are the explananda 
which are explicated through their explanans, a culture of political violence. 
Arguably, the review sets down the results of a culture of political violence 
stated in the literature, and it organizes models in subject order to determine the 
spectrum of a culture of political violence usage to explain events or properties. 
Then, it recognizes the types of the explanatory frameworks proposed by the 
authors.
 The second research question throws light on the structures of the explananda, 
and it handles to what extent are explanatory frameworks phrased correctly? An 
explanatory framework is correct if it meets the following set of criteria: (1) it 
conceptualizes a cause- and-effect relationship between the explanandum and the 
explanans, i.e., it consists of the general sentences which may be conveyed in 
the shape of the zero or the first conditional sentences and its apodosis (the con-
sequence) consists of the sentence declaring the occurrence of an explained 
event or phenomenon or describing a property being explained; (2) it contains 
the individual sentences which declare that the events designated by a protasis or 
protases (the condition) of general sentences took place; (3) it is operationaliza-
ble and thus verifiable; (4) it is not value- laden; (5) it is not normative; (6) it 
does not offer the statements put forward in the form of the second, the third, 
and the mixed conditional (a mixture of the second and the third conditionals) 
sentences; and (7) it is internally consistent. The higher the extent of the criteria 
fulfillment by an explanatory framework is, the higher the extent of its 
correctness is.
 The third problem deals with the applicability of explanatory frameworks to 
studies, and it asks about what is an extent of their applicability to empirical ana-
lyses? Overall, on the grounds of the correctness of the particular approaches, 
the review evaluates whether and under what conditions they apply to achieve 
research results in an intersubjective and diligent way. Additionally, it assesses 
properties of research fields and analytical levels explorable with models. The 
more specific and detailed the description of the causal relations between an 
explaining indicator or set thereof and an issue to be explained is, giving access 
to a high accuracy and precision of explanation, the bigger the extent of the 
applicability of the framework is. Also, the broader the range of the application 
of a model is, the more informative the model is. The review scrutinizes explan-
atory frameworks employable to studies in terms of their analytical reach.
 The literature offers the 19 broadly based models treating a culture of polit-
ical violence as an explaining indicator of beings, phenomena, processes, their 
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configuration, and lack thereof (Ayele 2011; Coleman 1998; Kling 1963; Forti 
and Maina 2012; Gohel 2014; Le Vine 2000; Moniruzzaman 2009; Njoku 2010; 
Obi 2011; Omotola 2010; Siniawer 2008, 2012; Taylor 1981; Theobald 1999; 
Waldman 2007). Most of them just mention a culture of political violence 
without specifying its essential features, but they give it an explaining function. 
The category often serves as an umbrella term to name the unidentified explain-
ing things. We are not against the explanatory frameworks which introduce a 
semantically unspecified explaining category as long as we see the chance to 
define and operationalize both it and the relations between it and a thing or 
things to be explained. The review discusses the ways of thinking about relations 
between the explananda and the explanans and the scope of the possible 
explananda. It scrutinizes definitions and their operationalization potential 
because they are of practical relevance for evaluating the exploratory and explan-
atory power of a theoretical framework.
 Negussay Ayele presents Ethiopian culture of political violence as the 
explaining indicator of its political culture (2011, 219) in Gabriel A. Almond, 
Sidney Verba and Lucian W. Pye’s meaning (Almond and Verba 1972; Pye and 
Verba 1972). On the one side, the model is marked by considerable usefulness 
for research because of the determined, specified, and well- justified relations 
between the explaining category and the category to be explained. On the other 
side, Ayele introduces a simplified and contextual framework to assess Ethiopian 
political culture. It consists of three levels of political orientations by people 
about government. They are traditional or parochial levels of minimal awareness 
of political phenomena and virtually no role in governmental activities, some 
basically suppressed awareness of political matters and rights, and remaining 
subject to authoritarian centers of power, and the highest form of citizenship and 
participation in governmental activities, as in modern democratic governments 
(Ayele 2011, 219).
 Ayele applies this framework to set out the results of a culture of political 
violence. He reveals that for the most part, Ethiopia has had the monarchic 
authority systems reinforced by feudal, aristocratic coteries, which usually have 
exercised tyrannical or absolute rule over the masses to this day. Furthermore, 
for centuries the Ethiopians have been subordinated subjects, rather than citizens, 
and they have had little or no say, role or share in governing or political parti-
cipation. As such, the political subjectivity of the ruled was greatly reduced and 
relatively close to the political objectiveness. Their attitudes towards politics 
have been parochial to a high extent and to some extent subdued obeisance. 
Sometimes the ambitious person who covets high office gathers supporters and 
unleashes armed rebellion. If such an armed rebel succeeds, the person defeats 
the incumbent and seizes the state. A new ruler’s rule fails to differ markedly 
from the reign of a predecessor. Kings and emperors asserted that “God” chose 
them to rule. The analysis also shows that nearly all the rulers in Ethiopia 
assumed power by removing incumbents with political violence. Arms and polit-
ical violence are the integral parts of political superiority achievement and main-
tenance of power. In other words, according to Ayele’s approach, Ethiopian 
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political culture emanates from the long- time history of its culture of political 
violence. As the researcher emphasizes, this particular culture of political viol-
ence has unfolded over the centuries of simultaneous and constant internal, 
regional, and colonial armed conflicts, battles, and wars (Ayele 2011, 219).
 Ayele’s internally consistent model precisely conceptualizes a cause- and-
effect relationship between the explanandum and the explanans. As Ayele 
assumes, if a culture of political violence exists, a specific pattern of political 
culture appears. This pattern locates between the ideal types of the parochial and 
the subject political culture, close to the former. The framework satisfies the cri-
teria of correctness, which makes it applicable to empirical research. Neverthe-
less, the semantic field of the category of political culture reduces the 
applicability because it is modified to fit merely the Ethiopian context. Ayele 
presents convincing arguments that his explanatory framework has a use for 
accounting for the pattern of political culture occurring in Ethiopia. We are 
unsure if it is equally useful to explain other patterns of political culture. Ques-
tionable as well is whether the essential features derived from Almond, Verba, 
and Pye’s model may serve to modify Ayele’s framework to endow it with a 
wider scope of applicability and a universal character.
 Ayele proposes one more approach towards a culture of political violence as 
an explaining category. Just like the first framework, the second one has a 
considerable explanatory power because of the way and results of setting the 
relations between the explanandum and the explanans. In the second, Ayele 
argues that the analysis of the history of the use of political violence to accom-
plish political goals in Ethiopia intimates that the “violence of culture” is an 
outcome of a long- standing culture of political violence (Ayele 2011, 226). As 
the researcher maintains, in Ethiopia, political violence has become the preoccu-
pation of a “culture of masculinity.” Moreover, according to Ayele’s research 
results, for the majority of the population, the culture of masculinity is fixed as a 
“default” norm of male behavior. It is the long- lasting expression of the long 
history of Ethiopia’s culture of political violence maintained in the ruthless 
“violence of political culture” (Ayele 2011, 226). The internal consistency of the 
model is eroded by naming the explanandum “violence of culture” either “viol-
ence of political culture” or “culture of masculinity” without any justification. 
Ayele uses them interchangeably to characterize the same phenomenon. Thus, 
despite different meanings, the names cover the same semantic field in the 
framework (Edwards 2006). The categories are not well established in the spe-
cialist literature, which makes their semantic establishment challenging. Before 
applying the model to research, a researcher should adopt one name to avoid 
confusing a reader or to reserve they have equivalent meanings. Although the 
model meets most of the correctness criteria, it is anchored in the Ethiopian 
context. A researcher may, however, remove the references to the context to 
improve the model’s level of applicability.
 Just like Ayele, Merle Kling provides a highly developed elaboration of a 
culture of political violence as an explaining indicator. Kling’s framework meets 
the correctness criteria and is of high applicability to empirical research, but it 
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focuses on essentially different research field than Ayele. According to Kling, in 
Latin Amer ican societies, a culture of political violence produces conditions in 
which the provocation and organization of violence are not the sole domain of 
professional soldiers. Although Kling refers to the territory, the model is not 
contextual in general. The author reckons that political subjects other than 
professional soldiers compete for power by using violence to achieve their public 
goals. Kling emphasizes that students become involved in riots, store and fire 
weapons from in the legal sanctuary of universities, and express a high extent of 
militancy and belligerency in advocating public policies. Moreover, their 
engagement in public affairs and experience in combatting the organized police 
and military forces make them professional revolutionists (Kling 1963, 126).
 Kling defines the professional revolutionists as those who sustain interest in 
the pursuit of governmental authority by using violence. Thus, as the researcher 
indicates, a culture of political violence accommodates the expert, counter- 
expert, and amateur in violence. The differences between the three individuals 
become fluid when some of the amateurs secure training in guerrilla tactics and 
terrorism. Kling points out that when the expectations of peaceful governmental 
transition are low, the individuals and groups not integrated into regular military 
formations strive to gain expertise in the techniques of violence. The revolution-
ist serves to differentiate a culture of political violence and to highlight the role 
of experts in violence or in such a culture (Kling 1963, 126). The differences 
between political subjects who chose to use violence in a public sphere to 
achieve goals are slightly obscure but, fortunately, they do not contribute to the 
very nature of the model. Kling bases the framework on the zero conditional 
sentences: if a culture of political violence exists, the society uses physical viol-
ence to accomplish political goals regardless of their social roles. In doing so, he 
makes a welcome contribution to the understanding of the essence of a culture of 
political violence production.
 So, Kling puts a strong emphasis on perpetrators of political violence rather 
than the results of their activities. Stephen Coleman, on the other hand, forsakes 
incorporating political subjects to his explanatory framework and focuses pre-
dominantly on the outcomes of the unidentified people’s activities. In drawing 
on the case of Northern Ireland, Coleman states that if a culture of political viol-
ence appears, people are killed, maimed, disfigured, beaten, tortured, incarcer-
ated, and exiled because of political goals (1998, 6). One may assume that, 
according to Coleman, aiming at the achievement of political goals with the use 
of political violence against people is a consequence of a culture of political 
violence. The author does not specify the essential features of the explaining 
indicator, but he outlines the relationship between its nature and the vicious 
political actions taken against people because of the objectives of political nature 
and relevance. Although the model meets the correctness criteria and applies to 
empirical research, it does not allow us to obtain a nuanced explanation and reli-
able conclusions due to its apparent and excessive theoretical simplicity.
 Notably, Kling offers one more explanatory model which is formally correct 
and applicable to empirical research. He assumes that a culture of political 
Theoretical Approaches  43
 violence creates the context in which an array of likely results accompanying a 
revolution is vast. As Kling highlights, the higher the extent of the compatibility 
between the acceptance of violence and the prevailing norms of a political 
system is, the more extensive the range of the policy results that may attend the 
use of violence is. According to Kling, if a culture of political violence emerges, 
a revolution may carry out the function of an election because violence does not 
need justification in this context. The similarity of a revolution to an election 
consists in leading to a personnel rotation and serving as a prelude to the intro-
duction of the relatively limited changes in public policies. However, as Kling 
notices, in contrast to an election, a revolution may indeed shift personnel, erase 
certain social classes, substantially modify the capabilities of diverse interest to 
exert influence and power and transform the system for absorbing and resolving 
public conflicts. Kling adds that revolutionary means are compatible with diverse 
ends (1963, 130–131). In a culture of political violence, a revolution per se may 
or may not be a portent of radical alteration.
 The two next models introduce the relation between a culture of political viol-
ence and violence during and after elections. Admittedly, Shola Omotola avoids 
defining a culture of political violence, but the researcher assumes that it is one 
of the indicators which explain electoral violence (2010, 70). According to 
Omotola, favorable for electoral violence are the contexts where issues of 
military co- exist with authoritarian remnants of previous regimes and a prevail-
ing culture of political violence feature prominently, the nature of the African 
state and its politics, weak economic foundations of the democratization process, 
including pervasive poverty, and the weak institutionalization of democratic 
architectures, particularly political parties, electoral management bodies and the 
judiciary (Omotola 2010, 70–71). Here, a culture of political violence is just a 
part of the unfinished explanatory model. It contributes to electoral violence, but 
it has to occur along with the range of other indicators in a comprehensive 
explanatory framework.
 In turn, according to Daniel Forti and Grace Maina, a culture of political viol-
ence explains the 2007–2008 post- election violence, a substantial proportion of 
the population that participated in protests, and the reality that may be attributed 
to the snowball effect of grassroots mobilization (2012, 74). Although both 
Omotola’s and Forti and Maina’s model meets the correctness criteria, the latter 
is contextual due to the time reference. Admittedly, they apply to empirical 
research but in the limited scope because a culture of political violence is unde-
fined and its link with the various phenomena to be explained is obscure. It is a 
result of the use of the underdeveloped conceptual frameworks proposed to 
produce the theoretical models.
 Robin Theobald argues that an undetermined culture of political violence 
creates the conditions under which Latin Amer ican militaries and paramilitaries 
are routinely deployed against dissidents. As Theobald strongly emphasizes, 
although Mexico has not abided military government since the reign of the 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional, its political system has always been based 
on the army to cope with the opposition as an after effect of a culture of political 
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violence. In the line of the approach, a culture of political violence also explains 
that after several years, in formally democratic Argentina, critics of the regime 
of Carlos Menem are harassed and killed (Theobald 1999, 153). Theobald 
assumes that a culture of political violence is of a long- standing nature.
 While mindful of the context, Theobald introduces three results of a culture 
of political violence and tests the model empirically. First, if a culture of polit-
ical violence appears, it creates the conditions under which Latin Amer ican mili-
taries and paramilitaries are routinely deployed against dissidents. Second, if a 
culture of political violence originates, a political regime uses the army to cope 
with the opposition. Third, if a culture of political violence comes into sight, the 
critics of the regime of Carlos Menem are harassed and killed in formally demo-
cratic Argentina. The model satisfies the correctness criteria, but it is slightly 
limited by the lack of semantic boundaries of the explaining category. Correct-
ness of the model implies that it is of high applicability to empirical research. 
Nonetheless, its contextual nature determined by the references to the territory 
and time reduces the extent of its analytical utility. A researcher should remove 
the contextual components and underpin the conceptual framework to increase 
an explanatory potential of Theobald’s model.
 The literature also offers no- frills models organized into one- sentence 
assumptions. Their authors premise that a culture of political violence triggers 
off some beings, phenomena, processes, and lack thereof. The frameworks share 
an extent of correctness, and they are of a similar applicability to empirical 
studies.
 Cyril Obi claims that a semantically undetermined culture of political viol-
ence causes problems to Nigeria’s electoral democracy (2011, 373). This model 
is largely contextual in the scope of the reference to the state rather than uni-
versal. Although the category of problems is vague, the model implies that as 
long as a culture of political violence exists, Nigeria’s electoral democracy does 
not work according to its fundamental rules. A researcher may deprive the 
approach of the contextual feature by removing the reference to Nigeria. Then, a 
culture of political violence would explain the transposition of democracy into 
or towards a non- democratic regime.
 Thomas Waldman’s view on the meaning of a culture of political violence for 
the state is close to Obi’s. As the author asserts, in Iraq, a culture of political 
violence minimizes the chances of the establishment of peaceful democratic 
rules (Waldman 2007, 70). As Obi does, Waldman avoids defining the explain-
ing category. This framework is also of the contextual nature as it makes refer-
ence to Iraq. Nevertheless, according to Waldman, if a culture of political 
violence occurs, peaceful democratic rules are less probable in Iraq. Whereas in 
Obi’s account, a culture of political violence undermines a democratic system 
(2011, 373), in Waldman’s perspective it precludes its establishment (2007, 70).
 More similar to Obi’s model is Victor T. Le Vine’s model. The researcher 
maintains that a culture of political violence contributes to the collapse of demo-
cracy. As Le Vine premises, a culture of political violence resulted in the death 
of Lebanese democracy (2000, 276). His approach is contextual because of the 
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direct reference to the state. Nevertheless, Le Vine offers also a more general 
framework by pointing out that a culture of political violence explains a demo-
cratic breakdown (2000, 277–278). None of them sets a semantic field of a 
culture of political violence.
 Le Vine’s second model is supported by Eiko Maruko Siniawer who claims 
that a culture of political violence explains the breakdown of democracy in Japan 
in 1930 (Siniawer 2008, 73, 179). Siniawer defines the explaining indicator as 
the context in which the use of political violence is acceptable. This approach is 
also sharply contextual as it refers to the time and state.
 In his different work, Siniawer does not define a culture of political violence 
as the context. Instead, he assumes that a culture of political violence produces 
the context in which ruffianism, understood as vandalism, hooliganism or, 
simply, brutal, violent, and lawless behavior, is tacitly accepted as a routinely 
used tool of political life (Siniawer 2012, 629). This model satisfies the correct-
ness criteria and is employable in empirical research, even if one should deter-
mine semantic fields of the categories involved to make it complete. Siniawer’s 
previous definition of a culture of political violence has no use for this frame-
work because it would generate tautology: the context accounts for the context.
 Alphonsus O. Njoku claims that a political situation in Nigeria is a result of a 
pervasive culture of political violence in the body politic of the country. Njoku 
notices that Nigeria has presently sustained an uninterrupted democratic govern-
ment for the last 10 years. In spite of this seemingly enduring democratic system, 
the country is harassed with troubled polity (Njoku 2010, 16). Since a political 
situation is always dynamic, its particular representation captured in the space 
and the time cannot be used as a theoretical category. It is just an exemplifica-
tion. As Njoku implies, a culture of political violence undermines democratic 
consolidation. The framework is, however, strictly located in and produced by 
the context defined by the references to the state and time.
 The other no- frills frameworks seek to use a culture of political violence to 
account for a political change. M. Moniruzzaman indicates that a culture of 
political violence creates the enormous public distrust in the capacity of major 
parties to come out of the destructive political legacy and initiate a new political 
alternative (Moniruzzaman 2009, 96). A culture of political violence contributes 
to the particular political attitudes towards political change.
 Then, Stan Taylor assumes that a culture of political violence, defined as a 
tradition of violence, performs a pivotal role in promoting riots (1981, 170). The 
explaining indicator is, therefore, even if high- ranking, one of many undefined 
phenomena contributing to the promotion of riots. Far from clear is what the 
non- pivotal and concurrent factors are and how to identify them. Another puzzle 
is the criterion of the distinction of the promotion of riots and bringing the 
pivotal role under this political activity.
 Siniawer, in his highly contextual explanatory framework, reckons that a 
culture of political violence explains the institutionalization of sōshi, the young 
activists of the Freedom and People’s Right Movement, into party politics (Sini-
awer 2008, 73, 179). He sees the explaining category as the context in which the 
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use of political violence is acceptable and firmly attaches to it a crucial role in 
the process of the institutional transposition of the political movement into party 
politics.
 Finally, Sajjan M. Gohel does not define a culture of political violence, but he 
indicates that it undermines the secular and nationalist foundations of moderate 
Bangladesh (2014, 88–89). This model is also contextual because of the refer-
ence to the state. Gohel focuses mainly on a destructive influence of a culture of 
political violence but avoids specifying how it undermines the foundations of 
Bangladesh. Despite satisfying the correctness criteria, the no- frill models 
require elaboration before using them in empirical research because of their con-
textual character as well as the partial and biased conceptual frameworks.
 In the existing models, a culture of political violence explains the remarkably 
diversified beings, phenomena, processes, their configuration, and lack thereof – 
the pattern of political culture: between the parochial and the subject, close to 
the former (Ayele 2011); the violence of culture identified with the culture of 
masculinity and the political violence of culture (Ayele 2011); the conditions in 
which the provocation and organization of violence are not the sole domain of 
professional soldiers (Kling 1963); bringing about revolution to being able to 
carry out the function of an election (Kling 1963); electoral violence (Omotola 
2010); the 2007–2008 post- election violence; a substantial proportion of the 
population participating in protests; and the reality that may be attributed to the 
snowball effect of grassroots mobilization (Forti and Maina 2012); problems 
with Nigeria’s electoral democracy (Obi 2011); minimization of the chances of 
the peaceful democratic rules establishment in Iraq (Waldman 2007); death of 
Lebanese democracy (Le Vine 2000); democratic breakdown (Le Vine 2000); 
breakdown of democracy in Japan in 1930 (Siniawer 2008); creation of the con-
ditions under which Latin Amer ican militaries and paramilitaries are routinely 
deployed against dissidents; basing a political regime on the army to cope with 
the opposition, and harassing and killing critics of the regime of Carlos Menem 
in formally democratic Argentina (Theobald 1999); the political situation which 
undermines democracy (Njoku 2010); promoting riots (Taylor 1981); the pro-
duction of the context in which ruffianism is tacitly accepted as a routinely used 
tool of political life (Siniawer 2012); the political situation in which people are 
killed, maimed, disfigured, beaten, tortured, incarcerated, and exiled because of 
political goals (Coleman 1998); enormous public distrust in the capacity of the 
major parties to come out of the destructive political legacy and usher in a new 
political alternative (Moniruzzaman 2009); undermining the secular and nation-
alist foundations of moderate Bangladesh (Gohel 2014); the institutionalization 
of sōshi into party politics (Siniawer 2008). The researchers verified or just dis-
cussed the frameworks but most of the relations between the indicators are of 
contextual quiddity, which makes us pose the challenging questions, if they work 
when applied to some other empirical research and to what extent they keep their 
explanatory values while exploring different research fields.
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Classification Frameworks of Cultures of Political Violence
This part of the analysis involves classification schemes of a culture of political 
violence. Whereas the first part of the analysis presents the one- type approaches, 
this fourth section deals with two- class and more extended frameworks. The 
review scrutinizes them to solve four problems. The first one enables us to deter-
mine classification approaches towards a culture of political violence and it 
closely inquires into what types of classification schemes of a culture of political 
violence are in the literature. The review pays attention to an object of their 
semantic fields and a number of criteria applied to set classes. It recognizes a 
type of a classification framework by evaluating what and how many criteria 
organize a model and what classes it encompasses.
 The second problem connects directly with the first one, and it delves into the 
structure of classification schemes by asking about under what rules do research-
ers outline classification schemes. Frameworks differ in the content and configu-
ration of classes. Researchers establish them under the rules of (1) antinomy, or 
(2) gradation, (3) property, state or occurrence they are subjected to, and (4) rela-
tions between a culture of political violence and an object. The classification 
schemes based on the rule of antinomy are worked out according to the contra-
dictory features, and they take on the form of dichotomy divisions. A scheme 
may consist of any number of dichotomies. The others draw upon a modification 
of gradable features and translate the sets of features into the multi- classes divi-
sions. Each classification framework discloses the values of a culture of political 
violence which are the classes of a category, stages, or ranges.
 The third problem leads directly up to the evaluation of the correctness of clas-
sification approaches, and it poses the question of to what extent are classification 
schemes correct? A classification scheme is correct if it meets the following set of 
criteria: (1) a division of a culture of political violence into classes is according to 
one homogenous criterion or one homogenous and invariable configuration of cri-
teria; (2) it is exhaustive, i.e., each exemplification of the category belongs to one 
of the classes; (3) it is disjunctive, i.e., none of the exemplifications of the category 
belongs to more than one class; (4) it is complete, i.e., the sum of all classes is a 
semantic equivalent for the entirety of the divided category; and (5) it fulfills the 
saturation condition, i.e., each class includes some component (Tarchi 2017). The 
higher the extent of the criteria fulfillment by a classification scheme is, the higher 
the extent of its correctness is.
 Finally, the last problem strives for the adjudication of the classification 
approaches’ applicability to studies and it inquires into the extent of applic-
ability of classification schemes to empirical analyses. Therefore, on the 
grounds of the correctness of classification frameworks, the review weighs up 
whether and under what conditions they have a use for achieving research 
results systematically, intersubjectively, and diligently. It assesses the applic-
ability in terms of the properties of the research field and analytical levels they 
may examine to stake out a current range of a culture of political violence 
exploratory potential.
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 The literature presents merely three attempts to conceptualize any kinds of 
the category (Gerwarth 2011; Miller 1998; Waldman 2007). The classification 
fields of their frameworks differ in subject matter and are the same in avoiding 
making reference to a subject aspect of a culture of political violence. Each 
model applicable to classify cultures of political violence draws on a different 
division criterion and explores a variant classification field.
 Thomas Waldman distinguishes an entrenched and a pure culture of political 
violence (2007, 70). The critical criterion of their distinction is an extent of the 
rooting in the shape of the perpetuation of a culture of political violence in a 
population’s social awareness. It seems to be the division based on two anti-
nomic classes, but the rule of antinomy is not stated directly. The classification 
framework is simple, consistent, and constructed on the basis of one and homo-
genous criterion. On the one hand, it establishes the one- dimension classification 
field which is simply divided into two classes. On the other, it does not allow a 
researcher to see the semantic differences between the classes because they are 
undefined. One may merely assume what hallmarks of the classes are.
 The underlying limitation of the classification framework is its undetermined 
content and boundaries of the classification field of a culture of political viol-
ence. Additionally, Waldman avoids presenting features which would allow a 
researcher to identify and diversify the examples of a culture of political viol-
ence. As a result, it is unverifiable whether the framework is exhaustive, disjunc-
tive, and fulfills the saturation condition. In its current form, the extent of 
correctness and applicability of the model (Waldman 2007, 70) to empirical 
studies is very low because it does not define what an entrenched culture of 
political violence is and how to distinguish it among other political beings, phe-
nomena, processes, their configurations, or lack thereof in a political reality. 
Nevertheless, it considerably contributes to our understanding of the phenom-
enon by presenting the criteria of continuance and perpetuation as the potentially 
useful indicators of its variety.
 The second classification framework is also marked by the absence of essential 
features the category superordinate to its distinct classes (Gerwarth 2011, 518). 
Not unlike Waldman, Robert Gerwarth distinguishes the two classes: a localized 
and an informal culture of political violence. Gerwarth avoids, however, pointing 
out a homogenous criterion or a configuration of criteria used to determine the 
classes. In determining the localized pattern, the researcher might have employed a 
territorial criterion, but it is not stated explicitly. In turn, in the informal pattern, 
Gerwarth might have used an extent of formality, but it is not introduced as well. 
Nevertheless, the criteria that we suggest are not applicable to describe all the ele-
ments of the classification framework. Formality does not characterize the local-
ized class and the localization fails to depict the informal class. Just as in 
Waldman’s model, the boundaries of the classification field are undetermined. The 
reconstruction of the essential features of the classes is hardly possible. It is also 
far from clear how to determine antinomic classes, e.g., a formal and an unfocused 
culture of political violence on the grounds of the absence of their features and cri-
teria for distinction. The model is not exhaustive, disjunctive, and complete, and it 
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does not fulfill the saturation condition. The arguments uncover a low extent of 
correctness and applicability of Gerwarth’s classification framework to empirical 
research.
 Then, Daniel Miller singles out a material culture of political violence but 
avoids indicating the relation between the category and a pure pattern. The 
material class is constituted by the material images, forms of banners, and space 
of parading which produced violence and political conflict when other channels 
were generating compromise and peace (Miller 1998, 382). The author anthro-
pomorphizes the material pattern by bringing the power to produce violence and 
political conflict intrinsically under the culture, so, the category embraces not 
only violent behavior but also discrepancies of political interests, without any 
human indicator. The model omits an intangible culture of political violence. 
The examples which do not meet the essential features of the material class are 
beyond the classification framework. It shows that the framework is incomplete 
and does not allow us to capture in- depth the differences between phenomena.
 Miller’s approach lacks the category of a political subject mainly as a result 
of the anthropomorphism of the subject matter (1998, 382). Thereby, a human 
role is played by a thing. Arguably, an inanimate subject is not able to commit 
violence or cause political conflict. Such a being may become the component of 
the concept of a material culture of political violence only when we premise that 
a political subject’s awareness adopts the meaning of material incentives and this 
person starts to act because of it (Sjørslev 2012). Hence, only if there is an 
element of individual awareness, an incentive may be the indicator contributing 
to a culture of political violence (Szewczak 2005). Miller calls a culture of polit-
ical violence a material stimulus which may encourage somebody to behave 
aggressively. The category may be, however, of a higher exploratory potential 
when we assume that it determines if and to what extent a political subject uses a 
material resource to deploy violence.
 Admittedly, Miller does not offer a superordinate category to a material 
culture of political violence, but the material culture class’s definiens implies its 
essential features (1998, 382) which are material and immaterial beings and phe-
nomena marked by the potential and predisposition to trigger off political viol-
ence. One and homogenous criterion of the division of this classification field is 
a type of beings and phenomena. It divides its scope consistently into the 
material and immaterial patterns but defines just the former.
 Miller’s approach indeed goes far beyond the scope of the classification field 
of a culture of political violence with respect to the political reality that can be 
explored with this model. It introduces a possibility to determine the antinomic 
classes of – explicite – a material and – implicite – an immaterial culture of polit-
ical violence (Miller 1998, 382), namely, material and immaterial cultures of 
compromise and peace. As the analysis of the definiens discloses, they are 
marked by essential features antinomic to their antinomic classes.
 Formal correctness of Miller’s classification framework shows that it applies 
to empirical research to a low extent. It is not exhaustive or disjunctive and does 
not fulfill the saturation criterion but a researcher may improve it according to 
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the already introduced remarks. One should rethink the relation between behavi-
oral and awareness spheres and extend the model to obtain a tool to identify and 
compare the examples of cultures of political violence. It would demand to 
implement additional criteria for sub- classes of material and immaterial cultures 
of political violence. Reformulating the definientia and creating a conceptual 
framework would be of great relevance to the model’s applicability as well.
 The analysis points out that the classification frameworks of a culture of polit-
ical violence are widely diversified. Each model is entirely original because they 
divide the classification fields by using the different criteria which are an extent 
of rooting a culture of political violence in the social awareness of populations 
(Waldman 2007), the territory where a culture of political violence emerges and 
concentrates on as well as an extent of a culture of political violence formality 
(Gerwarth 2011), and the type of beings and phenomena constituting a culture of 
political violence (Miller 1998). Identification of their empirical validity makes 
an important contribution to the field because it reveals what features of cultures 
of political violence are worth evaluating in comparative studies.
 The literature offers the three classification schemes that consist of: an 
entrenched and a pure (Waldman 2007), a localized and an informal (Gerwarth 
2011), and a material and a pure culture of political violence (Miller 1998). No 
model makes use of either antinomy or graduation rule to determine the classes 
of the category. Hence, the classes cannot be put in any order. Moreover, neither 
the property, state, and occurrence classes are subjected to, nor the relations 
between a culture of political violence and an object are common to all the 
classes within any of the frameworks. The review reveals that they are of low 
formal correctness and applicability to empirical research.
Recommendations on the Construction of a Theoretical 
Framework of Cultures of Political Violence
Undoubtedly, a culture of political violence is an understudied topic in the schol-
arly literature. The analysis of its definitions, classification schemes, and explan-
atory frameworks considering a culture of political violence to be an explaining 
indicator or an indicator to be explained reveals a range of challenges for those 
researchers who might want to use them effectively in their studies.
 A theoretical category of a culture of political violence has to consist of its 
essential features. The set of features has to satisfy the correctness criteria and con-
tribute to an operationalizable definition. A researcher should carefully establish 
the explananda and the explanantia of explanatory frameworks so they introduce 
the causal relations and do not overlap semantically to avoid tautology, understood 
as the needless repetition of the same sense in different words and redundancy. 
Most of the explanatory frameworks under review fail to present any semantic 
field of a culture of political violence, thus making the models flexible.
 This flexibility is not always an asset since the explanatory frameworks are 
not the parts of any broader theoretical approaches. The causal relations between 
phenomena are often discretionary. Questionable is what really and exactly 
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 triggers off cultures of political violence, what their results are, and how to deter-
mine them. Regardless of methods, techniques, and tools employed to deal with 
the relations, a researcher is often able to observe merely the fact of correlation 
but not its direction. The proven ways of coping with this problem may be unde-
pendable as long as a culture of political violence is understudied. An extent of 
the correctness and applicability of the models is worth improving through meth-
odological, theoretical, and empirical contributions. Hence, some thought should 
be given to a culture of political violence as an explaining indicator and a thing 
to be explained to develop an explanatory potential of the category.
 The classification schemes are the underbelly of the literature on a culture of 
political violence. No approach towards the classification of its patterns meets all 
the correctness criteria. They do not define a culture of political violence, which 
generates the question of how to identify its expressions when one does not 
know how to understand this poorly established category. The authors fail to set 
the criteria of the classes’ distinction, and thereby it is also impossible to 
compare any would- be manifestations of the category. Therefore, the classifica-
tion framework which would allow a researcher to identify and compare cultures 
of political violence is still a challenging task to be undertaken.
 The critical discussion on the methodological and theoretical correctness of 
the frameworks is not able to take the place of solid empirical research. In spite 
of the determined limitations, the models should not be decisively rejected 
because there is no perfect theoretical approach in social science. Similarly, the 
frameworks assessed as correct and applicable to empirical analysis ought not to 
be taken for granted due to the complexity of the social reality that is often diffi-
cult to predict on the stage of research preparation.
 The research to follow neither adopts some theoretical approaches nor dismisses 
others without an empirical test. Therefore, Chapter 2 draws upon the existing 
insights into the necessary and sufficient essential features to identify and compare 
cultures of political violence. It makes use of the discussion on the semantic fields 
and the classification frameworks of the category. Chapters 3 and 4 take advantage 
of the literature review in the different ways. The former evokes all the explanatory 
frameworks reviewed in terms of the explaining indicators of a culture of political 
violence and tests those theoretical approaches one by one. They are examined to 
observe their empirical effectiveness to explain what contributes to cultures of polit-
ical violence. Chapter 4, on the other hand, concentrates on the explanatory frame-
works discussed with respect to a culture of political violence as an explaining 
indicator of other things. All those frameworks undergo tests to see how forceful 
they are to account for the results of cultures of political violence.
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2 Post- 2008 Cultures of Political 
Violence in the Eurozone
Methodology for Examining Cultures of Political Violence
Dealing with cultures of political violence demands to face a challenge of meas-
uring the immeasurable because those phenomena are unavailable for direct obser-
vation (Bruter 2013, 34; Lane 2016, 1141; Moustaki 2000, 211). As the literature 
review has shown, there is no available analytical tool to identify, describe, and 
compare cultures of political violence. But it has also revealed the array of concepts 
employable to characterize the things in the real world which are of relevance to 
devise such a model. Hence, the aims of this chapter are: to propose a precise and 
operationalizable definition of a culture of political violence, to construct a concep-
tual framework of that category, to test its empirical efficiency by analyzing the 
cases of post- 2008 incidents in which anti- austerity movements’ stakeholders took 
part, and to determine cultures of political violence which emerged in the crisis- 
ridden Eurozone of the times of austerity. Whereas the goals of this chapter are of 
an exploratory nature, the next chapters move on into an explanation.
 This chapter solves the first research problem of what patterns of a culture of 
political violence did stakeholders of post- 2008 anti- austerity movements have? 
By doing so, it strives to verify the first hypothesis organizing an analysis: stake-
holders of post- 2008 anti- austerity movements might have had patterns of a 
culture of political violence diversified with respect to the values of its essential 
features: (i) political subjects that made use of political violence; (ii) their mutual 
legitimation to the use; (iii) modes of the legitimation of the use; (iv) the 
intensity of physical political violence; and (v) forms of political violence. The 
five essential features covered by the hypothesis are the criteria for characteriz-
ing and distinguishing the patterns of cultures of political violence that constitute 
a typology. It sheds new light on the diversity of the cultures that are sympto-
matic of the European context.
 Let us move on towards the process of collecting and elaborating data. The 
study employs a qualitative method of written sources analysis to gather the data 
sufficient and necessary to identify the values of the essential features for 14 Euro-
pean states. A particular configuration of the values is a value of a culture of polit-
ical violence. The research technique of data collection is a relational qualitative 
content analysis of secondary data: reports, records, and databases of the states’ 
DOI: 10.4324/9781351205757-3
56  Post-2008 Cultures of Political Violence
police and 305 articles and visual materials published in public, commercial, and 
social media in 2007–2015, and secondary literature on the stakeholders of anti- 
austerity movements. The role of sources triangulation is to empower the basis of 
arguments and to minimize a selection bias. The research tools are: categorization 
key to content analysis, instruction to review the media of secondary data, typo-
logy of political subjects that deployed violence, continuum of mutual legitimation 
to use political violence, model of the modes of the legitimation of the use, contin-
uum of the intensity of physical political violence, and continuum of forms of 
political violence.
 The main criterion for sources selection is their utility to verify the hypothesis 
effectively. Therefore, the whole process of gathering the pieces of data is first 
and foremost purpose- driven. According to the principle of theoretical sampling, 
the theoretical developments that occurred in an analysis of the previously gath-
ered data lead the following stages of data collection. This cycle of alternation 
between data collection and analysis does not stop at two repetitions but it stands 
up to the achievement of theoretical saturation. In other words, until the new 
pieces of data are not introducing the exemplifications of new theoretical ele-
ments but instead are confirming what has already been discovered (Punch 2014, 
134). The attempts concentrate on gathering the data sets necessary and suffi-
cient to solve the research problem (Spangler 2016, 42).
 The research offers a new definition of a culture of political violence to 
project what it covers by its conceptual framework. A meaning of the category is 
not semantically determined by the modes of understanding of particular words 
constituting its definiendum (what is to be defined). Therefore, the semantic 
establishment of the definientia (the words or phrases that define) of culture, 
violence, political violence, and the predicate of political is not necessary to set 
down what the very nature of a culture of political violence is. The meaning of 
the category is not the sum of the meanings of the words which occur in its 
name. It is, however, crucial to define political violence as long as it remains a 
part of the definiens (the word or phrase that defines) of a culture of political 
violence. In other words, if political violence contributes to our conception of a 
culture of political violence, it has to have an operationalizable definition to 
serve as an indicator of the culture.
 A culture of political violence is a paradigm of using political violence in a 
political structure, which is determined by the temporal, subject, and subject matter 
indicators. This paradigm indicates who takes advantage of the use of political 
violence, what their mutual legitimation to the use is, how they justify and account 
for the use, what forms of political violence they employ, and what the intensity of 
political violence is. This definition is the basis for an original conceptual frame-
work applicable to describe and analyze cultures of political violence.
 Let us specify the meanings of the components of the definition. A political 
structure is constituted by its internal political subjects and relationships between 
them. The subjects may be either individual or collective, and their violent 
behavior is under scrutiny when describing a culture of political violence. The 
political subjects extrinsic to a particular political structure are irrelevant when a 
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culture of political violence is evaluated as long as they are not in relationships 
with domestic actors. Whereas political subjects are the subject indicator of the 
category, the use of political violence is the subject matter. Political violence is 
intentional influencing by a political subject(s) the thinking process, behavior, or 
physical state of other political subject(s), despite the lack of authority of the 
political subject under the influence, to achieve political goals. These goals are 
the creation, destruction, protection, deprivation of protection, distribution, and 
abandonment of distribution of public goods. Political violence may be an overt 
action or a non- action on the level of motivation.
 The analysis offers a conceptual framework to identify and compare cultures 
of political of violence in the member states of the Eurozone. It embraces the 
major things to be examined and the presumed relationships between them 
(Miles et al. 2013, 37; Spanakos 2016, 2). For the sake of clarity, the conceptual 
framework should not be mistaken for an explanation because it avoids settling 
causal relations. It does not perform explanatory goals, but it precedes the cre-
ation of an explanatory framework. It serves to determine the reference cat-
egories for the empirical study. The conceptual and explanatory frameworks are 
the parts of the theoretical model which is to offer lenses to study the nature, 
sources, and results of the phenomena (Anfara and Mertz 2015). The conceptual 
framework is the product of a qualitative process of theorization made to help a 
researcher construct an interpretative approach towards social reality. It is the 
network of the interlinked concepts that together generate a comprehensive 
understanding of a phenomenon (Jabareen 2009, 50; Punch 2014, 116). In this 
research, the conceptual framework consists of the interlinked theoretical cat-
egories in the form of concepts taking on particular values (Rosenberg 2016, 85; 
Weber 2012).
Conceptualizing Cultures of Political Violence
The definition- driven conceptual framework applies to evaluate the qualitative 
features of cultures of political violence. It is necessary to determine the tem-
poral dimension of the phenomena under evaluation because a researcher may 
employ the category to generate both static and dynamic views on the cases. 
This analysis adopts a static perspective and focuses on the cultures of 
2007–2015, the time of the first great wave of anti- austerity events. It may, 
however, contribute to some broader research by establishing the dynamics of 
the cultures over time or become a field for a detailed study on the phenomenon 
dynamics within the period.
 If we understand the category of a culture of political violence as a paradigm 
of using political violence in a political structure, which is set by the temporal, 
subject, and subject matter indicators, five concepts constitute the very nature of 
the paradigm. They allow us to operationalize the essential features of the cat-
egory. It means that we have to answer the five questions to see what culture of 
political violence emerged in each case: who uses political violence? If and to 
what extent do political subjects in their political roles accept and find justified 
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the way in which others perform their political roles in the scope of using polit-
ical violence? How do political subjects justify and explain the use of political 
violence? What is the intensity of physical political violence? And what forms of 
political violence are in use? Five concepts drive the data collection questions to 
create a structured model for describing and comparing empirical cases (Punch 
2014, 62). Those concepts do double duty as research tools to answer the ques-
tions systematically and intersubjectively. The analysis applies the same set of 
questions and concept- based scales to examine each culture of political violence.
 The first concept allowing us to assess a culture of political violence derives 
from an array of answers to the question of who uses political violence. The 
literature review has shown that individual and collective political subjects 
deploy it. This study, however, demands to adopt a more specific approach to 
characterize the nature of the relationships between the stakeholders of anti- 
austerity movements. The perpetrators are, therefore, the political subjects that 
range from representatives of a state apparatus to anti- austerity movement parti-
cipants. The representatives of a state apparatus are politicians, police officers, 
firefighters, employees of a public sector, government officials, and the public 
media journalists who act as loyal supporters of politicians or are perceived by 
movement participants as doing so. Although firefighters usually do not perform 
political roles, they are involved because movement participants considered 
them to be linked with the state apparatuses and on this account attacked them 
over clashes in times of tensions (BBC 2015a; Onyanga- Omara 2015; Spiegel 
2015b; Wessel and Ewing 2015; Yan 2015). In turn, movement participants are 
those engaged in its structure and supporting it over protests and other activities 
(Tarrow 2011, 6; VanDusky- Allen 2017).
 The next question deals with the mutual legitimation of representatives of a 
state apparatus and movement participants to use political violence. It asks if and 
to what extent political subjects in their political roles accept and find justified 
the way in which others occupy their political roles in the scope of using polit-
ical violence. The literature review has revealed that cultures of political viol-
ence differ in how perpetrators perceive themselves and others in a political 
structure in terms of the violent means they provide for the use. Additionally, a 
political role itself predestines legitimation to the use or lack thereof because it 
forms a political subject’s scope of rights and duties concerning the usage. When 
she misuses violence or her right to control its commitment, she loses her 
previous political role. If a political subject legitimated to use political violence 
exceeds her authority, she inevitably becomes a political subject non- legitimated 
to the use. Mutual legitimation is gradable with respect to the extent of cohesion 
between political subjects’ actual usage of political violence and agreement on 
the use.
 Accordingly, the scale necessary to measure the cohesion and interpret the 
data referring to mutual legitimation is the continuum established by two 
extreme values, the maximum and the absence (Figure 2.1). Real values locate 
between the extreme points in various distances to them and vary in the extent of 
cohesion. The largest value (A), the highest extent occurs when there is no 
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strength confrontation between the political subjects. Movement participants 
avoid organizing protests and engaging in their activities representatives of a 
state apparatus. The action and non- action of political subjects achieve complete 
mutual legitimation. A very high extent (B) is when movement participants stage 
events in a public sphere and employ mental political violence to express their 
opinion in a widely accepted manner. They neither deploy nor provoke the use 
of physical political violence. In turn, representatives of a state apparatus take 
part in the proceedings, but the protest policing makes use of the threat in the 
way approved by a movement. The actions of a movement are recognized as a 
potentially and presumptively dangerous threat against public order, safety, and 
security and not fully approved. Therefore, this mode does not take on the great-
est value of the cohesion. A high extent (C) is when the incidents of the use of 
physical political violence take place, and they are not legitimated. Political sub-
jects approve others in a political structure and the mode and purpose of apply-
ing political violence. A disagreement appears over the incidents that are not 
very frequent. Moderate is, therefore, a discrepancy between political subjects’ 
actual usage of political violence and agreement on the use. A low extent (D) is 
marked with the use of excessive physical political violence unaccepted by those 
who attended clashes. Political subjects recognize others as non- legitimated to 
act in the way and for the purpose they do. High is a discrepancy between polit-
ical subjects’ actual usage of political violence and agreement on the use. A very 
low extent (E) makes an appearance when active physical political violence is 
misused by movement participants and representatives of a state apparatus, and 
both oppose to the misuse. A discrepancy between political subjects’ actual 
usage of political violence and agreement on the use achieves a very high level. 
Political subjects do not accept how others exercise their rights and perform 
duties within political roles. Representatives of a state apparatus are often 
 publicly and widely accused in social media of initiating violent clashes in 
A B C D E F
Maximum mutual legitimation                                                      Lack of mutual legitimation
Extents of mutual legitimation:
A – maximum
B – very high
C – high
D – low
E – very low
F – absence
Figure 2.1 Continuum of mutual legitimation to use political violence.
Source: Author’s own study.
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 plain- clothes. Movement participants may be detained before taking part in anti- 
austerity events to prevent their contribution. Those activities may fuel the next 
violent actions. Finally, the absence of the cohesion indicates no mutual legiti-
mation, and it (F ) is when clashes transform into the civil war, fully unaccepted 
but perpetuated, in which political subjects lose their current roles. There is a 
full discrepancy between political subjects’ actual usage of political violence and 
agreement on the use.
 The two essential features relate strictly to the political subjects empowered 
to use political violence. They are indeed legitimated or non- legitimated to carry 
out violent behavior by their roles in a political structure. Mutual legitimation is 
produced within political relations between the subjects (Alimi et al. 2015, 7; 
Bosi et al. 2014, 2). Not only does an issue of political subject legitimation 
matter but also the legitimation of political violence contributes to our under-
standing of the paradigm (Huff and Kruszewska 2016, 1774; Virta and Branders 
2016, 1150).
 As the literature review has underlined, the ways of how perpetrators justify 
turning to force influence the diversity of cultures of political violence. The 
modes of the legitimation of the use of political violence range from the law to 
the will when we address the question of what justifies and accounts for the use 
of political violence. Nonetheless, this dual model, which is based on one essen-
tial feature (the indicator of the mode of the use of political violence legitima-
tion) taking on the two extreme values (the law and the will), fails to cover in 
full swing all the possibilities and nuances of the processes of legitimation, rele-
gitimation, delegitimation, and redelegitimation (Vaara 2014, 501). Therefore, it 
is of particular relevance to determine an exact meaning and primary types of 
the legitimation of the use of political violence.
 The analysis adopts a broad meaning of legitimation to describe and evaluate 
this aspect of a culture of political violence. Legitimation is the discourse that 
accounts for and justifies the deployment of political violence. It involves pro-
viding reasons, grounds, and motivations for past, present, and future violent 
behavior. It generates answers to the questions of “why should we use political 
violence?” and “why should we use it in this way?” (Oddo 2011, 289). There-
fore, it is relevant to the content of the conceptual framework to ask about how 
political subjects justify and explain the use of political violence. In order to 
offer a simple but not excessively simplifying approach towards the modes of 
the legitimation of the use of political violence, a four- category model is 
adopted. It draws on Theo van Leeuwen’s typology of legitimation (2007, 92) 
that consists of authorization, moralization, rationalization, and mythopoesis.
 In the line of this model, authorization is the legitimation by reference to the 
personal or impersonal authority, custom authority of tradition or conformity, 
and commendation authority of an expert or role model (van Leeuwen 2007, 97). 
It is of constitutive, regulative, and evaluative nature (Wiener 2014, 18). When 
undiluted personal authority is discussed, legitimate authority is vested in a 
person because of her status or role in a particular institution (van Leeuwen 
2007, 94). Expert authority draws on an expertise providing legitimation (van 
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Leeuwen 2007, 94). In the case of the role model authority, role models or 
opinion leaders are followed (van Leeuwen 2007, 95). Not all of the types of 
authority legitimation are personal. Impersonal authority is based on laws, rules, 
and regulations (van Leeuwen 2007, 96). Authorization by tradition still may be 
invoked, particularly through keywords like “tradition,” “practice,” “custom,” 
and “habit” (van Leeuwen 2007, 96). Conformity legitimation takes the form of 
a direct comparison or is realized through high- frequency modality (van 
Leeuwen 2007, 97).
 Moral legitimation, also called moralization, makes use of evaluation, abstrac-
tion, and positive or negative comparison (van Leeuwen 2007, 100). According to 
van Leeuwen, this mode of legitimation is built on moral values, rather than 
imposed by some genre of authority without further justification. Moral values 
may be simply asserted by troublesome words such as “good” and “bad” which 
unrestrainedly travel between moral, aesthetic, and hedonistic spheres and often 
occur in configuration with authority legitimation (van Leeuwen 2007, 97). Most 
frequently, evaluation connects with specific discourses of moral value, which 
often are neither made explicit nor debatable. They are merely alluded to, by using 
predicates such as “healthy,” “normal,” and “useful.” Admittedly, they trigger a 
moral concept but are out of the system of interpretation they come from, at least 
on an awareness level (van Leeuwen 2007, 97). They reshape moral discourses 
into generalized motives (van Leeuwen 2007, 98). Moral evaluation legitimation 
employs evaluative adjectives to show what something is like or should be just due 
to some moral value or values and avoids setting out any arguments. A popular 
form of moral evaluation legitimation is naturalization legitimation constructed 
with references to time or the concept of profound change. In this case, a moral 
order takes the shape of a natural order (van Leeuwen 2007, 98). Then, moral 
legitimation based on abstraction consists in referring to practices or one or more 
their component actions or reactions in the abstract modes that moralize them (van 
Leeuwen 2007, 99). Analogies as the way of moral legitimation benefit from 
implicit or explicit comparisons. An activity that belongs to one social practice is 
presented by using the term which, literally, refers to an activity belonging to 
another social practice, and the positive or negative values which, in a given socio- 
cultural context, are attached to that other activity, are then transferred to the ori-
ginal activity (van den Broek 2017; van Leeuwen 2007, 99).
 Rationalization is the argument- driven legitimation by reference to the goals 
and uses of institutionalized social action and to the knowledge produced by 
society to arm itself with cognitive validity. Van Leeuwen distinguishes two 
major types of rationality. First, instrumental rationality legitimates practices by 
making reference to their goals, tools, and effects. Purposes serve to account for 
why social practices exist and why they take their current forms (van Leeuwen 
2007, 99). Accordingly, it may be goal-, means-, or effect- oriented. Second, 
theoretical rationality legitimates practices by reference to a natural order of 
things but in contrast to moral evaluation, it is followed by argumentation. It 
takes experimental, scientific, definition, explanation, or prediction forms (van 
Leeuwen 2007, 105).
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 Finally, mythopoesis is the legitimation through story- telling. It constructs the 
narratives whose results reward legitimate and punish non- legitimate actions 
(van Leeuwen 2007, 92). They take the shape of moral or cautionary tales (van 
Leeuwen 2007, 107). In the former, protagonists are rewarded for taking part in 
legitimate social practices or restoring the legitimate order (van Leeuwen 2007, 
105). The latter communicate what will happen if somebody does not conform 
to the norms of social practices. Their protagonists engage in deviant activities 
that guide to undesired endings (van Leeuwen 2007, 106). Single- determination 
and over- determination (inversion or symbolization) mythopoetize social actions 
(van Leeuwen 2007, 92, 2008, 120).
 Authorization, moralization, rationalization, and mythopoesis in van Leeuwen’s 
meaning are the modes of the legitimation of the use of political violence. All the 
discussed forms of legitimation serve to both legitimize and delegitimize the deploy-
ment of political violence (van Leeuwen 2007, 92; 2008, 120). They show how polit-
ical subjects justify and account for resorting to political violence to perform their 
goals. Thereby, they contribute to the very nature of a culture of political violence.
 The literature review has shown that the intensity of physical political viol-
ence leaves its mark on a society lastingly. Hence, the fourth essential feature of 
a culture of political violence is conceptualized by answering the question of the 
extent of the intensity of physical political violence. In order to circumscribe the 
values of the feature, one may check for how long political violence was and 
was not used in a given period on a given territory, or how much of this territory 
was and was not a scene of the use of violence over time. Notwithstanding, here, 
the intensity of physical political violence ranges from the maximally intense 
active to the abandonment of the use (Figure 2.2). The extreme theoretical cat-
egories establish a continuum. Making the threat is passive physical violence 
and locates halfway across the continuum. Then, the use of force localizable 
between the maximally intense physical political violence and the threat, exclud-
ing the latter, is active physical political violence.
 The scale applicable to evaluate empirical cases systematically is the continuum 
presenting the values of the feature. It is divided according to the extent of the 
intensity of physical political violence. The largest extent appears (A′) when move-
ment participants and representatives of a state apparatus make use of maximally 
intense physical force. Not only are the participants detained or arrested but they are 
being also wounded and killed. A high extent (B′) is when a case is between the 
maximally intense active physical political violence and the threat. The use is just 
slightly more often than the threat or the threat transforms frequently into the use. A 
moderate extent (C′) occurs when political subjects utilize the threat regularly but 
do not cross its qualitative line. It means that they avoid turning to active physical 
political violence. The intensity is low (D′) if the deployment of physical violence is 
between making the threat and the abandonment. There, passive physical political 
violence is deployed but not on a regular daily basis. Its complete absence indicates 
the abandonment of the commitment of physical political violence (E′).
 As the literature review has emphasized, the configuration of forms of polit-
ical violence allows us to see how cultures of political violence differ. The tool 
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under construction is far from turning to the traditional definition of political 
violence which equates it solely with war or active physical violence (Bernal 
2017, 32; Finlay 2017, 72). Instead, it approaches a culture of political violence 
from the perspective of answers to the question of what measures do political 
subjects adopt to commit political violence? An analytical approach towards the 
variety of means clinches the comprehension of political violence. All the 
answers fit in the continuum that ranges from a hard to soft power approach 
(Ad’ha Aljunied 2011, 656; Nye 2004). The discernment is not a simple refer-
ence to the demarcation between coercive power or payments on the one hand 
and attraction on the other (Nye 2004) but mirrors its very core (Figure 2.3). The 
hard power approach is based on the use of active physical political violence and 
bribery. In turn, the soft power approach is founded on the commitment of 
mental political violence and passive physical political violence. The mental 














Figure 2.2 Continuum of the intensity of physical political violence.
Source: Author’s own study.
A'' B'' C'' D''
Hard power approach Soft power approach
Configurations of forms of political violence:
A'' – the extreme predominance of active physical political violence
B'' – the combination of mental, and active and passive physical political violence
C'' – the combination of mental and passive physical political violence
D'' – the predominance of mental political violence and the absence of physical political
  violence
Figure 2.3 Continuum of forms of political violence.
Source: Author’s own study.
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Table 2.1 Essential features of cultures of political violence and their extreme values
No Essential features of cultures of 
political violence
Values of essential features of cultures of 
political violence
i political subjects that made use of 
political violence
(1) representatives of a state apparatus
(2) anti-austerity movement participants
ii mutual legitimation of political 







iii modes of the legitimation of the 













v forms of political violence (1)  the extreme predominance of active 
physical political violence
(2)  the blend of mental, and active and 
passive physical political violence
(3)  the combination of mental and passive 
physical political violence
(4)  the predominance of mental political 
violence and the absence of physical 
political violence
Source: Author’s study
type aims directly at gaining influence through multifarious appeal. Keeping in 
mind the properties of symbolic violence, let us underline that mental political 
violence encompasses both verbal and non- verbal activities (Bourdieu 
1991, 153).
 The scale applicable to interpret the pieces of data consists of four general 
points. A purely hard power approach (A″) occurs when active physical political 
violence is overwhelmingly predominant. A combination of soft and hard power 
approaches with the latter predominant (B″) appears when mental, and active 
and passive physical types of political violence are combined. A blend of soft 
and hard power approaches with the former dominant (C″) emerges when a 
blend of mental and passive physical political violence is in use. A purely soft 
power approach (D″) exists when just mental political violence originates.
 The conceptual framework of a culture of political violence consists of the set 
of the five concept- based observable indicators which take on values (Table 2.1). 
The comparative qualitative analysis employs it to examine paradigms of violent 
behavior of stakeholders of the post- 2008 anti- austerity movements in Austria, 
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Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
Germany, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Italy. Each type of a culture of polit-
ical violence is a particular configuration of the values of the essential features 
under scrutiny. To put it more concretely, the research examines what values 
were taken on by the concept- based indicators that create the hard core of a 
culture of political violence – its paradigm – in each case.
 The following parts of the chapter concentrate directly on those patterns. The 
analysis does not reproduce the broad- based activities of movements and of the 
police described in detail in current academic works (e.g., Andretta 2017; Crad-
dock 2017; Davies et al. 2016; della Porta 2017; Fernandes 2017; Flesher Fomi-
naya 2017; Katsambekis 2016; Konak and Dönmez 2017; Lombardo 2017; 
O’Connor 2017; Pickerill et al. 2015; Romanos 2017; Vogiatzoglou 2017). It also 
omits the causes and results of pursuing austerity policies because they are not its 
subject and have been broadly discussed in the substantive literature as well (e.g., 
Amenta 2016; Betz 2016; Borooah 2014; Cooper 2016; Dunn 2015; Jordà and 
Taylor 2016; Keller 2014; Klandermans and van Stekelenburg 2016; Mailand 
2014; Major 2014; Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos 2016). It avoids describing all the 
activities of the stakeholders engaged in the activities initiated by the movements. 
As the matter of fact, it does not count exactly what objects were thrown by protest 
participants at police officers, what forms political mobilization took, or how many 
times protesters deployed physical and mental political violence. Rather, it is of 
the essence to investigate what values the indicators took on in European states. 
The next sections of the chapter analyze cultures of political violence and present 
their values graphically by using the continua to illustrate the similarities and 
differences between patterns in a comparable and vivid way.
Empirical Study of Placid, Hector- Led, and Militant 
Cultures of Political Violence
A qualitative comparative analysis allows us to observe the three major patterns 
of a culture of political violence that entered post- 2008 Europe. They range from 
the most peaceful, through the moderately aggressive to the fiercely blazing 
types. The patterns are diversified intrinsically within their clusters, but they also 
differ widely from each other in terms of the criterion of forms of political viol-
ence. In fact, a type of a configuration of hard and soft power approaches is the 
critical feature that shapes the structures of the types. The form of violence 
entails what the intensity of political violence is and how stakeholders shape 
their political relationships. The conceptual representations of the components of 
cultures of political violence have individual semantic fields and empirical 
expressions, and as such, they are forceful to cluster the patterns.
Placid Cultures of Political Violence
The most peaceful type, placid cultures of political violence, entered Estonia and 
Slovakia. Their purely soft approach built upon mental political violence. The 
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mildly aggressive hector- led type emerged in Austria, France, and the Nether-
lands. Political subjects reached out for the soft power approach by combining 
mental and passive physical political violence. Dominant was, however, the 
former. In contrast to the placid, the cases of the hector- led pattern took 
advantage of the implicit threat. Political subjects employed active physical viol-
ence neither in the placid nor the hector- led cases. The last type, militant cultures 
of political violence were the least peaceful and occurred in Belgium, Finland, 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy. Just like the 
hector- led, this pattern drew on the blend of soft and hard power approaches. 
They differed, nevertheless, in the qualities of this configuration. The most 
aggressive type combined mental, and active and passive physical political viol-
ence. It means that the deployment of active violence characterized only the 
militant pattern.
 The further parts of the chapter present an account of empirical research struc-
tured into the state sections. The theory- driven case studies introduce the character 
of placid, hector- led, and militant cultures of political violence systematically by 
discussing similarities and differences between their expressions. The first part of 
the analysis focuses on the most peaceful types, Estonian and Slovak.
Estonia: “Welcome to the Titanic”
Let us start from the first peaceful case and the political subjects within that con-
tributed to the quality of its culture. In Estonia, representatives of the state appar-
atus and movement participants used political violence to express necessity and 
fear of the consequences of the financial crisis for the member states of the Euro-
zone respectively. The former, mainly political elites adopted the strategies of 
persuasion and information to influence the social reception of austerity meas-
ures by using mass media. Their action took the form of mental political viol-
ence, and they avoided deploying physical force (AFP 2013a; Ames 2012; 
Amundsen 2013; Bandow 2013; Guralnik 2017; Konwicki 2013; Mitchell 2012; 
Sahu and Jordaan 2013; Wagstyl 2012). In turn, among Estonian movement 
participants, in contrast to Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the 
Netherlands, and Ireland, attitudes towards the member states of the Eurozone 
which suffered from austerities were far from supporting or manifesting solid-
arity with others (Alter Summit 2015; Repečkaitė 2015). Although they were not 
manifestly hostile, they admonished the society against the following austerity 
policies. Estonian opposition to austerity measures, however, did not transform 
into mass political protests. According to the official information from Police 
and Border Guard Board, no event was organized in a public sphere to manifest 
a revolt over anti- austerity measures (Guralnik 2017). Instead, in a public sphere, 
movement participants located the banners expressing their clear opinion about 
the crisis and the austerity as the way of coming out of it. The banners showed a 
sinking ship named the Titanic. Smoke rose from its four chimneys marked with 
the sign of euro. The smoke was labelled with four names of the states: Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. The comment on the situation was the greeting: 
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“Estonia! Welcome to the Titanic” (in Estonian: Eesti! tere tulemast titanicule) 
(Moulds 2012). It was the indicator of mental political violence focused on 
making a pitch for a particular interpretation of the topical political situation.
 The modes of the legitimation of the use of political violence were: authoriza-
tion, mythopoesis, and rationalization. This set was unique in its lack of morali-
zation, and it entered merely Estonia. The activists introduced the authorization 
as the result of the freedom of speech and the manifestation of opinion within 
the legal boundaries. The mythopoesis drew upon the storytelling to account for 
and justify the use of political violence. It was the cautionary tale (van Leeuwen 
2007, 106) about the Titanic concentrated on conveying what would have hap-
pened if Estonia had not banned austerity measures. Mythopoesis should not be 
confused with the one- time internet memes common for the whole Eurozone 
which presented ironic messages but avoided telling stories, e.g., “If smoking 
doesn’t kill you, austerity certainly will” or “ ‘Never forget that everything Hitler 
did in Germany was legal.’ Martin Luther King Jr” (Anti- Austerity Anti- 
Corruption Ireland 2017). Finally, just as in the other European cases, the goal-, 
effect-, and means- oriented rationalization dominated in social media. It focused 
mainly on putting forward arguments against austerity policies and their makers, 
mainly particular politicians and the European Union.
 Worth stressing is, however, that in Estonia, as in Slovakia, representatives of 
the state apparatus and movement participants abandoned both using active 
physical political violence and making the threat (Figure 2.2: E′).
 The location of the case on the continuum was a result of the absence of phys-
ical political violence. Political subjects applied only a mental form to perform 
their goals. The arguments indicate that the soft power approach occurred in a 
pure form (Figure 2.3: D″). The Estonian culture of political violence had this 
essential quality of placid patterns in common with the Slovak type.
 In Estonia, just as in Slovakia, an extent of cohesion between political sub-
jects’ actual usage of political violence and agreement on the use took on the 
largest value because movement participants manifested their opposition to aus-
terity measures within the law and in the way fully accepted by representatives 
of the state apparatus. Similarly, Estonian politicians engaged in public relations 
concerning austerity measures made their point within the commonly accepted 
boundaries of public discourse (Figure 2.1: A). Moreover, opponents of the 
movement did not go beyond their rights to express opinion freely. The commit-
ment of mental violence fitted the rights and duties of political subjects con-
sidered by them to be fully appropriate.
 The values of the essential features of the conceptual framework point out 
that a placidly- observing culture of political violence emerged in Estonia. This 
pattern is the configuration of the following properties: (1) both representatives 
of a state apparatus and movement participants use political violence; (2) a 
maximum extent of mutual legitimation to the use; (3) the modes of the legiti-
mation of the use are authorization, rationalization, and mythopoesis; (4) an 
abandonment of physical political violence; and (5) a mental form of political 
violence constitutes a purely soft power approach.
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Slovakia: “No”
As in the case above, in Slovakia, representatives of the state apparatus and 
movement participants took advantage of political violence. A maximum extent 
of cohesion between political subjects’ actual usage of political violence and 
agreement on the use occurred there (Figure 2.1: A). Just as in Estonia, there was 
no strength confrontation between political subjects. Movement participants 
avoided engaging representatives of the state apparatus in their activities. Not 
unlike Estonia, in Slovakia, the action and non- action of political subjects 
achieved complete mutual legitimation.
 Furthermore, in Slovakia, as in Estonia, political subjects abandoned using 
active physical force and making the threat, and they used only mental political 
violence (Figure 2.2: E′).
 The political subjects involved in the movement’s public activities employed 
authorization by law as the mode of the legitimation of the use of mental polit-
ical violence. Movement participants organized peaceful strikes bound by local 
works. They carried banners and flags with the symbols of the Slovak trade 
unions. According to the available information, police did not secure the events 
(Balogová 2010; Cutler 2010). On the internet, mainly social media and discus-
sion platforms, the activists argued against anti- austerity measures (Císař and 
Navrátil 2015, 51, 53; Kubišová 2011; Malová and Dolný 2016; SITA 2013; 
SITA, Plus JEDEN DEŇ/vip, ds, md 2013; Sulík 2013). They made use of the 
effect-, means-, and goal- oriented instrumental rationalization. Similarly, repre-
sentatives of the state apparatus made use of these types of rationalization by 
applying the information and persuasion strategy (Kubišová 2011; Sulík 2013). 
In contrast to Germans, Austrians, Belgians, Finns, Frenches, Dutchmen, and 
Irishmen, Slovaks did not manifest support and solidarity with Southern Europe, 
which was typical for placid cultures of political violence but not only for them. 
Moralization and mythopoesis did not originate in the Slovak context, which was 
a unique property of this pattern.
 The purely soft power approach in the form of mental political violence 
emerged in Slovakia (Figure 2.3: D″). This feature occurred in Estonia as well.
 The Slovak case is the exemplification of a placidly rationalizing culture of 
political violence. The configuration of its properties encompasses: (1) both repre-
sentatives of a state apparatus and movement participants use political violence; 
(2) a maximum extent of mutual legitimation to the use; (3) the modes of the legit-
imation of the use are authorization and rationalization; (4) an abandonment of 
physical political violence; and (5) a mental form of political violence is a purely 
soft power approach. This pattern differs from the Estonian placidly observing 
pattern solely in terms of how political subjects legitimated resorting to violence. 
Whereas Estonians employed authorization, rationalization, and mythopoesis to 
justify and account for the use of violence that was to admonish people against 
austerity, Slovaks made attempts to authorize and rationalize the use perceived as 
a tool to improve their social well- being. In contrast to Estonians, Slovaks did not 
warn about the results of austerity measures but crossed them.
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Hector- Led Cultures of Political Violence
While the placid cultures of political violence were the peaceful paths towards 
goals, the hector- led ones manifested or implied a promise of a resort to active 
physical violence conditional on non- acceptance of certain expectations and 
demands of stakeholders of the anti- austerity movements. In Estonia and Slo-
vakia, movement participants decided not to hold protests, which limited the 
scope of circumstances favorable to the use of physical violence. They avoided 
creating such an environment and settled for mental violence. As a result, repre-
sentatives of the state apparatus were not obligated to confrontation, but they 
took part in the public discourse about austerity by employing mental violence. 
Police officers did not engage in events organized by movement participants. In 
contrast to the placid patterns, in the states of the hector- led pattern, the activists 
of anti- austerity movements staged protests. They created and perpetuated the 
opportunities to use active physical political violence to perform their aims. 
Vivid manifestations of readiness to deploy active physical force caused the 
engagement of representatives of the state apparatuses in the tense relationships 
between political subjects. The anxiety about crossing a qualitative line between 
passive and active physical violence fueled violent behavior of stakeholders of 
the anti- austerity movements and tensions between them. Dread was the emotion 
that marked the ways they perceived their use of political violence and them-
selves in political structures. This part of the chapter analyzes the hector- led 
Austrian, French, and Dutch cultures of political violence which were more 
violent than the placid but less aggressive than the militant patterns.
Austria: “Too Much EU Is Not Good for You”
In Austria, both representatives of the state apparatus and movement participants 
committed political violence when they were approaching austerity measures in 
a public sphere. The former used rationalization and authorization by law as the 
means to legitimate the use of political violence. They made attempts to show 
how Austria may have benefited from the EU- imposed policies (Bloomberg/
Hahn 2012; Neugera 2012). In turn, activists employed authorization by law, 
rationalization, and moralization (Klandermans et al. 2015, 155) during object-
ing austerity. They functioned within the boundaries of their political roles and 
authorized the use of violence by their rights. They also made use of moral 
evaluation. The primary value underscored on banners was solidarity with 
Southern Europe, most notably Greece (Wearden 2012). The public discourse 
concentrated on expressing a tremendous support for all those Europeans who 
suffered from austerity measures. References to abstraction, such as the future, 
well- being, and mothers’ love for the young affected by growing up in the times 
of austerity, and the future of cuts- stricken education of Austrian children, were 
also in use as the modes of legitimation. They occurred in banners with slogans, 
e.g., “With a whole heart for our children” (in German: Mit ganzem Herzen für 
unsere Kinder) (Press TV Videos 2013). Social well- being did double duty as a 
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vehicle to moralize and rationalize violent behavior. Whereas moralization 
avoided providing justifications but was the justification itself, rationalization 
drew upon the value’s nature to introduce arguments.
 Movement participants employed the instrumental goal-, means-, and effect- 
oriented rationalization to justify the use of threat and mental political violence 
against austerity. They based argumentation on the social well- being-driven jus-
tification (van Leeuwen 2007, 101). The protesters manifested a vehement 
opposition to the austerity measures implemented not only in Austria but also in 
the European Union as a whole. They justified the stance they pleaded by claim-
ing that the government programs are ruinous (in German: ruinös) (Wearden 
2012). The role of the internet – in particular, social media – to rationalize the 
use of political violence was a standard feature of the European anti- austerity 
movements (Anti Austerity Alliance 2017a; Anti Austerity Alliance Galway 
2017; Europe says OXI 2015; TVXS 2015a). The set of authorization, rationali-
zation, and moralization typified all the hector- led and militant patterns that 
entered: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy.
 Representatives of the state apparatus used regularly mental political violence 
through the mass media content. Passive physical political violence emerged as 
well when they attended the places where protests occurred to maintain and 
ensure public order, safety, and security. It took the form of protest policing, the 
control of protest (della Porta et al. 2006, 3). They were ready to employ coer-
cive and preventive measures and thus made the threat. The protesters did not 
use active physical political violence but concentrated their concerted efforts on 
mental measures that co- occurred with the threat. The verbal expressions used 
by Austrians allow us to see the features of their soft power approach. They were 
grounded in “saying no to austerity measures” (Wearden 2012). In a public 
sphere, activists displayed banners with anti- austerity slogans, e.g., “Too much 
EU is not good for you” and “Our Europe, your choice” (in German: Unsere 
Europa ihre Wahl) (Waites 2014).
 Not unlike in the Netherlands, in Austria, an extent of cohesion between polit-
ical subjects’ actual usage of political violence and agreement on the use was very 
close to the largest value (Figure 2.1: B). As the analysis has shown, movement 
participants staged events in a public sphere and made use of mental political viol-
ence to express their opinion in a commonly accepted way. They neither deployed 
nor provoked the use of physical force. Representatives of the state apparatus, on 
the other hand, took part in the events and used the threat over demonstrations. 
Movement participants accepted both the fact that and how the representatives 
used the threat. Police officers participated in anti- austerity events because viewed 
the activity of protest attendees as potentially and presumptively dangerous. They 
did not entirely approve activists’ behavior perceived as the threat to public order, 
safety, and security. In protest policing, officers used passive physical political 
violence. Hence, this mode did not take on the maximum value of the cohesion.
 The forms of political violence contributed to the soft power approach (Figure 
2.3: C″) in the shape of the blend of mental and passive physical political 
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 violence. On the continuum, the Austrian case was at some distance from the 
purely soft power approach because the employment of the threat was not in the 
minority. The mental mode did not function as predominant. However, no polit-
ical subject chose to make use of active physical force. Therefore, the forms of 
political violence were at a greater distance from the hard power approach than 
from the soft one. This quality also typified the Netherlands and France, which 
means that it was a common feature for the hector- led patterns.
 After the juxtaposition of empirical evidence, the analysis of the Austrian 
case identifies a low extent of the intensity of physical political violence. On the 
continuum of the intensity, just like the Netherlands and France, Austria was 
between making the threat and the abandonment of the use of physical political 
violence (Figure 2.2: D′). Although the threat was common, political subjects 
avoided bringing about its dangerous escalation not to transform it into active 
physical force. Passive physical violence was not dominant, and stakeholders 
were far from making it the major mode of operation.
 The pattern of a culture of political violence that entered Austria is a hector- 
consenting culture of political violence. Its properties are: (1) both representa-
tives of a state apparatus and movement participants use political violence; (2) a 
very high extent of mutual legitimation to the use; (3) the modes of the legitima-
tion of the use are authorization, rationalization, and moralization; (4) the 
intensity of physical political violence is on the continuum between the threat 
and the abandonment; and (5) the mental and passive physical forms of political 
violence compose a soft power approach.
The Netherlands: “No Euro, No Cry”
In the Netherlands, the spirit of solidarity with Southern Europe was similar to 
that observed in Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, and Ireland. The 
Dutch anti- austerity movement acted in fellowship with Spain and Greece by 
displaying the states’ flags and banners with slogans “No euro, no cry” 
(Euronews 2015c), and it turned against the EU- imposed austerity measures in 
the Eurozone (Connolly and Chrisafis 2012; The Economist 2013; Worldcrunch/
Expatica 2012). Representatives of the state apparatus and movement particip-
ants resorted to political violence while they were establishing their relationships 
over austerity. In the Netherlands, like Austria, an extent of cohesion between 
political subjects’ actual usage of political violence and agreement on the use 
was very high, very close to the largest value on the continuum (Figure 2.1: B).
 In the Netherlands, as in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Spain, 
Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy, political subjects employed 
authorization, rationalization, and moralization to legitimate the use of political 
violence. Movement participants staged events in a public sphere and made use 
of mental political violence to manifest their opinion in a commonly accepted 
manner. They neither deployed nor provoked the deployment of active physical 
force. In turn, representatives of the state apparatus participated in the proceed-
ings, but they policed protests by using the threat, which was accepted by the 
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movement. Police officers recognized the actions of activists as potentially and 
presumptively dangerous and impending public order, safety, and security. 
Therefore, just like Austria, in the Netherlands, the extent of the cohesion did 
not take on a maximum value.
 Representatives of the state apparatus employed mental political violence by 
adopting the information and persuasion strategies and made the threat by taking 
part in protests as the guards of public order, safety, and security. They revealed 
the readiness to deploy coercive measures if needed. Then, movement particip-
ants used mental political violence by marching against austerity policy and 
carrying flags and banners. They abandoned, however, employing active phys-
ical political violence and making the threat. Hence, in the Netherlands, the 
extent of the intensity of physical political violence was on the continuum 
between the threat and the abandonment (Figure 2.2: D′). Just as in Austria and 
France, it took on a low value.
 Anti- austerity event participants used the authorization by law as the mode of 
legitimation of the commitment of political violence. They also applied the 
instrumental goal-, effect-, and means- oriented rationalization. There was no 
difference between their performance in the Netherlands and the already dis-
cussed countries. Furthermore, the protesters who manifested solidarity with 
Southern Europe employed moralization by moral evaluation. As in the Nether-
lands, Austria, Belgium, Finland, and France, it consisted in evoking the value 
of fellowship in a public sphere. They also had a deep mistrust of representatives 
of the state apparatus in common (Smith- Spark 2012). The current decision- 
making processes that brought about the implementation of austerity measures 
were shown as the incentive to use political violence.
 In the Netherlands, as in Austria and France, the forms of political violence 
were on the continuum between hard and soft power approaches, close to the 
latter (Figure 2.3: C″). The identification of the Dutch case as the soft power 
approach was a result of the occurrence of the configuration of passive physical 
and mental political violence. Importantly to the nature of the pattern, no polit-
ical subject used active physical force.
 The same pattern of a culture of political violence that entered Austria also 
occurred in the Netherlands. The features defining a hector- consenting culture of 
political violence are: (1) both representatives of a state apparatus and movement 
participants use political violence; (2) a very high extent of mutual legitimation to 
use political violence; (3) the modes of the legitimation of the use are authorization, 
rationalization, and moralization; (4) the intensity of physical political violence is 
on the continuum between the threat and the abandonment; and (5) the mental and 
passive physical forms of political violence compose a soft power approach.
France: “Enough Is Enough”
Across France, activists staged angry protests against austerity measures and in 
the name of social services protection, public transport, and equality in employ-
ment (Le Monde 2014; McPartland 2015; The World Post 2013). Just as in 
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Austria and the Netherlands, they used authorization, rationalization, and morali-
zation to legitimate the use of political violence. According to movement parti-
cipants, they tried to explain to the government the necessity to change its 
economic policy because the effect of austerity was impacting on employment, 
public investments, and wages in an unacceptable and ravaging way (AFP 2015; 
Chabanet and Lacher 2016; McPartland 2015). They made use of banners with 
slogans to express their opinion and rationalize the commitment of political viol-
ence. Amidst them, the following were dominant: “Hollande, that’s enough,” 
“When you are leftist you support employees” (Wire services 2014); “Enough is 
enough!” (in French: Maintenant ça suffit!); “Against finance and austerity” (in 
French: Contre la finance et l’austérité) (McPartland 2015); “No to austerity!” 
(in French: Non à l’austérité) (Euronews 2015a); “Give Greece a chance,” “We 
support Greece #StopAusterity” (TVXS 2015b); “For a solidarity- based Europe, 
not for the austerity treaty” (in French: Pour une Europe solidaire, non au traité 
de l’austérité), “Resistance!” (in French: Résistance!) (Le Roux 2012); and 
“Labor, social equality, solidarity” (in French: Du travail, de l’égalité sociale, 
de la solidarité) (Julian 2012). French movement participants openly expressed 
their determined opposition to anti- austerity measures and gave voice to solid-
arity with Greece and the whole of Europe, just like the activists from Germany, 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, and Ireland (News247 2015; Zougla 
2015b). The expressions of support and solidarity with Southern Europe were 
typical for the hector- led cultures of political violence.
 Apart from banners, protesters carried flags, badges, flares, colorful balloons, 
and caricatures of Nicolas Sarkozy (The Globe and Mail 2010). They seldom 
burnt pallets and other flammable things to make the threat (The Globe and Mail 
2010). More often, however, they blocked access to public buildings and block-
aded oil depots and airports (Wolf 2010). The Eiffel Tower was unavailable to 
tourists because its staff decided to take part in protests (McPartland 2015; The 
Local staff 2015). Public and private sector workers stopped working and joined 
anti- austerity events. Also, senior citizens and students took to the streets (BBC 
2012b; Gleize 2015; John, Ireland, and Heinrich 2015; The Globe and Mail 
2010). Movement participants used mainly mental political violence and rarely 
the threat. They abandoned employing active physical political violence.
 Activists authorized the deployment of violence by a right to express their 
opinion in a public sphere. They rationalized violent behavior by the references 
to the goals, effects, and uses of the institutionalized social action and common 
knowledge (van Leeuwen 2007, 92). Apart from those dominant modes of legiti-
mation, they made use of moralization by moral evaluation. The values of social 
solidarity, equality, and justice as the means of moralization were in the 
minority. This set of modes was the feature of the hector- led and militant cul-
tures of political violence.
 In France, just as in Austria and the Netherlands, representatives of the state 
apparatus were ready to deploy the coercion means, but active physical political 
violence did not occur. They controlled the use of political violence and made 
the threat. Summing up the arguments, not unlike the other hector- led patterns, 
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the extent of the intensity of physical political violence was low. The case was 
on the continuum between the threat and the abandonment (Figure 2.2: D′).
 As in Austria and the Netherlands, in France, politicians and police officers 
legitimated the use of political violence by the instrumental rationalization and 
the authorization by law. The extent of cohesion between political subjects’ 
actual usage of political violence and agreement on the use was close to a 
maximum level (Figure 2.1: C). Both representatives of the state apparatus and 
movement participants used their duties and rights within the boundaries of their 
political roles in a manner accepted by the political subjects. They did not 
approve of incidents of the use of physical political violence. Anti- austerity 
event participants accepted each other in the political structure as well as the 
modes and purposes of applying political violence. A disagreement made an 
appearance just exactly over the incidents that were uncommon eventually. 
Hence, just as in Finland, the mutual legitimation took on a high level in France. 
This value was unique for those two cultures that were of different patterns. 
Whereas the French pattern was the most aggressive from among the hector- led 
examples, the Finnish militant pattern was the least violent within the militant 
cluster.
 The forms of political violence were between soft and hard power approaches, 
close to the former (Figure 2.3: C″). Just as in Austria and the Netherlands, in 
France, the configuration of mental and passive physical political violence 
emerged. Political subjects kept themselves from the use of the active type.
 An original pattern of a culture of political violence made an appearance in 
France. A hector- acknowledgment culture of political violence is featured with: 
(1) both representatives of a state apparatus and movement participants use polit-
ical violence; (2) a high extent of mutual legitimation to use political violence; 
(3) the modes of the legitimation of the use are authorization, rationalization, 
and moralization; (4) the intensity of physical political violence is on the contin-
uum between the threat and the abandonment; and (5) the mental and passive 
forms of physical political violence set a soft power approach.
 This pattern differed from the hector- consenting culture of political violence 
that entered Austria and the Netherlands in terms of mutual legitimation to 
commit political violence. The value of this feature took on a slightly lower level 
in France than in Austria and the Netherlands. Whereas the acknowledgment 
symptomatic of the French pattern consisted in passive countenancing how other 
political subjects use violence, the Austrian and Dutch consent based on general 
approval. The hector- led types had the remaining properties in common.
Militant Cultures of Political Violence
The most aggressive type of a culture of political violence that occurred in the 
times of austerity was also the most frequent. Whereas the placid patterns made 
an appearance in two cases and the hector- led pattern in three, the militant type 
entered nine states. The unique feature of the latter was the deployment of active 
physical political violence by stakeholders of anti- austerity movements to gain 
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their goals. They passed the qualitative line between passive and active force 
impassable for the placid and hector- led patterns. The evidence of the activity of 
political subjects shows that within the militant cultures of political violence the 
threat often transformed into active physical force. Furthermore, just as in the 
case of the moderately belligerent patterns, movement participants organized 
protests and thus generated numerous occasions to clash with representatives of 
state apparatuses. This part of the chapter scrutinizes the militant cultures of 
political violence that entered Finland, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Italy, Greece, Spain, and Ireland after 2008.
 The militant cultures of political violence differed in the mutual legitimation 
of political subjects to deploy political violence. Whereas in the aggressively 
militant pattern this feature took on a very low extent, in the obstreperously 
militant pattern just a low extent, and in an indulgingly militant a high extent. 
The aggressively militant and obstreperously militant types differed from the 
indulgingly militant one in terms of the intensity of physical political violence. 
While the former located on the continuum very close to the maximally intense 
active physical political violence, the latter was just close. It indicates that the 
aggressively militant pattern was the most violent from among the militant cul-
tures of political violence. The use of physical force was fully accepted by stake-
holders of the anti- austerity movements, which is mirrored by the highest level 
of the intensity in Greece, Spain, and Ireland. Nevertheless, simultaneously, 
those political subjects legitimated others to commit political violence to the 
lowest degree. Overwhelming brutality contributed to an extremely aggressive 
nature of that pattern. The obstreperously militant type was marked by a slightly 
higher extent of mutual legitimation to commit political violence than the most 
aggressive cultures. Despite the impetuousness of the former, it had a lower 
transformation potential than the latter to change into warfare. The narrowly 
represented indulgingly militant pattern was driven by general mutual legitima-
tion to permit physical political violence. Although within the indulgingly 
militant type the extent of the intensity was higher than in the other cases, it was 
still the acquiescence to crossing a qualitative line between the threat and the use 
of active physical force. In fact, stakeholders of the Finnish anti- austerity move-
ment were indulgent while they were shaping relationships and discourse about 
austerity measures.
Finland: “People’s Power”
Austerity measures caused one of the largest protests in Finland’s history, which 
resulted in closing down ports, canceling or delaying flights, and general disrup-
tion of other means of transport (Whitman 2015; YLE 2015b). Protesters staged 
anti- austerity events in many cities in the whole state. Publicly funded institu-
tions stopped working for one day in 2015 (BBC 2015b; S2W 2015). In Finland, 
both movement participants and representatives of the state apparatus employed 
political violence. The former who took part in protests made claims that they 
called three theses: against austerity politics in Finland, Europe, and the rest of 
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the world; an adequate livelihood for everyone; and human and basic rights for 
everyone (Väisänen 2015). Moral evaluation built on the references to human 
rights justified and accounted for violent behavior. Just as in Austria and 
Belgium, the activists made references to the value of solidarity with the coun-
tries suffering from austerity.
 Over protests, movement participants carried colorful balloons, flags, elec-
tronic devices playing pop music, and placards with writings: “People’s Power – 
Fuerza collective” (in Finnish: Joukkovoima) (Väisänen 2015); “#STOP,” “NO 
WAY” (in Finnish: EI ONNISTU) (The Malaymail Online 2015; TRT World 
2015; Press TV 2015); “No to cuts” (in Finnish: Ei leikkauksia; ei leikata!), 
“Cooperation not competition!” (in Finnish: Yhteistyötä ei kilpailua!) (Ei leikata 
2015; RT 2015a); “That’s Enough Now!” (in Finnish: Riittää Now!) (Finland 
Times 2014); and the scissors crossed out (Banjo 2015). Worth noticing is that 
the slogan “People’s power” directly mirrored the core of the new protest wave, 
the discourse of citizenship (Bosi et al. 2016, 7; Gerbaudo 2017). It was keenly 
and across the board employed to legitimate the use of political violence.
 Just as in all the hector- led and militant patterns, in Finland, movement parti-
cipants took advantage of authorization, moralization, and rationalization to 
legitimate the deployment of political violence. The claims and banners showed 
that the rationalization was instrumentally means-, effect-, and goal- oriented. 
Activists authorized the use of violence by evoking a right to express their 
opinion.
 Representatives of the state apparatus legitimated the use of political violence 
by the authorization of law too. During all the protests, officers made the threat 
by exposing direct coercive and preventive measures (Banjo 2015). Neverthe-
less, they did not settle for the use of passive psychical violence but made use of 
tear gas and pepper spray to disperse the agitators when the latter made attempts 
to break through a police barrier and approach the parliament building (Finland 
Times 2014). Active physical political violence was often in use because anti- 
austerity event participants fought with riot police. On the continuum, an extent 
of the intensity of physical political violence was moderately high. It placed the 
case between the maximally intense active physical political violence and the 
threat, close to the former. To be more specific, a value of the feature located 
between a high extent of the intensity and a moderate extent, close to the former, 
and thus the case took on a moderately high value (Figure 2.2: B′~). A tilde sign 
(~) in the figure indicates a close similarity of the case to the point of high 
extent, but simultaneously it means that the intensity did not crest and the prop-
erty was of somewhat lower or higher intensity than the high and the moderate 
extents respectively. Although physical political violence was not incessant, the 
threat more than often transformed into the use. This property made the Finnish 
pattern, which was the least violent from among the militant cultures of political 
violence, unique in the Eurozone.
 In Finland, the configuration of soft and hard power approaches emerged 
(Figure 2.3: B″). The case was on the continuum in a larger distance from the 
former. It was a consequence of the configuration of the means employed by 
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representatives of the state apparatus and movement participants. In Finland, as 
in Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Ireland, 
political subjects made use of the blend of mental, and active and passive phys-
ical political violence. It was a standard property of militant patterns.
 In Finland, not unlike in France, the extent of cohesion between political sub-
jects’ actual usage of political violence and agreement on its use was close to the 
greatest point (Figure 2.1: C). The feature took on a high value. Anti- austerity 
event participants condemned incidents of the employment of physical political 
violence. Political subjects approved each other in a political structure and the 
mode and purpose of applying political violence. A disagreement occurred over 
the incidents that, however, were not very often. Therefore, the discrepancy 
between political subjects’ actual usage of political violence and agreement on 
its use was moderate. Notably, the Helsinki Police detained the movement parti-
cipants that were blocking roads after the anti- austerity protests and refused to 
make way for traffic on Siltasaarenkatu (YLE 2015a). Activists informed offi-
cers about the other activists who did not want to leave the road (YLE 2015a). 
Representatives of the state apparatus co- operated with movement participants 
in the field of controlling the use of political violence.
 An indulgingly militant culture of political violence is the original pattern that 
entered Finland. The following properties are of its nature: (1) both representa-
tives of a state apparatus and movement participants use political violence; (2) a 
high extent of mutual legitimation to use political violence; (3) the modes of the 
legitimation of the use are authorization, rationalization, and moralization; (4) 
the intensity of physical political violence is on the continuum between the max-
imally intense active and passive physical political violence, close to the former; 
and (5) the mental, and active and passive physical forms of political violence 
constitute the blend of soft and hard power approaches.
Belgium: “Nothing but Crumbs for Us”
Just as in Finland, representatives of the state apparatus and movement particip-
ants used physical political violence in Belgium. They did not accept each 
other’s violent behavior. Although police officers deployed coercive measures 
within the boundaries of their political roles, movement participants went 
beyond the scope of their rights. Politicians and police officers did not leave it 
without comment and fierce reaction respectively. Therefore, the extent of cohe-
sion between political subjects’ actual usage of political violence and agreement 
on its use was low (Figure 2.1: D). The Belgian pattern had this property in 
common with the German, Portuguese, Slovene, and Italian cultures of political 
violence.
 In Belgium, the modes of the legitimation of the use of political violence were 
diversified in the way common for the hector- led and militant patterns. Political 
subjects used authorization, rationalization, and moralization to legitimate resort-
ing to political violence. Representatives of the state apparatus took advantage of 
the authorization by law and the goal-, means-, and effect- oriented instrumental 
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rationalization. In turn, movement participants utilized the authorization by law, 
the moralization by moral evaluation, and the same types of rationalization. Not 
unlike in Finland, in Belgium, the stakeholders made references to their political 
roles in the state. Thus, they justified and explained their brutal acts by an array 
of rights and duties in the political structure.
 Just like Austrian, Dutch, French, Finnish, German, Italian, and Irish activ-
ists, Belgians expressed the solidarity with those who suffered badly from aus-
terity policies (Protothema.gr 2015) to moralize the employment of force. The 
fellowship among Europeans was instrumentally employed in justifying the use 
of political violence. Activists carried Greek flags, banners with the mani-
festation of solidarity with Greece and Spain, and chanted anti- austerity slogans 
(Ls/sms, AP, dpa 2015; Protothema.gr 2015). Furthermore, they directly opposed 
the austerity measures implemented by Charles Michel’s government. The 
intensity of the verbal political violence expressed via banners took on a relat-
ively low value. The slogans used by activists in the widespread protests shed 
considerable light on the ways of accounting for and justifying the use of phys-
ical political violence. The dominant cries rationalizing the modes of operating 
were the following: “Nothing but crumbs for us” (in French: Rien que des 
miettes pour nous), “Austerity does not work” (in French: L’austérité ne fonc-
tionne pas), “No to austerity, priority to jobs and growth” (BBC 2010a), “Aus-
terity = sustainable poverty,” “Austerity measures = sustainable poverty” (in 
French: Austérité = pauvreté durable; Mesures d’austérité = pauvreté durable), 
“No to the impoverishment of the weakest” (in French: Non a l’appauvrissement 
des plus faibles), “Don’t touch the index!!!” (in French: Touchez pas a 
l’index!!!), and “People, not profit” (AFP 2014; France TV Info 2014; Le Monde 
2015; Ouest France Justice et Liberté 2015; La Tribune 2014). They expressed 
the instrumental rationalization. In turn, representatives of the state apparatus 
rationalized their violent behavior by showing it as a response to savage activ-
ists. They underscored the importance of performing duties.
 Then, as in Greece, Spain, Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy, in 
Belgium, the extent of the intensity of physical political violence was very high. 
It located the case between the maximally intense active physical political viol-
ence and the threat (Figure 2.2: A′~), considerably closer to the former extreme 
stage (Le Monde 2015). It has been marked with A′~ because it is the closest 
point on the continuum to the Belgian case. A tilde sign (~) in the figure means a 
close similarity between A′ and A′~, but simultaneously it indicates that the 
exact value of A′ did not crest.
 Movement participants threw things at police officers. The things utilized as 
weapons were stones, paving stones, firecrackers, flares, smoke flares, bottles, 
parts of fences, barriers, sticks, whistles, horns, and garbage mustered in the time 
of incidents (BBC 2010a, Le Monde 2015; L’obs 2014; La Tribune 2014). 
Activists also set fire to cars, motorcycles, tires, and cartons arranged in piles 
and devastated public and private property (Lyon 2015). Law enforcement offi-
cers answered the violent behavior by using water cannons and tear gas 
(AFP/A.P. 2015; Ls/sms, AP, dpa 2015; La Tribune 2014). As a result of 
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 confrontations, the most active participants were detained, arrested, and injured. 
Wounded in the protest policing were also police officers (20 Minutes avec AFP 
2014; RT en français 2015).
 In Belgium, the combination of hard and soft power approaches occurred 
(Figure 2.3: B″) as the blend of mental, and active and passive physical political 
violence. Frequent struggles were a direct reason for locating the case close to 
the hard power approach on the continuum. Belgium had this property in 
common with the other militant patterns that entered Finland, Germany, Portu-
gal, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Ireland.
 An obstreperously militant culture of political violence is the pattern that 
emerged in Belgium. Its properties are: (1) both representatives of a state appar-
atus and movement participants use political violence; (2) a low extent of mutual 
legitimation to commit political violence; (3) the modes of the legitimation of 
the use of political violence are authorization, rationalization, and moralization; 
(4) the intensity of physical political violence is on the continuum between the 
maximally intense active type and the threat, very close to the former; and (5) 
the mental, and active and passive physical forms of political violence contribute 
to the blend of soft and hard power approaches.
Germany: “Capitalism Kills”
The German pan- European and anti- austerity movement called the Blockupy 
(BBC 2015a; Eckardt and Angerer 2015; News24 2015) was less active than the 
Greek or Spanish movement (Radio Stimme Russlands 2012; Spiegel 2012). The 
most violent confrontation between anti- austerity protesters and representatives of 
the state apparatus took place ahead of the inauguration ceremony for the Euro-
pean Central Bank’s (ECB) new headquarters in Frankfurt (Associated Press 2015; 
McHugh 2015). Demonstrators chose this place because they held economic elites 
culpable for the social and economic consequences of austerity measures.
 In Germany, representatives of the state apparatus and movement participants 
used physical political violence. Authorities built the barbed wire barricades 
around the ECB for extra security (AFP/The Local 2015). Police officers had 
riot gear (AP 2015) and fired rubber bullets at the aggressive protesters (Dreier 
and Lantier 2015). They deployed police bats, pepper spray, tear gas, and water 
cannons to disperse protesters after the attacks on officers, firefighters, a police 
station, and the Old Opera House (BBC 2015a; Onyanga- Omara 2015; Spiegel 
2015b; Wessel and Ewing 2015; Yan 2015). Political subjects fought (Onyanga- 
Omara 2015) despite declaring peaceful attitudes (Reuters 2015). The police 
cars, private vehicles, bikes, furniture, tires, garbage bins, trash, billboards, 
fences, and flammable objects on the streets were set on fire (AP 2015; Healy 
2015; McHugh 2015; Il Messaggero 2015; Wessel and Ewing 2015; Yan 2015). 
Windows, waste bins, planters, and police cars were smashed (BBC 2015a; 
Fidler 2015; Healy 2015; Spiegel 2015c) and road signs torn out of the roads. 
The private and public property was severely damaged (Black et al. 2015; Sky 
News 2015).
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 Movement participants often dressed up as clowns (Fidler 2015; Weaver 
2015), manifested vulgar non- verbal signs (BBC 2015a), and threw smoke flares, 
concrete slabs, cobblestones, paving stones, stones, rocks, bottles, and metal 
objects at the public property and representatives of the state apparatus, includ-
ing firefighters (AP 2015; Associated Press 2015; BBC 2015a; Dailymail 2015; 
Kleeman 2015; Spiegel 2015a; Yan 2015). They also attacked police officers 
with an unidentified irritating substance similar to pepper spray (News24 2015; 
Yan 2015). Protesters blocked traffic (CBS News 2015). Some local schools, 
shops, restaurants, and trams stopped working (Capon 2015; CBC News 2015).
 The intensity of physical political violence situates Germany on the contin-
uum between the maximally intense active type and the threat, very close to the 
former (Figure 2.2: A′~). Its value was indeed very high. As in Belgium, Greece, 
Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy, in Germany, movement participants 
and representatives of the state apparatus made use of excessive active physical 
political violence.
 Political subjects decided to apply authorization, rationalization, and morali-
zation to legitimate the deployment of political violence, just as in all the hector- 
led and other militant types. The major mode of the legitimation of the use of 
political violence was the authorization by law, regardless of a political role. 
Politicians and activists used mass media to express and disseminate the argu-
ments for and against austerity measures respectively. In Germany, as in Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and Ireland, movement participants 
strongly emphasized the solidarity with Greece (Defencenet.gr 2015; Iefimerida 
2015; Newsbomb 2015; Pavlou 2015). They waved Greek flags and held banners 
stating “#thisisacoup” and “Οχι” which means “No” in Greek (Le Blond 2015). 
The “No” sign manifested opposition to austerity policy in the European Union. 
Activists also evoked people as a general value they fought for over protests. 
Movement participants used the moral evaluation to legitimate the use of polit-
ical violence as the values of solidarity and people were explicitly brought out.
 Representatives of the state apparatus stressed that they guarded, maintained, 
and restored public order. As they argued, their role was to provide citizens, 
denizens, and numerous foreigners engaged in protests with safety and security. 
Then, representatives of the anti- austerity movement proclaimed the protests to 
be loud but peaceful (Reuters 2015). They highlighted they were eligible to 
organize protests to make their point. Thus, anti- austerity event participants 
referred to the authorization by law when taking advantage of political violence.
 The third mode of the legitimation of using political violence was the goal-, 
effect-, and means- oriented instrumental rationalization. Stakeholders of the 
movement presented their arguments succinctly. They asserted they deployed 
political violence because of the socially adverse outcome of austerity measures 
and to manifest their strong opposition to the policy. Protesters displayed 
homogenous slogans; from among the most popular were: “People over banks, 
people over markets, humanity before profit” (Associated Press 2015), “E.C.B./
B.C.E. [in English: the European Central Bank (ECB)/in French: Banque cent-
rale européenne (BCE) – J.R.] stop your diktats,” “Capitalism kills” (in German: 
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Kapitalismus tötet) (Black et al. 2015; Sky News 2015), “Thanks for nothing” 
(in German: Danke für nichts) (Dpa 2015), and “Free caviar for everyone” 
(teleSUR/md- TP-cm 2015). Activists also chanted “Anti- capitalism” (in 
German: Anti- Kapitalismus), which was coherent with the banners (CBC News 
2015).
 As a result of clashes, the people involved were detained, arrested, and 
injured (Associated Press 2015; CBS News 2015; Kleeman 2015; McHugh 
2015; Yan 2015). In Germany, just as in Belgium, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy, 
the extent of mutual legitimation to use political violence was low (Sky News 
2015; Weaver 2015) (Figure 2.1: D). Indeed, those who attended clashes 
deplored the use of excessive active physical force. Political subjects labeled 
others as non- legitimated to behave in a violent way and for the purpose they 
did. As in Belgium, in Germany, the discrepancy between political subjects’ 
actual usage of political violence and agreement on the use took on a high value.
 The means used by political subjects over anti- austerity events indicated the 
occurrence of the blend of soft and hard power approaches (Figure 2.3: B″). The 
case was on the continuum close to the latter. Indeed, in Germany, just as in 
Finland, Belgium, Portugal, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Ireland, anti- 
austerity event participants used mental, and active and passive physical political 
violence.
 In Germany, just as in Belgium, the hallmarks of an obstreperously militant 
culture of political violence are: (1) both representatives of a state apparatus and 
movement participants use political violence; (2) a low extent of mutual legiti-
mation to use political violence; (3) the modes of the legitimation of the use of 
political violence are authorization, rationalization, and moralization; (4) the 
intensity of physical political violence is on the continuum between the maxi-
mally intense active type and the threat, very close to the former; and (5) the 
mental, and active and passive physical forms of political violence create the 
blend of soft and hard power approaches.
Portugal: “Fuck the Troika! We Want Our Lives!”
The Portuguese anti- austerity movement is called the 12 March Movement (in 
Portuguese: Movimento 12 de Março) (the name comes from the gathering 
staged on March 12, 2011, considered to be the beginning of the movement in 
Portugal) or the Portuguese for Struggling Generation (in Portuguese: Geração à 
Rasca). In Portugal, both representatives of the state apparatus and movement 
participants deployed political violence when acted for or against austerity meas-
ures respectively. Anti- austerity event attendees legitimated the use of political 
violence by employing authorization, rationalization, and moralization, not 
unlike in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Germany, Slovenia, and Italy.
 The 12 March Movement organized one of the biggest waves of massive pro-
tests in the history of the state (Accornero and Ramos Pinto 2015; de Notícias 
2013; Redação 2011) and commonly used both mental and physical political 
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violence. During anti- austerity events, activists played music, carried Portuguese 
flags and banners to express anti- austerity stances and, according to event organ-
izers, to create political awareness (Accornero and Ramos Pinto 2015; Al Jazeera 
and agencies 2012; Euronews 2013; 2014; Giunta 2015; McCauley 2015; Staff 
2013). The most famous slogans: “Fuck the Troika! We want our lives!” (in Por-
tuguese: Que se Lixe a Troika! Queremos as nossas vidas, also just “Fuck the 
Troika!”: Que se Lixe a Troika! (QSLT)) (the so- called Troika consists of the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European 
Commission) (Baumgarten and Carmo Duarte 2015); “The Troika only gives 
unemployment” (in Portuguese: Troika só dá desemprego); “Out, out of here, 
hunger and misery IMF [the International Monetary Fund – J.R.]” (in Portu-
guese: Fora, fora daqui, a fome a miséria e o FMI); “Merkel does not rule here!” 
(in Portuguese: A Merkel não manda aqui!) (Esquerda 2012); “Saving banks kill 
the people” (in Portuguese: Salvam bancos matam o povo) (Baumgarten 2013); 
and “For professional dignity and people’s security” (Queally 2013). Dignity, 
human safety and security, and human lives constructed the basis for the moral 
evaluation and abstraction applied to moralize the deployment of political 
violence.
 The remarkable employment of music as a tool of political violence charac-
terized Portuguese movement (NPR 2013). Activists wrote and sang the protest 
songs, which are thought to be a traditional tool of protest in Portugal (Baumgar-
ten 2017), in a tone similar to the banners: “Fuck the government,” “Fuck off 
back to Eton,” and “Bullshit lies. Revolting, revolting!” (for more see: Giunta 
2015). Protesters chanted over marches “Government, Merkel, and IMF out of 
here” (in Portuguese: Governo, Merkel e FMI fora daqui) (Esquerda 2012), and 
“General Strike” (in Portuguese: Greve Geral) (de Souza 2012). They legiti-
mated the use of political violence by the goal-, means-, and effect- oriented 
instrumental rationalization (Sousa and Santos 2014). The structure of this mode 
of legitimation did not differ from those adopted in the already discussed 
countries.
 In spite of declaring peaceful attitudes, movement participants clashed ser-
iously with representatives of the state apparatus (Santos- Moura 2012). Pro-
testers held flares (Telegraph 2013), set litter baskets and piled up litter on fire, 
jumped over the fire, attempted to set themselves on fire (BBC 2012a; Santos- 
Moura 2012), removed pavement, and deployed paving stones as a weapon 
(Santos- Moura 2012). They threw stones, rocks, metal objects, garbage, and 
burning objects at police officers. Some of the protesters were naked, others 
showed buttocks and wore masks (Santos- Moura 2012). Public institutions were 
closed, and their workers struck (Wise et al. 2012). Riot police in riot gear were 
armed with coercive measures and took advantage of them over clashes (Queally 
2013; Santos- Moura 2012). The threat more than often transformed into active 
physical political violence.
 Anti- austerity event participants legitimated the employment of political viol-
ence by law. Representatives of the state apparatus made the threat and permit-
ted it as a response to protesters’ attacks. The authorization to act aggressively 
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came from their political rights and duties. Activists, on the other hand, con-
sidered force to be a necessary device to achieve their political goals. They 
claimed that they made use of their rights and duties within the political 
structure.
 A very high extent of the intensity of physical political violence by stake-
holders of anti- austerity movement situated Portugal between a maximally 
intense active type and the threat, very close to the former (Figure 2.2: A′~). As 
in Belgium, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Germany, Slovenia, and Italy, in Portugal, 
movement participants and representatives of the state apparatus employed polit-
ical violence nearly maximally intensively.
 Within the Portuguese culture of political violence, an extent of mutual legiti-
mation to the deployment of political violence was low (Figure 2.1: D). Repre-
sentatives of the state apparatus did not misuse political violence. Police officers 
had to intervene to restore public order, safety, and security in a public sphere 
because movement participants abused active physical force. The deployment of 
excessive physical political violence was not accepted by the attendees of 
clashes and politicians. The political subjects engaged in clashes recognized 
each other as non- legitimated to act in the way and for the purposes they did. In 
Portugal, as in Belgium, Germany, Slovenia, and Italy, the discrepancy between 
political subjects’ actual usage of political violence and agreement on the use 
was high.
 Furthermore, the employment of political violence was the combination of 
soft and hard power approaches (Figure 2.3: B″). On the continuum, the case 
was close to the latter because stakeholders of the movement made use of 
mental, passive and active physical political violence. The feature took on this 
value also in Finland, Belgium, Germany, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, Spain, and 
Ireland.
 In Portugal, as in Belgium and Germany, an obstreperously militant culture of 
political violence is characterized by: (i) both representatives of a state apparatus 
and movement participants use political violence; (ii) a low extent of mutual 
legitimation to use political violence; (iii) the modes of the legitimation of the 
use of political violence are authorization, rationalization, and moralization; (iv) 
the intensity of physical political violence is on the continuum between the max-
imally intense active type and the threat, very close to the former; and (v) the 
mental, and active and passive physical forms of political violence constitute the 
blend of soft and hard power approaches.
Slovenia: “Do Not Wait for Spring – Spring Is Already Here”
In Slovenia, the anti- austerity movement, called the All- Slovenian Popular 
Uprising (Toplišek 2017; Kirn 2013a), was multi- generational, heterogeneous, 
and demonstrated the widespread nature of the dissatisfaction with political and 
economic elites, corruption, social inequality, and the austerity way the estab-
lishment responded to the crisis (Maza 2013b; Rushton 2013; The Slovenia 
Times 2012b). They heavily manufactured and underlined the distinction 
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between “they, the corrupted” and “we, the good” (RT 2013a; Toplišek 2017). 
Its rallying call was “They are finished!” (in Slovene: Gotovi so!) (Toplišek 
2017). Activists held numerous protests across the state (Euronews 2012; STA 
2012; Mekina 2012; Zerdin 2013). Even the public institutions stopped working 
for a few days (Zerdin 2013).
 The Slovene anti- austerity movement was, however, noted from staging “Pro-
testival” (Novak 2013). It was the set of cultural- social events organized in 
Ljubljana since December 2012 under the slogan “Do not wait for spring – 
spring is already here,” derived from the refrain of the popular Slovenian song 
(Maza 2013a; Nowak 2013). According to the manifesto, “ ‘Protestival’ articu-
lates protests against all political and economic measures that increasingly 
degrade human lives of Slovenians. They are specifically oriented towards the 
cultural expression of the people” (Maza 2013a). Movement participants 
assumed that “The ‘Protestival’ is a calling for a social renaissance and a return 
to the human while rejecting the manipulations of capital” and “It is connecting 
people through their cultural expression, via musical performances, physical 
theatre, puppets, poetry, as well as giving a voice to the protesters themselves, 
thus creating a unique people’s forum” (Novak 2013). People gave flowers to 
police officers and carried candles and the banners with the white zombie masks 
against the background of blackboards, made zombie masks, wore zombie 
masks, and disguised themselves as white- face zombies since the Prime Minister 
had called protesters “communist zombies” (Dakskobler 2012; Novak 2013). 
Many of them dressed up as diverse monsters to make reference to the zombie 
style and brought stage props, such as coffins and burning broomsticks (Dak-
skobler 2012; Gracner 2013). Some of the protesters were black- clothed (Mekina 
2014). Due to the zombie style (Ramos 2014), the protests organized by the 
Slovenian movement are known as the “Zombie Uprising” (Gracner 2013; 
Korsika 2015).
 In Slovenia, both representatives of the state apparatus and movement parti-
cipants used political violence, mainly over protests (Dr/jr et al. 2012). They 
legitimated violent behavior by applying authorization, rationalization, and mor-
alization, just as in other states of the militant and hector- led patterns. Movement 
participants fiercely clashed with police officers (Arbutina and glb 2012). They 
threw rocks, stones, bottles, metal objects, flares (CBC News 2012; Maza 2013a; 
RT 2012c), fireworks, firecrackers (Novak et al. 2012), torches, and home- made 
explosives at representatives of the state apparatus (Mekina 2014). As a result of 
numerous exchanges, rioters were injured, detained, and arrested (CBC News 
2012; Kirn 2013a; Maza 2013a; RT 2012c).
 Protesters burnt the pictures of Maribor’s (the city where some protests took 
place) Mayor Franc Kangler, litter baskets, and flammable objects (RT 2012c), 
and they severely damaged public and private property (Kirn 2013b). Police offi-
cers responded with the deployment of cavalry, water cannons, and tear gas to 
disperse the crowd and provide social safety and security. They also called air 
support (Durić and Žibret 2017; Kirn 2013b; Maza 2013a, 2013b; RT 2012c). 
The intensity of physical political violence was very high, which situated the 
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case extremely close to the maximum extent. On the continuum, it was indeed 
between the maximally intense active type and the threat, very near to the former 
(Figure 2.2: A′~). Not unlike in Belgium, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Germany, Por-
tugal, and Italy, in Slovenia, movement participants and representatives of the 
state apparatus made use of political violence almost maximally intensively.
 Apart from physical political violence, the mental type was committed. Whis-
tles and vulgar non- verbal signs such as giving somebody the finger were eagerly 
used (Dakskobler 2012). Movement participants chanted in front of the adminis-
trative building, “Thieves” (Maza 2013b), and on the streets, “It is enough!,” “It 
is over with them, they are done!” (in Slovene: gotov je, gotovi so!), “They are 
all crooks!,” and “We give the Parliament, but not the street!” (Kirn 2013b). The 
demand for “The spring to come, and Janša [the contemporaneous state’s Prime 
Minister, Janez Jananša] the political class to leave” was also popular (Kirn 
2013b). It appeared on banners as “Janša go home” as well (Santopadre 2012). 
Nonetheless, it was not the only slogan. Equally popular were: “I feel rEVOLt” 
[original spelling: with the marked inverted writing “LOVE”] (Wita 2013), 
“Power to the people,” “Let’s fire the troika, not the people” (RT 2013a), 
“Against EU servants” (Mekina 2014), “Dictatorship” (in Slovene: Diktatura), 
“End” (in Slovene: Do konca) (Dakskobler 2012), “No to destructive policies” 
(PanARMENIAN 2012), “Austere Austerity Leads to Even More Debt,” “You 
Can Take Everything I Have, But the Economy Still Won’t Grow,” “Stop to 
Social Inequality,” “Slovenia Is Most Competitive in Corruption” (The Slovenia 
Times 2012a), “All- Slovenian Revolt,” “Parliament is a criminal nest,” “Today 
is the new day,” “You are flexibly fired,” “You should walk among the people 
not over them,” “Thieves,” “Our city is not for sale,” “Fuck you, loan rates,” and 
“Direct democracy!” (APA Azeri Press Agency 2012; Tomaselli 2013). Thus, 
the protesters used, moralized, and rationalized the deployment of political viol-
ence (AFP 2012b; AP 2012; Dr/jr; Reuters; Vobič et al. 2014).
 Movement participants referred to an abstraction such as the people, society, 
social well- being, social equality, direct democracy, and independence to justify 
and account for the use of political violence. They also argued against austerity 
policy by showing its deleterious results, introducing goals of political mobiliza-
tion, and proposing means to solve the problems they turned against. Just as in 
other states, in Slovenia, the authorization by law was the dominant means of the 
legitimation of the deployment of political violence.
 In Slovenia, as in Belgium, Germany, Portugal, and Italy, the mutual legiti-
mation of stakeholders of the anti- austerity movement to deploy political viol-
ence was low (Figure 2.1: D). The Slovene case was marked with the use of 
excessive physical political violence that was unaccepted by clash attendees. 
Also, the political subjects engaged in anti- austerity events viewed each other as 
non- legitimated to act in the way and for the purposes they did. In sum, the dis-
crepancy between political subjects’ actual usage of political violence and agree-
ment on the use took on a high value.
 Although political subjects used the blend of soft and hard power approaches, 
the latter was ascendant (Figure 2.3: B″). Indeed, in Slovenia, just as in Finland, 
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Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Ireland, mental, passive, 
and active kinds of physical political violence were in use. Hence, the case was 
on the continuum in a larger distance to the soft mode than to the hard one.
 Not unlike in Belgium, Germany, and Portugal, in Slovenia, an obstreper-
ously militant culture of political violence originated. This pattern is marked by 
(i) both representatives of a state apparatus and movement participants use polit-
ical violence; (ii) a low extent of mutual legitimation to use political violence; 
(iii) the modes of the legitimation of the use of political violence are authoriza-
tion, rationalization, and moralization; (iv) the intensity of physical political 
violence is on the continuum between the maximally intense active type and the 
threat, very close to the former; and (v) the mental, and active and passive phys-
ical forms of political violence contribute to the blend of soft and hard power 
approaches.
Italy: “Nobody Represents Us”
The Italian anti- austerity movement, called the Pitchforks (in Italian: Forconi), 
was heterogeneous and consisted of the employees of public and private sectors 
and students mobilized in the Anomalous Wave (in Italian: Onda Anomala) 
under the slogan “We won’t pay for the crisis” (in Italian: Noi la crisi non la 
paghiamo) (AFP 2012a; BBC 2010b; Cullura 2013; Davies 2013; Gazzellanera 
2012; Mauro 2012; RT 2013b; Staff 2015; VWArticles 2013; Zamponi 2013). 
They opposed the activities of economic and political elites, including Silvio 
Berlusconi at the head (Arens 2014). The name of the Pitchforks comes from the 
movement’s roots among struggling farmers in Sicily, who in 2011 and 2012 
staged strikes and roadblocks to demand more support from the government 
(Cullura 2013). Italians decided against austerity measures and expressed solid-
arity with Spain, just like activists in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, and Germany. Their anti- austerity activities took place 
across the state (AP 2012).
 Representatives of the state apparatus and movement participants used polit-
ical violence regularly. They legitimated it by employing authorization, rational-
ization, and moralization, not unlike in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Portugal, and Slovenia. 
Moreover, in Italy, as in Belgium, Germany, Portugal, and Slovenia, the extent 
of cohesion between political subjects’ actual usage of political violence and 
agreement on its use was low (Avvenire 2012; Gazzellanera 2012) (Figure 2.1: 
D). Political subjects made use of excessive physical political violence but saw 
each other as non- legitimated to behave violently. As a result, the discrepancy 
between political subjects’ actual usage of political violence and agreement on 
the use was high.
 Over anti- austerity events, some activists wore Italian flag masks and white 
nooses around their necks (AFP 2013b; RT 2013b). They carried flags, danced, 
played music (Saviano and Scacchioli 2013), and fought with police officers 
(Agencies 2014; Elgot 2012; O’Leary 2013; Odd Stuff 2012; Tanglao 2014). 
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Protesters threw paint bombs, stones, rocks, smoke flares, smoke bombs, bottles, 
eggs, oranges, and firecrackers at government buildings and police officers 
(Agencies 2014; AFP 2013b; BBC 2010b; Chiariello 2012; O’Leary 2013; 
Repubblica 2015; RT 2013b; The World Post 2013). In spite of declaring peace-
ful attitudes (Marchetti 2013), they also attacked police officers in riot gear by 
using clubs, sticks, and home- made bombs (Agencies 2014; La Stampa 2012; 
Lampugnani 2013; O’Leary 2013; Saviano and Scacchioli 2013). They turned 
over litter bins, set garbage on fire (O’Leary 2013; Repubblica 2015), devastated 
private and public property (Bacchi 2012a; Cilluffo 2014; O’Leary 2013; Odd 
Stuff 2012; Saviano and Scacchioli 2013), including police cars (Saviano and 
Scacchioli 2013). The road traffic and public communication were stopped, 
flights were canceled, and access to tourist attractions were blockaded (BBC 
2010b; Davies 2013; Iannò 2013; Red.MM/mrj 2013; RT 2013b; Zamponi 
2013). Public and private institutions stopped working (Bacchi 2012b; CBC 
News 2013; DAC 2014). Representatives of the state apparatus recognized the 
violent activities as non- legitimated.
 Then, law enforcement officers deployed coercive measures, mostly batons 
and tear gas (AFP 2013b; Agencies 2014; Bacchi 2012a; The World Post 2013; 
Wire services 2014). They also made use of armored vehicles (Bacchi 2012a). 
Movement participants considered riot police actions to be the misuse of polit-
ical violence (Bacchi 2012a; 2012b; Odd Stuff 2012). Accordingly, those 
engaged in violent clashes were detained, arrested, and injured (AFP 2013b; 
Avvenire 2012; Agencies 2014; O’Leary 2013; Redazione Barlettaviva 2013; 
RQuotidiano 2012; Tanglao 2014; Wire services 2014).
 Overall, the intensity of physical political violence was very high, consider-
ably near to the highest level (Figure 2.2: A′~). It was on the continuum between 
the maximally intense active type and the threat, very close to the former. Just 
like Belgium, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Germany, Portugal, and Slovenia, in Italy, 
movement participants and representatives of the state apparatus applied polit-
ical violence almost maximally intensively.
 The authorization by law was the major mode of the legitimation of the use of 
political violence in Italy. Not unlike political subjects in the above cases, Ital-
ians also employed the effect-, means- and goal- oriented instrumental rationali-
zation. Movement participants deployed the moral evaluation by making 
references to the value of solidarity between the states most suffering from aus-
terity policies. They also referred to abstraction by calling the political repres-
entation question, rights to work, security, safety, and dignity.
 Buzzing, often chanted, and manifested on banners were the following 
slogans: “We will block the reform,” (BBC 2010b) “#fuckausterity,” “We won’t 
pay for the crisis,” “Nobody represents us” (in Italian: Non ci rappresenta 
nessuno) (Zamponi 2013), “No cuts, no profit!,” “Their reform will not pass” 
(BBC 2010b), “No to the Crisis and Austerity! Let’s take back our Schools and 
Cities!” (AFP 2012a), “Enough!” (Cullura 2013), “Austerity kills dignity. 
Reclaim Europe!” (Michael 2014), “One great work: home and income for all” 
(in Italian: Una sola grande opera: casa e reddito per tutti), “Fight against 
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insecurity” (in Italian: Lotta alla precarietà), “Siege to power” (in Italian: 
Assedio al potere), “Stop austerity” (in Italian: Smettere di austerità) (Sarra 
2013), and “We are the security hostages” (in Italian: Noi ostaggio della sicu-
rezza) (Iannò 2013). The stock graffiti predicated “Usurious loan sharks” (in 
Italian: Usurai strozzini) (Gazzellanera 2012).
 Political subjects employed the combination of soft and hard power 
approaches (Figure 2.3: B″). On the continuum of the forms of political viol-
ence, the Italian case was close to the latter because of the blend of mental, and 
active and passive physical political violence in use, just like in Finland, 
Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, Greece, Spain, and Ireland.
 In Italy, as in Belgium, Germany, Portugal, and Slovenia an obstreperously 
militant culture of political violence made an appearance. Its characteristics are: 
(i) both representatives of a state apparatus and movement participants use polit-
ical violence; (ii) a low extent of mutual legitimation to use political violence; 
(iii) the modes of the legitimation of the use of political violence are authoriza-
tion, rationalization, and moralization; (iv) the intensity of physical political 
violence is on the continuum between the maximally intense active type and the 
threat, very close to the former; and (v) the mental, and active and passive phys-
ical forms of political violence create the blend of soft and hard power 
approaches.
Greece: “Fight! They Are Drinking Our Blood”
In Greece, both representatives of the state apparatus and movement participants 
known as the Greek indignados or the Indignant Citizens Movement took 
advantage of political violence (Kanellopoulos et al. 2017; Nez 2016a, 178). 
However, the extent of cohesion between the political subjects’ actual usage of 
political violence and agreement on the use was very low (Amnesty International 
– Greek Section 2011) (Figure 2.1: E). Riot police and activists used tear gas and 
other expired and carcinogenic chemical substances during violent protests (Phil-
lips 2011; Radio Gamma 2015). Notably, police officers arrested movement 
participants before violent clashes and justified it by the need for averting 
aggressive confrontations, which met with strong public outcry (TVXS 2012). 
Activists claimed that representatives of the state apparatus committed an excess 
named the unlawful detention. Political subjects denounced the excessive use of 
physical force and recognized each other as non- legitimated to behave aggres-
sively. Therefore, the discrepancy between political subjects’ actual usage of 
political violence and agreement on the use was very high. The Greek pattern 
had this quality of mutual legitimation in common with Spain and Ireland.
 In Greece, just as in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Spain, the Nether-
lands, Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy, authorization, rationaliza-
tion, and moralization legitimated the use of political violence. Representatives 
of the state apparatus were geared to make use of coercive measures in the 
period of mass political mobilization (RT 2012a; Salonicanews 2011; TVXS 
2015c). Indeed, they deployed specialized less- than-lethal weapons, mainly 
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pepper spray, tear gas, flash bombs, chemicals, stun grenades, smoke bombs, the 
rifles that fire rubber bullets, batons, and Long Range Acoustic Devices (Beca-
toros and Gatopoulos 2015; Euronews 2015b; The Huffington Post 2015; 
McHugh 2015b; Maltezou and Papadimas 2013; Reuters 2011). The use of polit-
ical violence was instrumentally rationalized by introducing goals, means, and 
effects of violent behavior in a public sphere by politicians and police officers 
(Newsroom ΔΟΛ 2011).
 Political subjects used authorization as the mode of legitimation of using 
political violence. Representatives of the state apparatus highlighted their duty 
of protecting public order, safety, and security. Movement participants justified 
and accounted for its usage by the references to the right to express their thought 
freely. They also used the exaggerated rhetoric of rights and freedoms to act 
against austerity. The dominant ways of explaining the motives of undertaking 
violent means to manifest opposition to the so- called Troika, Angela Merkel, 
and austerity measures (Kousi 2016; Manolis 2013; Nallu 2015; Nellas 2011; 
Radio Gamma 2015; Strupczewski 2012) put on the banners were: “These meas-
ures are killing us little by little and lawmakers in there don’t give a damn” 
(Maltezou and Papadimas 2013) and “They are rich, they have everything and 
we have nothing and are fighting for crumbs, for survival” (Maltezou and 
Papadimas 2013). The very idea of general opposition fueled an anti- austerity 
campaign (Kanellopoulos et al. 2017). People who joined the anti- austerity 
movement manifested profound incomprehension of the implementation of aus-
terity policies (Nooz 2015; Stokokkino 2015; The TOC 2015).
 Protest participants hung flags and banners (Tagaris 2015). The most famous 
slogans were: “Thieves – hustlers – bankers” (in Greek: Κλέφτες – απατεώνες – 
τραπεζίτες), “You got the disease, we got the solution – revolution,” “We are not 
commodities in the hands of bankers and politicians,” “We don’t owe, we don’t 
sell, we don’t pay” (Georgiopoulos 2011), “Cancel the bailout!” (in Greek: 
Ακυρώστε το σχέδιο διάσωσης), “No to the policies of the European Union, the 
European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund” (Triandafyllou 
and Tagaris 2015), “No to the euro” (in Greek: Όχι στο ευρώ), “The People will 
not be blackmailed,” “The country’s not for sale” (Tagaris 2015), “We have 
been betrayed!”, “No” (in Greek: Οχι), “We said ‘No’, we meant ‘No’ ” (Ide and 
Szeftel 2015), “Unfuck Greece” (TVXS 2015a; Zougla 2015a), “We live in 
Europe” (in Greek: Μένουμε Ευρώπη), and “Greek – Europe – Democracy” (in 
Greek: Ελλάδα – Ευρώπη – Δημοκρατία) (In.gr 2015). Sometimes satiric car-
toons were displayed in public places to lampoon the politics deemed guilty for 
the results of austerity policy (Kaitatzi- Whitlock 2014; Kutz- Flamenbaum 2014; 
Radio Gamma 2015).
 Activists rationalized the use of political violence by showing how damaging 
influence the austerity measures had on social existence, what to do, and how it 
should be done. The instrumental rationalization was goal-, effect-, and means- 
oriented. In turn, moralization made use of the references to abstraction. Move-
ment participants invoked the state, the people, and democracy as the values 
which incentivized and fueled them to fight the austerity policy embodied by 
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representatives of the state apparatus and the European Union. They often 
pleaded the international solidarity and mental support for Greece from other 
European countries.
 When the movement acted, the Greek airplane, train, and ferry traffic in and out 
of the state stopped. Public buildings, such as schools, statehouses, banks, hos-
pitals, and numerous private businesses were closed (Real.gr 2015). Parliament 
was stormed. Garbage piled up on the streets (Maltezou and Papadimas 2013). 
Access to tourist attractions was blocked. Movement participants used sticks and 
pipes as the tools to fight with police officers (AP 2011) and threw Molotov 
 cocktails, firebombs, petrol bombs, rocks, stones, bottles, flares, smoke flares, 
pieces of marble, metal objects, and eggs at their opponents and public and private 
property (AP 2011; The Best News 2015; The Huffington Post 2015; Ide and 
Szeftel 2015; McHugh 2015b; Triandafyllou and Tagaris 2015). They caused 
enormous damage. Trash bins, cars, and some buildings, including, the finance 
ministry building and the Bank of Greece were set on fire (Euronews 2015b; 
McHugh 2015b; Maltezou and Papadimas 2013; Triandafyllou and Tagaris 2015). 
Local shops were looted (The Best News 2015; McHugh 2015b). Activists often 
chanted to warm up each other to act, “Fight! They’re drinking our blood” (Malte-
zou and Papadimas 2013). People put bags on their heads to simulate suicides. 
Those activities resulted in people’s death and more or less severe injuries 
(Guardian 2015; Phillips 2011). Law enforcement officers arrested and detained 
some of the protesters for questioning (Becatoros and Gatopoulos 2015).
 In Greece, the extent of the intensity of the physical political violence used by 
the stakeholders of the movement engaged in protests was very close to the 
extremely high strength (Figure 2.2: A′~). As in Belgium, Spain, Ireland, 
Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy, it took on a very high value. Movement 
participants and representatives of the state apparatus made use of political viol-
ence almost maximally intensively. They had a close shave with its transposition 
into the extreme point on the continuum.
 The configuration of mental, and active and passive physical political viol-
ence entered Greece, just like Finland, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Italy, Spain, and Ireland. The measures used by political subjects over anti- 
austerity events located the Greek case on the continuum between soft and hard 
power approaches, close to the latter (Figure 2.3: B″). This location was the 
result of the deployment of excessive physical force for the duration of the Greek 
anti- austerity movement.
 In Greece, an aggressively militant culture of political violence showed up. 
Symptomatic of this pattern are: (i) both representatives of a state apparatus and 
movement participants use political violence; (ii) a very low extent of mutual 
legitimation to use political violence; (iii) the modes of the legitimation of the 
use of political violence are authorization, rationalization, and moralization; (iv) 
the intensity of physical political violence is on the continuum between the max-
imally intense active type and the threat, very close to the former; and (v) the 
mental, and active and passive physical forms of political violence constitute the 
blend of soft and hard power approaches.
Post-2008 Cultures of Political Violence  91
Spain: “Not Enough Bread for so Much Chorizo”
The Spanish anti- austerity movement is called the 15-M Movement (in Spanish: 
Movimiento 15-M) because it began with the protest launched with the gathering 
on May 15, 2011, one week before local elections (May 22) (Beas 2011), the 
Indignados Movement (the Outraged), and the Take the Square (Taibo 2013). In 
turn, its participants are known as the indignados. The 15-M Movement was as 
heterogeneous as the Italian Pitchforks and actively functioned in the whole state, 
often by organizing mass protests (Galais and Lorenzini 2017; Nez 2016b).
 Representatives of the state apparatus and movement participants inflicted 
political violence (BBC 2014b; Day and Cobos 2012), which was of daily occur-
rence. They used authorization, rationalization, and moralization to legitimate 
the deployment of political violence, not unlike Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and 
Italy. In turn, as in Greece, in Spain, the extent of cohesion between political 
subjects’ actual usage of political violence and agreement on its use was very 
low (Figure 2.1: E). Not only were police officers ready to deploy coercive 
measures, but they also deployed and misused them (The Journal.ie 2012; Mail 
Foreign Service 2012; Telegraph 2012a). They beat the protesters with batons, 
forced people into riot police vans, and fired plastic and rubber bullets to dis-
perse the gathered in public places (BBC 2012b; Gates 2013; Tremlett and 
Traynor 2012; The World Post 2013). In social media, many users suggested the 
possibility that the secret police, infiltrated to cause violence, started most of the 
numerous violent clashes (Lopez 2012). In Spain, just like Greece and Ireland, 
the discrepancy between political subjects’ actual usage of political violence and 
agreement on the use achieved a very high level. Political subjects did not accept 
how each other fulfilled their rights and duties arising out of political roles.
 Protesters occupied public buildings and threw bottles, rocks, stones, flares, 
firecrackers, smoke bombs, and metal objects at policemen, and used sticks as a 
weapon (BBC 2014b; Gates 2013; Guardian 2014; RT 2014a; Telegraph 2012b). 
They set rubbish bins on fire and burnt police cars and makeshift coffins labeled 
“public services” (BBC 2012b; Gates 2013; Hedgecoe 2012). Also, they punc-
tured the tires of riot police vans (Tremlett and Traynor 2012), smashed shop 
windows, and vandalized cash machines (AFP 2012b; Keating 2014). The parti-
cipants of clashes were detained, arrested, and injured (CNN Wire Staff 2012; 
Guardian 2011; Heckle 2014; Sanz 2014). Private and public businesses stopped 
working because of strikes (The World Post 2013). Flights and trains were can-
celed. Metro and train stations were closed (The World Post 2013). People 
blocked traffic and access to tourist attractions. The extent of the intensity of 
physical political violence was, therefore, high and very close to the greatest 
point (Figure 2.2: A′~). The value of the intensity took on a very high value and 
had a transposition potential to change into the extreme type. Just as in Belgium, 
Greece, Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy, the Spanish movement 
participants and representatives of the state apparatus deployed political violence 
almost maximally intensively.
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 The modes of the legitimation of the use of political violence were the author-
ization by law, moralization by moral evaluation, and instrumental goal-, effect-, 
and means- oriented rationalization. Police officers asserted that acted to provide 
the society with public order, security, and safety. They declared aiming at pre-
vention, maintenance and, where appropriate, re- establishment of public order 
(Horsman 2017). Politicians supported this argument widely by utilizing mass 
media. The immoderate use of physical political violence was rationalized as the 
necessary tool to achieve those purposes (Lopez 2012).
 In turn, movement participants claimed that they were also authorized to 
commit political violence by the right to manifest their opinion and the freedom 
of speech. Protesters often used the references to dignity to moralize the use of 
political violence. They even called their marches the “Marches of Dignity” (in 
Spanish: Marchas de la dignidad) (BBC 2014a). Movement participants carried 
flags and banners with cartoons and slogans such as “No votes yet” (in Spanish: 
No les votes), “That we are governed by whores, their children have already 
failed us” (in Spanish: Que nos gobiernen las putas, sus hijos ya nos han 
fallado), “Real Democracy Now” (in Spanish: Democracia Real Ya) (Rioja2 
2011), “Revolt now,” “Tax the rich,” “Fighting or Slavery. Social Uprising” 
(Maltezou 2012), “Massive unemployment is violence” (JR/HJL/HRB 2015), 
“Bread, work and ceiling with DIGNITY. Walking towards the General Strike” 
(in Spanish: Pan, trabajo y techo con DIGNIDAD. Caminando hacia la Huelga 
General) (Agencies 2015), “Work, bread, and a roof (in Spanish: Trabajo, pan y 
techo) (RT 2015b), “Enough!” (in Spanish: Basta!) (Campos and Plandolit 
2015), “No more cuts!” (RT 2014a), “Regime of the 1%, Crisis for 99%” (in 
Spanish: Régimen del 1%, Crisis para el 99%), “We are 99%” (in Spanish: 
Somos el 99%) “1984 G. Orwell” (RT 2012b), “We can change the history” (in 
Spanish: Podemos cambiar la historia) (McHugh 2015a), “Rise up European 
People,” “No” and the sign of scissors (RT 2014b), “No to debt budgets” (in 
Spanish: No a los presupuestos de la deuda) (La Nación 2012), “It’s not a crisis, 
it’s the system,” “It’s not a crisis, I just don’t love you anymore” (RT 2012b; 
Goodman 2015), and “The Troika go home” (Heckle 2013).
 Activists beat drums and chanted “Yes, it can be done” (in Spanish: Sí, se 
puede) (RT 2012b; Goodman 2015), “They do not represent us” (in Spanish: No 
nos representan), “More education, less police” (in Spanish: Más educación, 
menos policía), “Do not look at us, join us” (in Spanish: No nos mires, únete), 
and “Resignation” (in Spanish: Dimisión) (La Nación 2012). Their argumenta-
tion introduced the aim to be achieved, the ways to perform them, and the 
expected effects. Mental political violence was dignity- driven because move-
ment participants eagerly evoked this umbrella moral value to justify and explain 
their aggressive behavior.
 Laying the consequences of austerity policies at the political and economic 
elites’ door was popular in Spain (Asara 2016; Font et al. 2015). The blame was 
fixed mainly on the members of Spanish parliament and bankers, who, on the 
other hand, rationalized their politics. Then, the involvement in the 15-M Move-
ment against the government and EU policy as well as broadly understood 
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 political elites was justified by their harmful acts: “We are here because we con-
tinue to be angry over the austerity policies which an economic elite is imposing 
on us” (RT 2012b). Graffiti saying “Guilty!” (in Spanish: Culpable!), and 
“Chorizo” on the statehouses and buildings owned by political and economic 
elites mirrored the major arguments (Tremlett and Roberts 2012). Furthermore, 
a poster used in the protests read “Not enough bread for so much chorizo” 
(chorizo is a type of traditional Spanish sausage made with pork) (in Spanish: 
No hay pan para tanto chorizo). It was the reference to political corruption 
because “chorizo” is the term employed to call somebody a “thief ” (Palabraspor-
madrid 2013). Corrupt practices and austerity measures were tightly connected 
as the sources of social hardship in the argumentation.
 In Spain, the violent measures used over anti- austerity events indicated the 
occurrence of the blend of soft and hard power approaches (Figure 2.3: B″). On 
the continuum set by these extreme values, the forms were closer to the latter 
due to the use of excessive mental, and active and passive physical political viol-
ence over protests. This value of the feature of a culture of political violence also 
entered Finland, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, and 
Ireland.
 Just as in Greece, in Spain, an aggressively militant culture of political viol-
ence appeared. Typical of this pattern are: (i) both representatives of a state 
apparatus and movement participants use political violence; (ii) a very low 
extent of mutual legitimation to use political violence; (iii) the modes of the 
legitimation of the use of political violence are authorization, rationalization, and 
moralization; (iv) the intensity of physical political violence is on the continuum 
between the maximally intense active type and the threat, very close to the 
former; and (v) the mental, and active and passive physical forms of political 
violence create the blend of soft and hard power approaches.
Ireland: “Not Even Our Waters Run Free”
In Ireland, both representatives of the state apparatus and participants of the Irish 
heterogeneous anti- austerity movement deployed political violence. Political 
subjects made use of authorization, rationalization, and moralization to legiti-
mate the employment of political violence, not unlike in the hector- led and the 
other militant patterns. Activists organized numerous protests against austerity 
measures, social politics, brutality of An Garda Síochána (commonly referred to 
as the Gardaí or “the guards”; An Garda Síochána means: the Guardian of the 
Peace, the Police Force of Ireland) (Anti Austerity Alliance 2017b; Duncan 
2010), and to express the solidarity with and support for Greece and Spain 
(TVXS 2015b). As in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, and the Netherlands, in 
Ireland, activists manifested the solidarity by displaying Greek and Spanish flags 
and banners with the slogans: “Ireland stands with Greece” and “Solidarity” 
(TVXS 2015b). The will of supporting the most suffering states was a kind of 
the moral evaluation (Desbos and Royal 2016) that legitimated taking advantage 
of political violence.
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 Worth underlining is that the extent of police officers’ brutality was so high 
that it became the source of further angry protests (Shea 2015). The Guardian of 
the Peace went beyond the use of the threat and deployed coercive measures to 
restore the public order and to increase the level of safety and security. Law 
enforcement officers and politicians legitimated the use of physical force by the 
authorization by law. Movement participants, nonetheless, thoroughly denounced 
police officers’ violent behavior and described them as unlawful. Officers acted, 
in the line of the opposite narration, in the scope of their rights and to carry out 
their fundamental duties (The Nationalist 2015). In Ireland, not unlike in Greece 
and Spain, the extent of cohesion between political subjects’ actual usage of 
political violence and agreement on its use was very low (Figure 2.1: E). Active 
physical political violence was misused by stakeholders of the anti- austerity 
movement. Political subjects did not accept how others fulfilled their rights and 
duties within political roles. They refused to acknowledge each other as not con-
travening the boundaries of the law.
 Authorization was also the mode of legitimation of the use of political viol-
ence selected by activists. They alleged the right to freedom of expression and 
freedom of assembly on the “public highway” (GuestPost 2015; Shea 2015) 
when they were acting aggressively (Adl 2015; BBC 2015b). Protest participants 
abruptly broke police barricades, which contributed to fierce clashes with repre-
sentatives of the state apparatus (Brennan 2014; Galway Bay FM 2012; Piggot 
2015). Police officers reacted to those activities by using pepper spray (Daniels 
2012), which enraged the crowd (AP 2013). As a result, protesters blocked the 
traffic, but police did not resort to physical force to disperse them (AP 2013). 
Rarely did the protesters throw at representatives of the state apparatus eggs and 
accidentally found objects (Tuite 2012). Political subjects often fought (Irish 
Examiner 2012). Some of the protesters were detained, arrested, and wounded 
(Brennan 2014; Preston and Silke 2014; RTÉ 2015; Tuite 2012).
 Rationalization and moralization also legitimated the use of political violence 
(Dublin 15 Anti Austerity Alliance 2017; Anti- Austerity Anti- Corruption Ireland 
2017). Protesters used a coffin draped in an Irish flag as a battering ram, and they 
chanted “They say cut back, we say fight back” (Irish Examiner 2012; Osiris 
2012). They torched flammable materials with the Irish political party symbols 
to express animosity towards the ruling class (Irish Examiner 2012). According 
to a popular narrative, “I’m here because I want to fight for my future” and “I 
want to be able to go to college, but Eamon Gilmore won’t let that happen” 
(Eamon Gilmore served as Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade 
from 2011 to 2014 and the Leader of the Labour Party from 2007 to 2014) (Irish 
Examiner 2012). Children held banners “My generation has no future in Ireland 
thanks to Fine Gael, Labour & austerity” (Murphy 2012). They moralized the 
use of political violence and employed it by using the abstraction reference. 
According to this discursive creation, they fought for their future and rights to 
education and self- realization. Simultaneously, they declared against representa-
tives of the state apparatus who sought to deprive them of the values by imple-
menting austerity measures.
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 Protesters stopped traffic and blocked access to tourist attractions, sang 
protest songs (Brennan 2014), carried Irish flags, and displayed banners with 
slogans (Bardon 2015; Dublin Bay North Anti Austerity Alliance 2017; Irish 
Examiner 2012) such as “Not even our waters run free” (Daniels 2012), “No 
way, we won’t pay” (Costello 2014), “Enda [Enda Kenny – the politician blamed 
for the results of austerity measures implementation]: stop punishing the poor 
for the sins of the rich,” “Reject fear – austerity stops here – fight the property 
tax,” “Fight for every job, resist every cut, people before profit,” “Fight auster-
ity, boycott property tax,” “Austerity out, Labour out now, shame on ICTU [The 
Irish Congress of Trade Unions]” (Murphy 2012), “Jail the banksters” (Pattison 
2015), and “Don’t register [to the party politics which supported and imposed 
austerity measures], don’t pay” (Humphries 2014). They carried the placards 
presenting pictures of the Labour Party founder and the 1916 martyr James Con-
nolly and the message: “Shame on you, Labour working- class traitors” (De 
Breadun 2012). The underscored values that contributed to the moralization 
mode were the people and rights to work and water. Rationalization drew on the 
opposition to the consequences of austerity measures. Activists claimed they 
employed political violence to make politicians both stop following the destruc-
tive policy and punish political and economic elites rather than citizens. They 
also strived to restore the social conditions from before the implementation of 
austerity measures.
 Hence, the instrumental rationalization of the use of political violence was the 
combination of goal-, effect-, and means- oriented argumentation against auster-
ity. Not unlike the other states, in Ireland, the hard core of moralization inspired 
rationalization by fueling the strong- worded argumentation. The modes of the 
legitimation were tightly interlinked. There, just as in the other cases, the argu-
ments applied to account for and justify the use of political violence were simul-
taneously its vehicle.
 The intensity of physical political violence in Ireland was between the maxi-
mally intense active type and the threat, very close to the former (Figure 2.2: 
A′~). It achieved a very high value. Not unlike in Belgium, Greece, Spain, 
Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy, in Ireland, movement participants and 
representatives of the state apparatus employed political violence nearly maxi-
mally intensively.
 In Ireland, not unlike Finland, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, Italy, 
Greece, and Spain, the blend of mental, and active and passive physical political 
violence stemmed. Then, the forms of political violence were on the continuum 
between hard and soft power approaches, close to the former (Figure 2.3: B″).
 Like Greece and Spain, in Ireland, an aggressively- militant culture of political 
violence made an appearance. The following features are characteristic of this 
pattern: (i) both representatives of a state apparatus and movement participants 
use political violence; (ii) a very low extent of mutual legitimation to use polit-
ical violence; (iii) the modes of the legitimation of the use of political violence 
are authorization, rationalization, and moralization; (iv) the intensity of physical 
political violence is on the continuum between the maximally intense active type 
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and the threat, very close to the former; and (v) the mental, and active and 
passive physical forms of political violence constitute the blend of soft and hard 
power approaches.
Typologies of Cultures of Political Violence in Times of 
Austerity
The application of the conceptual framework of a culture of political violence to 
the empirical study allows us to verify the hypothesis. When the post- 2008 anti- 
austerity movements acted, the patterns of a culture of political violence were 
undifferentiated in relation to a type of the political subject that employed viol-
ence to achieve political goals over the duration of the movements. Nonetheless, 
they richly differed in the values of its remaining four essential features: mutual 
legitimation to the use, modes of the legitimation of the use, the intensity of 
physical political violence, and forms of political violence.
 Similarities and differences between the patterns are apparent when we delve 
analytically into the details of the hypothesis. Once again, the cultures of polit-
ical violence were the same in terms of the stakeholders of anti- austerity move-
ments that made use of political violence. In Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Italy, both movement participants and representatives of the state 
apparatuses committed political violence. The activities of the former drew the 
latter in contention. Nowhere was one of them the only perpetrator.
 The cases were widely varied in the mutual legitimation to use political viol-
ence. The highest extent occurred in Estonia and Slovakia where the confronta-
tion of strength did not take place with political subjects’ consent. Participants of 
the Estonian movement avoided organizing protests. The Estonian and Slovak 
movements did not engage representatives of the state apparatuses in their activ-
ities directly. Instead, they held the discourses about austerity that were co- 
produced by their state opponents. The action and non- action of political subjects 
gained complete mutual legitimation. In turn, in Austria and the Netherlands, the 
mutual legitimation took on a value very close to the maximum extent. Admit-
tedly, it was very high but lower than in Estonia and Slovakia. Movement parti-
cipants organized events in a public sphere and used mental political violence to 
express their opinion in a commonly accepted manner. They neither used nor 
provoked the use of active physical political violence. Representatives of the 
state apparatuses participated in proceedings, but the protest policing benefited 
from the threat in the way accepted by the movements. The actions of activists 
were considered to be the potentially and presumptively dangerous threat against 
public order, safety, and security. As such, violent behavior was not fully 
approved. The cohesion did not take on the greatest value in those cases. A high 
extent of mutual legitimation in Finland and France located them close to the 
largest level. The incidents of the use of physical political violence occurred, and 
they were not legitimated by their participants. Political subjects approved others 
in the political structures and agreed upon the modes and purposes of applying 
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political violence. A disagreement appeared over eminently violent incidents 
that, however, were not very frequent. Therefore, the discrepancy between polit-
ical subjects’ actual usage of political violence and agreement on the use was 
moderate. A low extent characterized Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, 
and Italy. The use of excessive physical political violence was unaccepted by 
clash participants. Political subjects recognized others as non- legitimated to act 
in the way and for the purposes they did. Hence, the discrepancy between polit-
ical subjects’ actual deployment of political violence and agreement on the use 
took on a high value. A very low extent was in Greece, Spain, and Ireland. Spain 
was the only state where representatives of the state apparatus were accused in 
social media of initiating violent clashes in plain- clothes. In Greece, the police 
officers arrested movement participants before violent clashes and justified it by 
the need for preventing violent confrontations, which met with public outcry. 
Both in Greece and Spain, active physical political violence was misused by 
stakeholders of the anti- austerity movements. The violent actions of Irish police 
officers incentivized further angry protests. In Spanish, Greek, and Irish con-
texts, a full discrepancy occurred between political subjects’ real employment of 
political violence and agreement on its use. Opponents lacked mutual acceptance 
on fulfilling their roles in the political structures in using political violence. In no 
state, nonetheless, did clashes transform into a militant conflict, and thus 
nowhere a complete absence of the cohesion occurred.
 All the modes of the legitimation of the use of political violence made an 
appearance in the analyzed states, but they were slightly differently configured. 
The set of authorization, rationalization, and moralization occurred in most 
states: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy. The configuration of authoriza-
tion and rationalization entered Slovakia. In Estonia, authorization, rationaliza-
tion, and mythopoesis were in usage. It means that in each case, stakeholders of 
the anti- austerity movements applied authorization by law to explain and justify 
turning to political violence to achieve political goals. Not less popular was the 
goal-, means-, and effect- oriented instrumental rationalization that paved ways 
for the argument- based political violence. Political subjects also leaped at the 
moralization by moral evaluation and abstraction. The moralization was solid-
arity-, political-, and social- values-driven. Just in the Estonian case, the move-
ment made use of mythopoesis to spin the cautionary tale supporting the 
employment of political violence. The arguments throw light on the relative uni-
formity of the cases in the modes of the legitimation of resorting to political 
violence.
 The diversity of the cultures of political violence is mirrored by the variety of 
the values of the intensity of physical political violence that occurred in the 
European states. On the continuum, the first value of that feature located between 
the threat and the abandonment in the cases of Austria, France, and the Nether-
lands where the intensity was low. Then, between the maximally intense active 
physical political violence and the threat, close to the former was Finland. An 
extent of intensity was moderately high in the Finnish case. In Belgium, Greece, 
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Spain, Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy, an extent of intensity 
located between the maximally intense active physical political violence and the 
threat, very close to the former. There, the use of the active force was much 
more frequent than the passive one, and the latter often transformed into the 
former. The abandonment of using physical political violence entered both 
Estonia and Slovakia.
 The analysis neatly divides the cultures of political violence into three types 
according to the criterion of the forms of political violence. The first type char-
acterizes Estonia and Slovakia. There, mental political violence originated, cre-
ating the purely soft power approach. Austria, France, and the Netherlands were 
on the continuum in a larger distance to the hard point than to the soft one. 
Active physical political violence did not originate there. Thereby, the second 
type draws on the soft power approach which was the blend of mental and 
passive physical political violence. The last value of the feature was the most 
frequent and consisted in intertwining soft and hard power approaches. It entered 
Finland, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, Spain, and 
Ireland which combined mental, and active and passive physical political viol-
ence. The cases were on the continuum between the extreme types close to a 
hard power approach.
 The research results shed considerable light on the similarities and differences 
between the cultures of political violence which originated in the 14 member 
states of the Eurozone. The added value of the hypothesis verification is the con-
struction of the five already introduced typologies. Each one has been con-
structed according to one and homogeneous criterion. They form, however, the 
basis for a more informative typology of a higher exploratory value. When we 
apply those five criteria concomitantly and simultaneously to categorize the pat-
terns of a culture of political violence, we identify seven types of a culture of 
political violence among the Eurozone cases.
 The first two types are of a placid nature. Whereas the placidly observing 
culture of political violence emerged in Estonia, the placidly rationalizing pattern 
entered Slovakia. Political subjects won hearts and minds by using an unmixed 
soft power approach. The types slightly differed but just in the modes of the 
legitimation of the use of political violence. In the Estonian pattern, mythopoesis 
occurred apart from the Slovak set of authorization and rationalization. The third 
type, the hector- consenting culture of political violence, entered Austria and the 
Netherlands. France was the location of the fourth type, the hector- 
acknowledgment pattern. Those two patterns were hector- led but approached 
hectoring differently. They slightly varied in an extent of cohesion between 
political subjects’ actual usage of political violence and agreement on its use. 
Whereas the extent was very high in Austria and the Netherlands where the 
hector- consenting culture of political violence made an appearance, in France, 
where the hector- acknowledgment pattern occurred, it was just high. The indulg-
ingly militant pattern, the fifth type, occurred just in Finland. In turn, the multi-
tudinously represented obstreperously militant was the sixth pattern which 
occurred in Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy. The last pattern, 
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the aggressively militant type showed up in Greece, Spain, and Ireland. It 
was the most violent culture from among those that entered the Eurozone.
 The similarities and dissimilarities between the patterns have already been 
discussed. Here, however, it should be highlighted that the most significant 
difference between the last three types of cultures of political violence on the 
one hand, and the placid and the hector- led on the other, were forms of political 
violence. The placid patterns were based on the purely soft power approach in 
the form of mental political violence. Then, the hector- led patterns drew on the 
soft power approach in the shape of the blend of mental and passive physical 
political violence. The militant types took advantage of the blend of soft and 
hard power approaches. There, political subjects made use of the combination of 
mental, and active and passive physical political violence. Nonetheless, the 
militant patterns varied in an extent of cohesion between political subjects’ 
actual usage of political violence and agreement on the use. It was high in 
Finland (indulgingly militant), low in Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, 
and Italy (obstreperously militant), and very low in Greece, Spain, and Ireland 
(aggressively militant).
 The simultaneous and joint application of the five criteria allowed us to for-
mulate the seven- type typology which consists of the seven patterns of a culture 
of political violence: placidly observing, placidly rationalizing, hector consent-
ing, hector acknowledgment, indulgingly militant, obstreperously militant, and 
aggressively militant. It reveals the diversity of the cultures of political violence 
among stakeholders of the anti- austerity movements in the member states of the 
Eurozone. Not less importantly, it introduces what values the variable of the 
post- 2008 patterns of a culture of political violence take on for the 14 cases.
 In the next chapters, the research puts into work the variable in different mean-
ings on account of its roles in an explaining process. Chapter 3 makes use of a 
culture of political violence as a dependent variable because it tests the explanatory 
frameworks that consider it to be a thing to be explained. Independent variables 
are theory- driven parts of the explanatory frameworks and thought to have explan-
atory power to account for why the different patterns of a culture of political viol-
ence entered the member states of the Eurozone in the times of austerity. Then, 
Chapter 4 utilizes a culture of political violence as an independent variable. Thus, 
it tests the explanatory frameworks that present it as an explaining indicator. 
Dependent variables derive from the theories and are claimed to explain the results 
of the variety of the post- 2008 cultures of political violence.
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3 Towards the Explanations of the 
Sources of Cultures of Political 
Violence
Uncovering the Sources of Cultures of Political Violence
Identification of distinctive and essential features of the cultures of political viol-
ence which occurred in the Eurozone was a necessary step towards the explana-
tion of their sources. The objectives of the chapter are to test the empirical 
effectiveness of the current explanatory frameworks by working with the post- 
2008 incidents in which anti- austerity movements’ stakeholders participated, to 
make a contribution to the development of an explanatory framework meeting 
the correctness criteria, and to verify if a developed model accounts for the cul-
tures of political violence. The chapter evaluates empirically the explanatory 
frameworks, identified in the literature review, that treat cultures of political 
violence as the things to be explained.
 Although it may seem to be potentially useful to make a theory generation- vs-
verification contrast sharply to underline differences in research process stages, the 
distinction is not carried out so sharply in practice. Theory generation is highly 
dependent on proposing new explaining indicators and frameworks and progressive 
verification as well (Punch 2014, 134). Hence, the quest for the explanation of the 
patterns of a culture of political violence begins with verification. The process of 
testing is, however, led by methodological and theoretical effectiveness purposes on 
the one hand and the critical remarks formulated in the literature review on the 
other. A new approach is shaped and reshaped before proposing how to contribute 
to an explanatory framework useful to scrutinize the research subject field.
Methodology for Verification of the Theories that Consider a 
Culture of Political Violence as the Thing to be Explained
The chapter solves the second research problem of to what extent current explan-
atory frameworks explain why stakeholders of the post- 2008 anti- austerity move-
ments had particular patterns of a culture of political violence. To do so, it verifies 
the following hypothesis: current explanatory frameworks probably to a low extent 
explain why stakeholders of the post- 2008 anti- austerity movements had particular 
patterns of a culture of political violence. The current explanatory frameworks 
are those identified in the literature review and already assessed in terms of 
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correctness criteria and general applicability to empirical research. They undergo a 
test in spite of their drawbacks which are an insufficient reason for discarding the 
theories that prove problematic. Each theory in social science is controversial, and 
their development is accelerated only with theoretical, methodological, and empiri-
cal efforts rather than mere abandonment (Opp 2009, 8). The subsequent parts of 
the chapter formulate and test the specific theory- driven hypotheses.
 The statistical analysis method serves the verification of the specific hypo-
theses. The Pearson correlation technique allows us to determine the type and 
strength of linear correlations between explaining indicators and indicators to be 
explained. The analysis computes Pearson linear correlation (r) separately for 
each set of indicators, and it interprets research results under a more detailed 
scale than a standard measuring instrument to provide us with conclusions as 
precise as possible. Values on a scale present the conditions of rejecting null 
hypotheses. For a good research practice purpose, let us introduce the instru-
ment. It is as follows for positive coefficients:
|r| = 0 – the absence of correlation
0.0 < |r| ≤ 0.1 – very small positive correlation
0.1 < |r| ≤ 0.3 – small positive correlation
0.3 < |r| ≤ 0.5 – medium positive correlation
0.5 < |r| ≤ 0.7 – strong positive correlation
0.7 < |r| ≤ 0.9 – very strong positive correlation
0.9 < |r| < 1.0 – almost full positive correlation
|r| = 1.0 – full positive correlation
The research adopts a parallel scale for negative coefficients:
|r| = 0 – the absence of correlation
0.0 > |r| ≥ −0.1 – very small negative correlation
−0.1 > |r|  ≥ −0.3 – small negative correlation
−0.3 > |r|  ≥ −0.5 – medium negative correlation
−0.5 > |r|  ≥ −0.7 – strong negative correlation
−0.7 > |r|  ≥ −0.9 – very strong negative correlation
−0.9 > |r| > −1.0 – almost full negative correlation
and |r| = −1.0 – full negative correlation
The extreme values are often of asymptotic nature in social sciences.
 The analysis also conducts a two- tail test to compute the statistical signifi-
cance of the correlations, and it assesses them on a standard scale. The Pearson 
correlation is significant when the Sig. 2-tailed is at the 0.05 level or lower. In 
turn, it is not significant when the coefficient is at a level higher than 0.05.
 In turn, when there is no need to calculate, the explanatory models undergo 
the causal- process observations that allow us to handle the data- set observations 
(Brady et al. 2006) or they are rejected by critical argumentation (Munck 2016; 
Paine 2016; Schneider 2016). The choice of a set of methods, techniques, and 
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tools heavily depends on a type of data either qualitative or quantitative as well 
as on a quest for research process optimization.
 A type of cultures of political violence is a dependent variable which carries 
three values of its patterns located on a simple ordinal scale: placid, hector- led, 
and militant. A placid type is aggressive narrowly (coded as 1), hector- led – 
moderately (coded as 2), and militant – sublimely (coded as 3). As the previous 
chapter has shown, whereas Estonia and Slovakia had placid cultures of political 
violence, Austria, the Netherlands, and France – hector- led patterns, and Finland, 
Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Ireland – 
militant patterns (Figure 3.1). They were diversified in mutual legitimation to the 
use of political violence, modes of the legitimation of the use, the intensity of the 
use of physical force, and forms of political violence.
 Independent variables come from the theories identified in the literature 
review. The research tests each explanatory framework to evaluate and compare 
its empirical effectiveness with others. Thus, the explaining indicators recog-
nized as the potential contributors to a culture of political violence, whose valid-
ity is to be tested, are: intrastate elements of political violence involving vicious 
struggles for the pinnacle of political power by aspirants of collective political 
subjects such as ethnic groups or inhabitants of geographical entities, rivalry 
between regions, and colonization of the land (Ayele 2011), seminal experiences 
of war, revolution, and civil war (LaPorte and Worley 2008), structural indi-
cators (Onslow 2011), noisy and turbulent politics of the street, the town square, 
and the factory, in which socioeconomic grievances, hostility to state authority, 
and new and recycled dreams of a purified community are expressed (Gerwarth 
1A 1B 2C 2D 3E 3F 3G
(3) militant patterns(2) hector-led patterns(1) placid patterns
1: placid patterns
1A: placidly observing culture of political violence (Estonia)
1B: placidly rationalizing culture of political violence (Slovakia)
2: hector-led patterns
2C: hector-consenting culture of political violence (Austria and the Netherlands)
2D: hector-acknowledgment culture of political violence (France)
3: militant patterns
3F: indulgingly militant culture of political violence (Finland)
3G: obstreperously militant culture of political violence (Belgium, Germany, Portugal,
  Slovenia, and Italy)
3H: aggressively militant culture of political violence (Greece, Spain, and Ireland)
Figure 3.1 Post-2008 cultures of political violence in the Eurozone.
Source: Author’s own study.
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2011), the situation when the highly mobilized and urbanized civil society in the 
developed states with strong democratic traditions identified with the state does 
not confine its militaries to the narrowly constitutional role and ruthless and 
determined military governments threatens at length the civil society (Theobald 
1999), repeated expressions of political violence (Eubank and Weinberg 2000), 
tribal and religious loyalties (Waldman 2007), non- political agencies of sociali-
zation (Kling 1963), youths’ engagement in electoral violence (Okwong 2012), 
the fictions of political violence defined as novels, short stories, plays, movies, 
or parts thereof, where political processes and political views are reasonably 
close to the surface (Dexter and Guittet 2014), and the internationalist spirit of 
the 1960s (Pensado 2013). They are the explaining indicators derived from the 
theories which treat them as the sources of cultures of political violence.
 The second type of independent variables relates to the temporal dimension 
of political reality. It is the time from the date of the explaining indicator’s last 
occurrence (the independent variables of the first type) to the date of the first use 
of political violence by stakeholders of an anti- austerity movement. The time is 
determined by the simple subtraction expressible in the shape of the following 
straightforward algebraic expression: a – b = c. The period involved is the differ-
ence (c), and it forms a result of subtracting b from a. Whereas the date of the 
first use of political violence by stakeholders of an anti- austerity movement is 
the minuend (a), the date of a given indicator’s last occurrence is the 
subtrahend (b).
 Some general methodological assumptions are to be introduced here to shed 
light on the verification of the models’ empirical effectiveness in explaining the 
diversity of cultures of political violence. The application of the conceptual 
framework of a culture of political violence to the empirical analysis in the 
previous chapter allowed us to establish the dates of the first use of political viol-
ence by stakeholders of anti- austerity movements. Importantly, the dates rel-
evant to the research process indicate the beginning of objection to austerity. 
They were more than often in phase with the implementation of austerity meas-
ures in the states. Keeping in mind that, in the span under scrutiny, the opposi-
tion to social inequality and anti- democratic tendencies emerged as well, we 
made attempts to capture the very first violent behavior committed exactly 
against austerity. According to empirical evidence, stakeholders of the anti- 
austerity movements used political violence for the first time in 2010 in Belgium 
(BBC 2010a), France (The Globe and Mail 2010), Ireland (Duncan 2010), Slo-
vakia (Balogová 2010), and Italy (BBC 2010b); in 2011 in Greece (Phillips 
2011), Spain (Beas 2011), and Portugal (Redação 2011); in 2012 in Austria 
(Wearden 2012), Estonia (Guralnik 2017), the Netherlands (Connolly and 
Chrisafis 2012), Germany (Müsgen 2017), and Slovenia (Durić and Žibret 2017); 
and in 2014 in Finland (Finland Times 2014).
 Due to the lack of databases containing the indicators determined in the liter-
ature review, the research employs a qualitative method of written sources ana-
lysis to gather data sufficient and necessary to test the specific hypotheses. The 
research technique of data collection is a content analysis of secondary sources, 
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more strictly, secondary specialist literature concerning the indicators involved 
in the explanatory frameworks. It is crucial to establish what values are taken on 
by the indicators or the sets of indicators in particular states and to present them 
in the form of the data- set observations. These databases are the original contri-
bution of this research to the studies on cultures of political violence. For the 
purpose of empowering the basis of arguments, the analysis makes use of theor-
etical sampling and adopts sources triangulation. The research tool is an instruc-
tion to review the secondary data.
 The theory- based explanatory frameworks undergo tests in their existing, 
modified, and extended if necessary forms or are rejected if unmodifiable and 
unemployable to the case studies. The changes made in their content do not 
encroach upon the hard core of the models. The research verifies the central 
hypothesis by weighing up the arguments and counterarguments formulated 
throughout the chapter over the verification of the specific hypotheses concern-
ing particular explanatory frameworks. The conclusions and proposals inform 
clues useful to develop new models.
Intrastate, Regional, and Colonial Explaining Indicators
The first explanatory framework considers the intrastate, regional, and colonial 
indicators to be the things accounting for the culture of political violence in Ethi-
opia between 1769 and 2009. It defines the culture as the use of extensive phys-
ical political violence in the state. The intrastate indicator is the element of 
political violence finding its expression in vicious struggles for the height of 
political power taken up by aspirants of collective political subjects such as 
ethnic groups or inhabitants of geographical entities. The regional indicator is 
the rivalry between regions. The colonial indicator is the colonization of the land 
(Ayele 2011, 216–217). Although Negussay Ayele’s model is context- laden, a 
researcher acquires a universal explanatory framework after dropping the time 
and territory references from its design (Rak 2017a).
 Ayele’s explanatory framework informs the first set of specific hypotheses to 
be tested.
 H0: There might be no correlation between a fixed set of intrastate, regional, 
and colonial indicators and the time of its appearance in the history of a state and 
a pattern of a culture of political violence of stakeholders of an anti- austerity 
movement in the state.
 HA: If in the history of a state, a fixed set of intrastate, regional, and colonial 
indicators make an appearance, stakeholders of an anti- austerity movement in 
the state might have a militant culture of political violence, but the culture loses 
its militant value over time and the more time intervenes from the occurrence of 
the indicators, the more peaceful the culture gets.
 While mindful of state contexts (Bosi et al. 2015), the verification of Ayele’s 
model consists of three general stages set according to a subject matter criterion. 
On each stage, a different explaining indicator – out of the three – is submitted 
for analysis. The research checks carefully if the particular explaining indicator 
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occurred in the history of a state, when it took place last time before or over the 
continuance of an anti- austerity movement, and what was the time from the date 
of the explaining indicator’s last occurrence to the date of the first use of polit-
ical violence by stakeholders of an anti- austerity movement. It determines the 
values of the indicators detachedly for each state. Then, the fixed set of the indi-
cators and their configurations undergo a test as the components of the explan-
atory models.
 The first part of the test takes into consideration the first component of 
Ayele’s explanatory framework. In drawing on the secondary literature, it checks 
over whether the intrastate indicator occurred in the member states of the Euro-
zone. The model encompasses the active physical political violence expressed in 
brute struggles for the height of political power by aspirants of collective polit-
ical subjects such as ethnic groups or inhabitants of geographical entities (Ayele 
2011, 216). According to Ayele, the intrastate indicator occurs in a state when an 
ethnic group or inhabitants of a geographical entity pursue their claim to rule by 
deploying physical force. Making claims to rule is not associated with irredent-
ism whose hard core are territorial claims. Rather, this approach concentrates on 
the endeavors made to change the relationships between political subjects in the 
relation of public power. Intervention in politics is not just an opposition to 
ruling elites, but it is organized to take their place (O’Kane 2015). Those who 
used to be the ruled subjects seek to become the ruling subjects. Furthermore, on 
the grounds of a more general statement, if a collective political subject employs 
physical political violence to pursue its claim to rule, the intrastate indicator 
makes an appearance.
 The only state from among the 14 cases where the intrastate indicator did not 
emerge was Slovenia typified with the obstreperously militant culture of political 
violence. In the states with the placid patterns, the manifestations of the intra-
state indicator were the following: Estonia – the 1924 Estonian coup d’état 
attempt finished in 1924 (Valge 2011) and Slovakia – the 1948 Czechoslovak 
coup d’état in 1948 (Lukes 2011). Note should be taken, the Prague Spring 
(1968) does not meet the critical criteria of the intrastate indicator introduced in 
the theoretical framework because it was not an intervention in politics organ-
ized by the ruled subject to take the place of the ruling subject. The time from 
the date of the intrastate indicator’s last occurrence to the date of the first use of 
political violence by stakeholders of an anti- austerity movement was 88 years in 
Estonia and 62 in Slovakia.
 In the states with hector- led cultures of political violence, the intrastate indi-
cator took the form of the failed coup d’état attempt, the so- called July Putsch in 
Austria finished in 1934 (Klösch 2007), the failed coup d’état attempt, the so- 
called Troelstra’s mistake in the Netherlands in 1918 (Verkade 1965), and the 
failed coup d’état, the Algiers putsch, also known as the Generals’ putsch in 
France in 1961 (McCarthy et al. 2013). The time from the date of the intrastate 
indicator’s last occurrence to the date of the first use of political violence by 
stakeholders of an anti- austerity movement was 78 years in Austria, 94 in the 
Netherlands, and 49 in France.
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 The intrastate indicator took on the variety of shapes also in the states with 
militant cultures of political violence. They were: the failed coup d’état 
attempt, the so- called Pyjamas Coup in Greece finished in 1975 (Thomopoulos 
2011), the failed coup d’état, known as the 23-F in Spain in 1981 (Hill 2007), 
the Mäntsälä rebellion, the failed coup d’état attempt in Finland in 1932 
(Ahlbäck 2016), the Easter Rising in Ireland in 1916 (Dhiarmada 2016), the 
failure of the members of the German resistance to assassinate Adolf Hitler 
and seize control in Germany in 1944 (Hart 2013), the organization by the 
Armed Forces Movement the Carnation Revolution, a military coup d’état in 
Portugal in 1974 (Fishman 2011), the Belgian Revolution in Belgium in 1830 
(Church 1977), and the Golpe Borghese, the failed coup d’état attempt in Italy 
in 1970 (Tota and Luchetti 2016).
 The time from the date of the intrastate indicator’s last occurrence to the date 
of the first use of political violence by stakeholders of an anti- austerity move-
ment was 36 years in Greece, 30 in Spain, 82 in Finland, 94 in Ireland, 68 in 
Germany, 37 in Portugal, 180 in Belgium, and 40 in Italy.
 In the states with placid cultures of political violence, the intrastate time indi-
cator ranged from 62 to 88. Then, the ends of the continuum of the states with 
hector- led patterns were 49 and 94. In the states with militant types, the values 
of the indicator ranged from 30 to 180. The exemplifications of the latter pattern 
took on both the lowest and the highest values. Among the hector- led cases was 
the state with a lower value than the states classified as the placid patterns. In 
turn, the placid cases assumed a higher value than one of the hector- led cases. 
Strictly speaking, no regularity has appeared in the data concerning the time 
factor.
 The explaining indicator characterizes most of the states in the world, and it 
is of low explanatory power as the part of the model in its current form. The 
simple co- occurrence avoids providing any compelling explanation. Checking it 
for the dates of appearance, however, has failed to increase the model’s value. 
The analysis has revealed no regularity between the intrastate indicators and the 
cultures of political violence. The correlations between the variables support that 
argument. The Pearson correlation between a type of a culture of political viol-
ence and the occurrence of the intrastate indicator coefficient equals 0.189, indi-
cating a small positive linear correlation, and it points out that the coefficient is 
not significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.517, which is 
considerably higher than 0.05. Noticeably, there is no statistically significant 
correlation between the explaining indicator and the indicator to be accounted 
for at the 0.05 level.
 The time from the date of the intrastate indicator’s last occurrence to the date 
of the first use of political violence by stakeholders of anti- austerity movements 
ranged from 30 years in Spain with the aggressively militant pattern to 180 in 
Belgium with the obstreperously militant culture. The analysis has shown no 
regularity in the relationships between the types of a culture of political violence 
and the period under scrutiny. The correlation between a type of a culture of 
political violence and the time from the date of the intrastate indicator’s last 
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occurrence to the date of the first use of political violence by stakeholders of an 
anti- austerity movement coefficient equals −0.043, indicating a very small neg-
ative correlation, and it states that the coefficient is not significantly different 
from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.889, which is tremendously higher than 0.05. 
A statistically significant correlation does not exist between the variables at the 
0.05 level. Furthermore, the coefficient is counted for 13 out of 14 cases because 
the intrastate indicator did not enter Slovenia, which indeed reduces the meaning 
of the indicator even more so. The intrastate indicator occurred in 92.86 percent 
of the cases.
 In Ayele’s model, the second explaining indicator is the rivalry between 
regions. When the rivalry makes an appearance, the regional indicator emerges. 
The rivalry meeting a critical criterion existed in four out of 14 cases, in Spain, 
Ireland, Belgium, and Italy. In Spain, the rivalry between Catalonia and other 
regions was present over the Spanish anti- austerity movement continuance 
(2011) (Vargas 2015). The Irish anti- austerity movement co- occurred with the 
rivalry between Irish republican and Ulster loyalties (2010) (Phillips 2015). Sim-
ilarly, when the Belgian anti- austerity movement acted, the rivalry between the 
Flemish Region (Flanders), the Walloon Region (Wallonia), and Brussels- 
Capital Region entered Belgium (2010) (Collard 2014). Abruzzo (The Abruzzi), 
Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Emilia- Romagna, Friuli- Venezia, Giulia, Lazio 
(Latium), Liguria, Lombardia (Lombardy), Marche (The Marches), Molise, Pie-
monte (Piedmont), Puglia (Apulia), Sardegna (Sardinia), Sicilia (Sicily), 
Toscana, (Tuscany), Trentino- Alto Adige, Umbria, Valle d’Aosta, and Veneto 
rivaled in Italy when the Italian anti- austerity movement functioned (2010) 
(Valeriano 2013). The time from the date of the regional indicator’s last occur-
rence to the date of the first use of political violence by stakeholders of the anti- 
austerity movement was 0 in years, in each case.
 Whereas stakeholders of the anti- austerity movements in Belgium and Italy 
epitomized the obstreperously militant culture of political violence, Spanish and 
Irish political subjects formed the aggressively militant pattern. The explaining 
indicator co- occurred only in 28.57 percent of the cases. In Finland, Germany, 
Portugal, Slovenia, and Greece with the militant cultures, regional rivalries were 
not present. Although the regional indicator entered many states with the militant 
patterns, we should not overstate its meaning and explanatory potential due to its 
absence in the history of other states with the placid, hector- led, and militant pat-
terns. So, its role as the part of the explanatory framework is minor. However, 
the regional indicator did not co- occur in the states with the placid and hector- 
led types. It means that if a regional rivalry exists in a state, a militant pattern of 
a culture of political violence is more likely to originate there than placid or the 
hector- led patterns. More likely also is that if the rivalry does not emerge, a 
placid or hector- led pattern makes an appearance. Nevertheless, an extent of 
probability is not very high just because of the already discussed flaws.
 The Pearson correlation between a type of a culture of political violence and 
the occurrence of the regional indicator coefficient equals −0.432, indicating a 
medium negative linear correlation, and it shows that the coefficient is not 
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significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.123, which is strikingly 
higher than 0.05. The results demonstrate that there is no statistically significant 
correlation at the 0.05 level.
 Ayele defines the colonial indicator as the colonization of the land (Ayele 
2011). The analysis strives to observe if the territory of a state was colonized, 
rather than if a state was a colonizer. The meaning taken on by the explaining 
category comes directly from Ayele’s theory. It should not be, therefore, con-
fused with other types of relations between an empire and the territories ancil-
lary to the empire (Annus 2012; Loomba 2005). Additionally, the exclusion of 
the direct references to Ethiopia from the framework follows its replacement 
with another methodological assumption. The research dismisses the simplest 
approach of a colonizing Europe and a colonized Africa and Asia from the six-
teenth century onwards because it obscures the details of the colonial history, 
and it fails to consider the experience of people in colonies (Cooper 2005). It 
also does not adopt the questionable premise that a colony ought to be an over-
seas territory of a colonizer. The predicate “overseas” is not a distinctive feature 
of the colonies in the review of the history of the states (Steinmetz 2014).
 Instead, the institution of a colony in one territory by a ruling political subject 
from another territory, and the subsequent perpetuation, expansion, and exploita-
tion of that colony are of the nature of colonialism. The act of the institution 
manufactures a set of unequal relationships between the colonial center and the 
colony and, thereby, also between the colonists and the indigenous peoples. A 
group of people who leave their native state to create in a new land, a settlement 
subject to or connected with the parent nation, creates a colony.
 In the history of European states, colonialism was usually one of the types of 
dependency relations between territories, which emerged over time (Steinmetz 
2014). Their appearance had either a concealed or overt form (Bäcker 2011, 123). 
In spite of the considerable moderation of the criteria of the colonial indicator dis-
tinction, it appeared only in three out of 14 cases. It means that the explaining indi-
cator originated merely in 21.43 percent of the cases. It emerged in all the states 
with the placid cultures of political violence, that is, in Estonia, the colonial period 
finished in 1991 (Mertelsmann and Rahi- Tamm 2009) and 1989 in Slovakia 
(Myant 1992). Furthermore, in both cases, it took the form of Soviet colonialism, 
the occupation of the territories that later developed into a colonial rule (Annus 
2012). The indicator existed pending the end of colonialism. The term is acknow-
ledged as the date of the last occurrence of the indicator.
 Surprisingly, the time from the date of the colonial indicator’s last occurrence 
to the date of the first use of political violence by stakeholders of the anti- 
austerity movements was the same in both states, and it totaled exactly 21 years. 
The colonial indicator also entered Ireland, but the time was equal to 79 years. It 
was the Statute of Westminster 1931 (Hull 2015) which stopped the colonialism. 
In Ireland, in contrast to Estonia and Slovakia, the aggressively militant culture 
of political violence pattern emerged. Only one from among the nine states with 
the militant type was the colony. Furthermore, the colonial indicator did not 
enter the states with the hector- led patterns.
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 The Pearson correlation between a type of a culture of political violence and 
the appearance of the colonial indicator coefficient equals 0.595, indicating a 
strong positive linear correlation, and it points out that the coefficient is signifi-
cantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.025, which is strikingly lower 
than 0.05. It reveals a statistically significant correlation at the 0.05 level. Its 
meaning should not be, however, overestimated for the explanatory framework. 
Contrary to Ayele, the colonial indicator typifies the more peaceful patterns of a 
culture of political violence.
 On the one hand, the co- occurrence of the elements of the explanatory frame-
work is indisputable when we consider strictly and only the states with the placid 
patterns. On the other hand, the framework should be tested in this scope by 
working with further examples to verify if the relations between the indicators 
are not casual deceptively. We put forward this caveat because the research has 
identified no regularity between the indicators in other cases. In contrast to 
Ayele’s assumption, the colonial indicator did not precede the cultures of polit-
ical violence that benefited from the use of excessive physical political violence. 
Ireland, representing the militant pattern, was the only exception to this state-
ment, but the model in its current form does not introduce its potential deriva-
tion. Ultimately, although it cannot be foreclosed that the colonial explaining 
indicator comes in handy to account for the placid patterns, the model is of relat-
ively low explanatory power to deal with the question of the European cultures 
of political violence.
 The facts of simple occurrence explain little here. It would therefore be advis-
able to delve deeper into the very nature of the indicator. The history of colon-
ization is worth scrutinizing in terms of how many times a state was colonized, 
how long it was a colony, what the proceedings of the dependency relation were, 
and how exactly the relationship ended. One may consider the rhetoric of the 
new capitalism as a “new colonial” power (Sartre 2001) to be an inspiring frame-
work for a reconceptualization of Ayele’s model in the semantic field of the 
colonial indicator. Finally, it would also be desirable to check whether a state 
has been in some other dependency relations and, if so, what essential features it 
has had. Note should be taken that much more time passed from the date of the 
colonial indicator’s last occurrence to the date of the first use of political viol-
ence by stakeholders of the anti- austerity movement in the militant than the 
placid type. It suggests that in the former colonies which lost their colonial status 
a shorter time ago, it is more likely that a placid pattern occurs than in the 
colonies which lost it a long time ago.
 Ayele argues for employing the intrastate, regional, and colonial indicators as 
the fixed explaining set (Ayele 2011). Nevertheless, all the explaining indicators 
occurred merely in Ireland, that is 7.14 percent of the cases. It means that the 
explanatory framework as a unified whole has not provided a researcher with the 
possibility to explain and compare the sources of the cultures of political viol-
ence. The Pearson correlation between a type of a culture of political violence 
and the full Ayele model coefficient equals −0.189, indicating a small negative 
linear correlation, and it shows that the coefficient is not significantly different 
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from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.517, which is measurably higher than 0.05. It 
means that the correlation is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level, in con-
trast to Ayele’s assumption.
 The test of significance does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis at the 
0.05 level, which indicates that there is no significant correlation between the 
intrastate, regional, and colonial indicators and the time of their occurrence in 
the history of a state and a pattern of a culture of political violence of stake-
holders of an anti- austerity movement in the state. It means that the alternative 
hypothesis cannot be assumed.
 Apparently, the model has proved rather useless to approach the remaining 13 
cases where the fixed set of the indicators have not emerged. Its applicability is, 
therefore, confined to account for the culture of political violence entering Ethi-
opia in the particular historical period, in the line of Ayele’s original model. The 
verification of Ayele’s framework fails to come across with arguments for con-
sidering the straightforward involvement of the indicators to the explanatory 
model under construction. Nonetheless, it informs the explanatory model which 
approaches the indicators in specific configurations.
 It was much more useful to take the components of the explaining set as the 
elements of the arrays of diverse models which may emerge in various configu-
rations and thus create distinct frameworks. Stronger is a relationship between 
the configurations of the sets of the explaining indicators and the cultures of 
political violence than the individual explaining indicators and the patterns. The 
Pearson correlation between a type of a culture of political violence and a con-
figuration of the intrastate, regional, and colonial explaining indicators coeffi-
cient equals 0.651, indicating a strong positive linear correlation, and it points 
out that the coefficient is significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 
0.012, which is substantially lower than 0.05. It reveals notably a statistically 
significant correlation at the 0.05 level.
 Notably, the configurations of the explaining indicators show that only and all 
the placid cultures of political violence typify with the occurrence of the intrastate 
and colonial indicators. The hector- led types, but not only they, are marked with 
the intrastate indicator. More diversified are the explanatory frameworks of the 
militant pattern. The mildest militant culture of political violence, the indulgingly 
militant type in Finland, shares the explanatory model with the hector- led patterns. 
The moderately militant types, the obstreperously militant patterns in Belgium, 
Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy, are broadly based. They are explained by 
the set of the intrastate and regional indicators (Belgium and Italy) and just the 
intrastate indicator (Portugal and Germany). The model is not useful to explain 
the Slovene culture of political violence. The sets of the explaining indicators of 
the most thuggish patterns, the aggressively militant culture of political violence in 
Greece, Spain, and Ireland, were fully diversified. They were: just the intrastate 
indicator, the set of the intrastate and regional indicators, and the configuration of 
the intrastate, colonial, and regional indicators respectively.
 Undoubtedly, the full Ayele model encompassing the intrastate, colonial, and 
regional explaining indicators used as the fixed, united, and unchangeable set is 
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of low applicability to explain the occurrence of cultures of political violence. It 
may, however, be effectively modified to boost its explanatory power in the 
already introduced directions but, obviously, they are not the only one.
Experiences of War, Revolution, and Civil War
Norman LaPorte and Matthew Worley presume that if German party militants’ 
seminal experiences of war, revolution, and civil war take place, a culture of 
political violence occurs (2008, 246). Just as in Ayele, a culture of political viol-
ence is defined as the use of extensive physical political violence. The frame-
work lacks assumption about its gradability. In contrast to Ayele, not Ethiopia 
but Germany is the territorial context of the phenomena involved in LaPorte and 
Worley’s theoretical approach. The reference to the state makes the approach 
highly contextual and, thus, applicable to examine the research field severely 
restricted by the particular territorial boundaries. It may be, however, quickly 
removed from the explanatory model for the purpose of increasing the level of 
its applicability to empirical studies. The theory formulated by LaPorte and 
Worley informs the null and alternative hypotheses.
 H0: There might be no correlation between a fixed set of war, civil war, and 
revolution indicators and the time of their occurrence in the history of a state and 
a pattern of a culture of political violence of stakeholders of an anti- austerity 
movement in the state.
 HA: If in the history of a state, a fixed set of war, civil war, and revolution 
indicators occur, stakeholders of an anti- austerity movement in the state might 
have a militant culture of political violence, but the culture loses its militant 
value over time, and the more time intervenes from the occurrence of the indi-
cators, the more peaceful the culture becomes.
 LaPorte and Worley introduce a quite simplified but clear approach towards the 
explaining indicators (Carter et al. 2012; O’Kane 2015; Tarrow 2007). The 
straightforward occurrence of war, civil war, and revolution in a particular state is 
considered by them to be an explanation of the complex phenomenon of a culture 
of political violence. The predicate of “seminal” does not provide a researcher with 
additional aspects of conflicts as long as we assume that each of them always has 
socially important consequences. In fact, the model fails to cover the sources, 
course, and outcomes of warfare and revolutionary acts. The repertoire and 
intensity of contention, frequency, features, and dynamics of the indicators in the 
history of a particular state are omitted as well (McAdam 2014; Wada 2016).
 Sue Onslow’s case study of Zimbabwe shows that the distinctive features of 
war are worth taking into consideration in attempts to account for the most 
vicious cultures of political violence. Nevertheless, the researcher fails to 
produce any complete explanatory framework which would involve war. Onslow 
merely points out that some structural indicators may contribute to the occur-
rence of a culture of political violence (2011, 8). The category of a structural 
factor is broad, unspecified, and thus far from being applicable in its current 
shape to account for the European patterns.
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 By the time of testing the framework, the research verifies if, what, and when 
the explaining indicators entered the particular states. War is the first indicator 
under scrutiny, but it may be approached in at least two different ways. First, we 
can confirm the occurrence of the war explaining indicator if the authority of a 
state wages war. Second, we can verify the existence of the war explaining indi-
cator when the war takes place on the territory of a state and, thus, afflicts its 
populace. LaPorte and Worley avoid operationalizing the category, so the meth-
odological assumption to be made is not limited to the design properties. The 
first proposal concerns the war which might be somewhere beyond the interest 
of the state inhabitants. The questions of public advocacy of taking part in war 
and backlash against its making are outside the scope of the indicator features. 
Additionally, in general, they do not have to be taken into consideration by the 
ruling political subjects. The results of waging war are not necessarily socially 
noticeable and measurable. The second suggestion refers to a political structure 
as a whole to a higher extent. Denizens of a state are directly engaged in the 
warfare which is not recognized barely as a domain of political elites. Following 
the arguments, the research adopts the second variant form to deal with the 
values of the war indicator.
 LaPorte and Worley present the use of extensive physical political violence as 
the very essence of a culture of political violence. The results of their model 
application to analysis provide arguments against and for its empirical effective-
ness to explain dissimilarities between the patterns of a culture of political 
violence.
 For the sake of clarity, the dates recognized as the occurrence of the war, civil 
war, and revolution indicators are equal to the closing caesurae of the warfare or 
revolutionary activities in a state. Each state involved in the research was in a 
state of war in the past, including those with the placid patterns. It means that the 
indicator made an appearance in 100 percent of the cases. Warfare took the form 
of the Guerrilla war in the Baltic states finished in 1956 in Estonia (Zaccor 
1994), World War II in Slovakia, Austria, the Netherlands, France, Greece, 
Finland, Germany, Belgium, and Italy finished in 1944 in France and Greece, 
and in 1945 in the other states (Willmott 2008), the Peninsular War finished in 
1814 in Spain (Daly 2016), the dissident Irish Republican campaign was linger-
ing in 2010 when the Irish anti- austerity movement came into being (Tonge 
2014), and the Ten- Day War, called the Slovenian Independence War or the 
Weekend War finished in 1991 in Slovenia (Prebilič and Guštin 2010). It points 
out solely the absolute co- occurrence of the facts, which is nothing to marvel 
over because the war left its mark on the history of Europe.
 Note should be taken that the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) is treated as a 
civil war rather than war, although foreign military entities engaged in the 
warfare. This methodological choice is justified by the relationships between the 
belligerents. In fact, the major political actors were internal. They were just sup-
ported by the external entities (Matthews 2014).
 The sheer appearance of war in the history is not a forceful component of the 
explanatory framework proposed by LaPorte and Worley if we assess it out of 
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some other indicators. Not more useful is the next aspect under scrutiny, the time 
from the end of a particular war to the violent behavior of an anti- austerity 
movement. The Pearson correlation between a type of a culture of political viol-
ence and the time from the date of the war indicator’s last occurrence to the date 
of the first use of political violence by stakeholders of the anti- austerity move-
ment coefficient equals 0.095, indicating a very small positive linear correlation, 
and it reveals that the coefficient is not significantly different from 0. The Sig. 
2-tailed level is 0.747, which is higher than 0.05. It is not a statistically signi-
ficant correlation at the 0.05 level. It means that it does not matter how many 
years have passed since the war finished when we aim to explain the European 
cultures of political violence.
 The time, in years, from the date of the war indicator’s last occurrence to the 
date of the first use of political violence by stakeholders of an anti- austerity 
movement was: 56 in Estonia, 65 in Slovakia, 67 in Austria, 67 in the Nether-
lands, 66 in France, 67 in Greece, 197 in Spain, 69 in Finland, 0 in Ireland, 67 in 
Germany, 93 in Portugal, 65 in Belgium, 21 in Slovenia, and 65 in Italy. In the 
states with the placid cultures of political violence, it ranges from 56 to 65. The 
extreme values of the cases with the hector- led patterns are 66 and 67. No mean-
ingful regularity emerges between the indicators because the exemplifications of 
the militant types are on the continuum determined by 0 and 197. The values of 
all the cultures of political violence are localizable on the last continuum, which 
means that no regularity exists in the relationships between a pattern of a culture 
of political violence and the time from the date of the war indicator’s last occur-
rence to the date of the first use of political violence by stakeholders of an anti- 
austerity movement.
 The second part of the explanatory framework concentrates on the civil war 
indicator. Just like the war indicator, it fails to deal with the details of potentially 
useful properties to account for the diversity of the cultures of political violence 
(Hartzell 2009). The civil war emerged as the Austrian Civil War, also known as 
the February Uprising finished in 1934 in Austria (Jeffrey 1995), the Fronde in 
1653 in France (Davies 1990), the Greek Civil War in 1949 in Greece (Christo-
doulakis 2016), the Spanish Civil War, known as The Civil War or The War in 
1939 in Spain (Matthews 2014), the Finnish Civil War in 1918 in Finland (Arosalo 
1998), the Irish Civil War in 1923 in Ireland (Kissane 2000), The German Peas-
ants’ War in 1525 in Germany (Scott and Scribner 1991), the brief civil war in 
1919 in Portugal (Payne 2011), and the Italian Civil War in 1945 in Italy (Pavone 
2014). It did not occur in Estonia, Slovakia, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Slo-
venia, which means that the indicator emerged in 64.29 percent of the cases.
 It allows us to discern that civil war erupted in the states with the hector- led 
and militant cultures of political violence. Nevertheless, it did not erupt in all of 
those states, which inhibits detecting a considerably meaningful regularity in the 
relations between the indicators. Importantly, the civil war indicator did not 
make an appearance in the cases with the placid patterns. The Pearson correl-
ation between a type of a culture of political violence and the occurrence of the 
civil war indicator coefficient equals −0.509, indicating a high negative linear 
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correlation, and it points out that the coefficient is significantly different from 0. 
The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.063, which is slightly higher than 0.05. Therefore, it 
is not a statistically significant correlation at the 0.05 level.
 The time from the date of the civil war indicator’s last occurrence to the date 
of the first use of political violence by stakeholders of an anti- austerity move-
ment, in years, was: 78 in Austria, 357 in France, 62 in Greece, 72 in Spain, 96 
in Finland, 87 in Ireland, 487 in Germany, 92 in Portugal, and 65 in Italy. The 
values ranged from 78 to 357, in the states with the hector- led cultures of polit-
ical violence. The extreme values of the indicator in the states with the militant 
patterns were 62 and 487. In the states where the placid cultures of political viol-
ence originated, civil war did not break out. The analysis detects no regularity in 
the relationships between the variables because the continua of the hector- led 
and militant patterns overlap. However, we have to keep in mind that the civil 
war did not enter the states with the placid cultures of political violence, which 
is perfectly in the line of LaPorte and Worley.
 The linear correlation between a type of a culture of political violence and the 
time from the date of the civil war indicator’s last occurrence to the date of the 
first use of political violence by stakeholders of an anti- austerity movement is 
computed for nine cases because the civil war indicator emerged in nine from 
among 14 cases. The Pearson correlation coefficient equals −0.228, indicating a 
small negative linear correlation, and it reveals that the coefficient is signifi-
cantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.555, which is considerably 
higher than 0.05. It is not a statistically significant correlation at the 0.05 level.
 The last part of the explanatory model focuses explicitly on the revolution 
indicator. Just like the previous parts, it is limited to the simple fact of the occur-
rence of revolution. It makes us pose a question of why other forms of conflict, 
such as rebellion, revolt, uprising, putsch, coup d’état, and counterrevolution are 
not involved in the framework. Although they are beyond the subject matter 
scope of the model, their validity to account for the cultures of political violence 
is worth verifying in future research.
 Admittedly, LaPorte and Worley avoid introducing an operationalizable defi-
nition of revolution and its essential features, but they indicate that a political 
type of revolution is of relevance to a culture of political violence. Political 
revolution is a specific type of conflict which contributes to a rapid change of the 
relationships between political subjects: the ruled and the ruling, springing from 
both the ineffectiveness of a political system and its delegitimation (Beck 2015; 
Davies 1962; Stone 1966). This simple definition is applied to verify whether the 
revolution indicator entered the European states. To put it another way, only 
those examples of contentious politics which meet fully all the criteria intro-
duced in the definition are found revolutions. Accordingly, even if some events 
are known as revolution, e.g., the Singing Revolution (1987–1991) in Estonia 
(Brokaw and Brokaw 2001), but they fail to satisfy all the essential features of 
revolution handsomely, they are not placed into the category.
 The revolution indicator found expression in the Velvet Revolution or the 
Gentle Revolution finished in 1989 in Slovakia (Dellinger 2016), the revolution 
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of 1848–1849 in 1849 in Austria (Smith IV 2013), the Belgian Revolution in 1831 
in the Netherlands (van Goethem 2010), the French Revolution of 1830, also 
known as the July Revolution, the Second French Revolution or Three Glorious 
Days in 1830 in France (Church 1977), the Greek War of Independence, also 
known as the Greek Revolution in 1829 in Greece (Church 1977), the Glorious 
Revolution in 1868 in Spain (Smith 1953), the Irish Revolution in 1923 in Ireland 
(Coleman 2013), the German Revolution or the November Revolution in 1919 in 
German (Lambert 1999), the Carnation Revolution in 1974 in Portugal (Cerezales 
2016), the Belgian Revolution in 1831 in Belgium (van Goethem 2010), and the 
Revolutions of 1848, known in some countries as the Spring of Nations, the 
 People’s Spring, the Springtime of the Peoples, or the Year of Revolution finished 
in 1848 in Slovenia, and in 1849 in Italy (Rapport 2008). It means that the indi-
cator occurred in 85.71 percent of the cases. Revolution did not enter two states: 
Estonia and Finland, where the placidly observing and indulgingly militant cul-
tures of political violence came into sight respectively. It makes out a case that the 
straightforward occurrence of the revolution does not allow us to identify regular-
ity in data between the explaining indicator and the patterns of a culture of political 
violence. The Pearson correlation between a type of a culture of political violence 
and the occurrence of the revolution indicator coefficient equals −0.279, indicating 
a small negative linear correlation, and it shows that the coefficient is significantly 
different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.334, which is substantially higher than 
0.05. Then, it is not a statistically significant correlation at the 0.05 level.
 In years, the time from the date of the revolution indicator’s last occurrence 
to the date of the first use of political violence by stakeholders of an anti- 
austerity movement was: 21 in Slovakia, 163 in Austria, 181 in the Netherlands, 
180 in France, 182 in Greece, 143 in Spain, 87 in Ireland, 93 in Germany, 37 in 
Portugal, 179 in Belgium, 164 in Slovenia, and 161 in Italy. In the states with 
the placid cultures of political violence, the only value was 21. The values of the 
states with the hector- led patterns ranged from 163 to 181. The continuum for 
the militant patterns had the extreme points of 37 and 182. The values of the last 
two types overlap, which inhibits us seeing differences between the relationships 
between the variables.
 The research computes the correlation for 12 cases because the revolution 
indicator did not originate in the two other states. It scrutinizes the relationship 
between a type of a culture of political violence and the time from the date of the 
revolution indicator’s last occurrence to the date of the first use of political viol-
ence by stakeholders of an anti- austerity movement. The correlation coefficient 
equals 0.226, indicating a small positive linear correlation, and it intimates that 
the coefficient is not significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 
0.479, which is substantially higher than 0.05. At the 0.05 level, it is not a statis-
tically significant correlation.
 All the components of LaPorte and Worley’s explanatory model occurred in 
Austria, France, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Germany, Portugal, and Italy. The set as 
a whole did not enter Estonia and Slovakia whose patterns of a culture of polit-
ical violence were of placid nature. It means that all the indicators emerged in 
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85.71 percent of the cases. Let us emphasize that in no state with the most peace-
ful patterns the fixed set of the indicators appeared. It entered two out of the 
three states with the hector- led cultures, Austria (hector- consenting) and France 
(hector- acknowledgment). The Netherlands (hector- consenting) lacked the civil 
war indicator, just like the states with the placid types.
 The war, civil war, and revolution indicators were present in six from between 
the nine states with the militant cultures of political violence, that is, in Germany, 
Portugal, and Italy in the form of the obstreperously militant patterns and in 
Greece, Spain, and Ireland – the aggressively militant patterns. The set did not 
make an appearance in Finland, Belgium, and Slovenia. It appeared in all the 
most violent Greek, Spanish, and Irish cases representing the aggressively 
militant cultures of political violence. Nevertheless, apart from Greece, Spain, 
and Ireland, the fixed set of indicators also entered the states with less vicious 
patterns. It shows that the model in its current and undivided form does not allow 
us to see the distinct differences between the hector- led and militant cultures of 
political violence. Therefore, it would be advisable to consider the inclusion of 
additional indicators to its content and to pay more attention to the details of the 
existing indicators (McAdam 2003).
 Despite LaPorte and Worley’s assumptions, the correlation between a type of 
a culture of political violence and the fixed set of the war, civil war, and revolu-
tion indicators coefficient equals 0.394, indicating a moderate positive linear 
correlation. It testifies that the coefficient is not significantly different from 0. 
The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.163, which is considerably higher than 0.05. It points 
out that correlation is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
 Evidence does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis. There is no signi-
ficant correlation between the war, civil war, and revolution indicators and the 
time of their occurrence in the history of the member states of the Eurozone and 
the cultures of political violence of stakeholders of anti- austerity movements in 
the states, at the 0.05 level. LaPorte and Worley’s explanatory framework is 
effective to explain the diversity of cultures of political violence to a low extent.
 Nevertheless, if we look at LaPorte and Worley’s model, not as the fixed 
totality but a modifiable set of components, its empirical effectiveness is greater. 
According to a modified framework, if in the history of a state, the war or the 
war and revolution occur, it is likely that a placid pattern enters the state. The 
placidly- observing culture of political violence followed the war in Estonia. In 
Slovakia, the war and revolution preceded the placidly rationalizing pattern. The 
relationship between the variables is more probable to appear in the states with a 
placid type when just the war indicator makes an appearance in a state because 
some examples with not only the placid but also hector- led and militant patterns 
had the set of war and revolution in common. The hector- led types were fueled 
by this set but also by the full LaPorte and Worley’s explanatory framework 
encompassing the war, civil war, and revolution indicators. The hector- 
consenting culture of political violence co- occurred with those two configura-
tions in the history of Austria and the Netherlands. In turn, in France, the full set 
preceded the hector- acknowledgment pattern.
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 The model is invulnerable to notice the sharp differences between the sources 
of the hector- led and militant types. The mildest militant pattern, the indulgingly 
militant culture of political violence which entered Finland co- occurred in the 
state with the set of war and revolution which also was correlated with the 
hector- led types. The moderate type, the obstreperously militant pattern that 
entered Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy may be explained with 
the appearance of the war and revolution set in Belgium and Slovenia and the 
full set of the indicators in Germany, Portugal, and Italy. The most vicious 
pattern, the aggressively militant culture might be accounted for just the com-
plete set of war, civil war, and revolution in Greece, Spain, and Ireland. Thereby, 
if we observe the emergence of the comprehensive set in the history of a state, it 
is more likely that political subjects in its structure will represent a more relent-
less culture of political violence. This part of the test confirms the validity of the 
already discussed assumption made by LaPorte and Worley.
 The explaining indicators in particular configurations are more empirically 
effective to explain the sources of the cultures of political violence than the fixed 
set of factors. The test has thrown light on the relationships between the configu-
rations of the war, civil war, and revolution explaining indicators on the one 
hand and the patterns of a culture of political violence on the other. The correl-
ation coefficient equals 0.545, indicating a high positive linear correlation 
between the variables, and it reveals that the coefficient is significantly different 
from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.044, which is slightly lower than 0.05. It is 
indeed a statistically significant correlation at the 0.05 level. It provides us with 
a counterargument for applying LaPorte and Worley’s explanatory framework in 
its existing form and an argument for looking at the indicators in the diverse 
configurations to enhance the current theories.
Noisy and Turbulent Politics of the Street, the Town Square, 
and the Factory
The intrastate, regional, colonial, war, civil war, and revolution indicators are 
beyond the interest of the next framework. According to Robert Gerwarth, a 
culture of political violence is the result of the noisy and turbulent politics of the 
street, the town square, and the factory, in which socioeconomic grievances, hos-
tility to state authority, and new and recycled dreams of a purified community 
are expressed (2011, 518). The research applies this set of indicators as one 
explaining indicator in an empirical test for two reasons. Whereas the first is of 
practical nature, the second is formal. First, in political reality, the components 
of the approach are usually combined tightly. So, it would hardly be possible to 
identify and assess them separately. It would also be ineffective since they co- 
occur. Second, just like Ayele, in Gerwarth’s model, the concomitance of the set 
of the explaining indicators is the necessary condition under which a culture of 
political violence makes an appearance. Therefore, the occurrence of all the ele-
ments involved in the explaining set is treated as the appearance of the explain-
ing indicator.
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 Gerwarth’s explanatory framework approaches the independent variable sim-
ilarly to William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg. As they point out, if repeated 
expressions of political violence occur, a culture of political violence originates 
(Eubank and Weinberg 2000, 294). The second model is not as much elaborated 
as Gerwarth’s model. However, after the operationalization of the explaining 
indicator proposed by Gerwarth, Eubank, and Weinberg, they cover the same 
empirical expressions. The theory- driven relationship between the indicators 
informs the content of the hypothesis to be tested. What derives directly from the 
Gerwarth theoretical approach is: if the explaining indicators enter a state, a 
culture of political violence might emerge in the state.
 The expressions of the explaining indicator appeared in every state over the 
continuance of the anti- austerity movements. It means that the time from the 
date of the noisy and turbulent politics indicator’s last occurrence to the date of 
the first use of political violence by stakeholders of an anti- austerity movement 
was equal to 0 in years in each case, regardless of a represented type of a culture 
of political violence.
 Here, some arguments against the usefulness and empirical effectiveness of 
the model resurface. Presumably, a culture of political violence is always of 
some value, and its patterns range from the fully peaceful to extremely vicious 
types. Therefore, the essential features of patterns have to have different sources. 
Gerwarth’s model is invulnerable to those differences, and thus it is useful to 
examine the Eurozone cases to a very low extent. Furthermore, nowadays, mass 
political mobilization is frequently used to achieve political goals. Thereby, it 
often meets fully the set of critical criteria of the explaining indicator introduced 
by Gerwarth. As it implies, a culture of political violence is an unceasing phe-
nomenon. As long as the model remains unchanged, it explains almost every-
thing because it co- occurs in a vast variety of cases with beings, phenomena, 
processes, and their configurations entering social reality constantly.
 The employment of the conceptual framework of cultures of political viol-
ence shows that the angry anti- austerity protests took the form of noisy and tur-
bulent politics of the street, the town square, and the factory. Participants of 
those events were representatives of the variety of professions. Except for 
Estonia and Slovakia, in the Eurozone states, the factory workers attached them-
selves to the movements and staged protests. Socioeconomic grievances consti-
tuted the expressed reason why people decided to use political violence in a 
public sphere. They were highlighted and fueled the crowd. A plethora of verbal 
and non- verbal expressions mirrored the demonstrable hostility to state authority 
when protest participants referred to representatives of state apparatuses. The 
messages transmitted directly to political elites were full of overt hostility as 
well. New and recycled dreams of a purified community presented the states free 
from both austerity measures and their makers. They introduced the hope for the 
unchained society able to lead an existence worthily. Movement participants in 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, and Italy satisfied all the critical criteria of the 
explaining indicators handsomely. The indicators entered Austria in 2012, 
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Belgium in 2010, Finland in 2014, France in 2010, Greece in 2011, Spain in 
2011, the Netherlands in 2012, Ireland in 2010, Germany in 2012, Portugal in 
2011, Slovenia in 2012, and Italy in 2010 and took the form of anti- austerity 
protests. The dates are the periods of the protests that meet the critical criteria of 
the explaining indicators in Gerwarth’s meaning.
 In the remaining states, political subjects avoided holding anti- austerity pro-
tests. Although the explaining indicators occurred there, they took different forms. 
In Estonia, a huge anti- ACTA demonstration and numerous strikes took place in 
2012 (Koorits 2012; Raun and Kund 2012). In turn, in Slovakia, the protests of 
various occupational class occurred in 2010 (Boyd 2010a, 2010b, 2010c).
 Gerwarth’s explanatory model is of very low usefulness to account for the 
cultures of political violence existence and differentiation. The hypothesis is not 
rejected, but it has a small cognitive value. Its explanatory power to delve 
analytically into the research field is rather scarce. In its existing form, it fails to 
generate any framework which would allow a researcher to observe relevant 
differences between the sources of various patterns of a culture of political viol-
ence. The explaining indicators and the phenomena to be explained are also con-
nected too loosely. A culture of political violence is not a particular result of the 
noisy grievances, hostility to state authority, and new and recycled dreams of a 
purified community.
From Ruthless Military Governments to Youth’s 
Engagement in Electoral Violence
A more detailed approach towards explaining indicators typifies the next models. 
Robin Theobald brings a relatively narrowly determined role under civil society 
(Stacey and Meyer 2005). He states that a culture of political violence originates 
when the highly mobilized and urbanized civil society, in the developed Latin 
Amer ican states with strong democratic traditions, identified with the state does 
not confine its militaries to the narrowly constitutional role, and ruthless and 
determined military governments threaten at length the civil society (Theobald 
1999). Just like LaPorte and Worley, Theobald understands a culture of political 
violence as the use of excessive physical political violence. His approach also 
does not make the difference between cultures of political violence.
 An extent of applicability of Theobald’s framework is limited by its contex-
tual dimension, much like LaPorte and Worley’s model. Therefore, once again, 
it is a methodological demand to remove the reference to the territory, here to 
the Latin Amer ican states, to make the framework applicable to work with the 
European cases. It contributes to the generation of two premises. First, if a highly 
mobilized and urbanized civil society in the developed states with strong demo-
cratic traditions identified with the state does not confine its militaries to the nar-
rowly constitutional role, a culture of political violence occurs. Second, if 
ruthless and determined military governments threaten at length the civil society, 
a culture of political violence emerges (Theobald 1999, 153). These explaining 
indicators did not enter the member states of the Eurozone under analysis 
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(Chandhoke 2007) when the anti- austerity movements acted. Therefore, Theo-
bald’s model is of a low empirical effectiveness to explain the diversity of the 
post- 2008 cultures of political violence.
 Thomas Waldman assumes that if tribal and religious loyalties occur, a culture 
of political violence emerges (2007, 70). Admittedly, the elements of the explan-
atory framework are undefined, but Waldman’s description of a culture of political 
violence is semantically close to the classic definition. It is the use of extensive 
physical political violence. The loyalties which are to account for this phenomenon 
are identifiable in all the states involved because there is a resurgence of tribalism 
and religiosity in the contemporary world (Gao 2016). Nevertheless, in some 
cases, such as Estonia and Slovenia, physical political violence did not occur. 
Instead, they had the placid cultures of political violence. It proves that simple 
occurrence of tribal and religious loyalties is not useful to be the sole explaining 
factor. In addition, the model is not vulnerable to discern the differences between 
various types of the phenomenon to be explained. The potential application of the 
model to empirical research requires, therefore, devising a range of criteria which 
would allow a researcher to delve analytically into the differences between tribal 
as well as religious loyalties to abstract indicators from the structures of theoretical 
categories.
 In drawing on Waldman, one might want to produce the model which would 
approach the intensity of religious cleavages entering the particular states rather 
than the sheer religious loyalties emergence (Minkenberg 2009). Then, new tri-
balism is also worth taking into consideration. Modern tribalism has two forms. 
The first, ascriptive tribalism refers to the forms of organization based on 
kinship, blood, and territory (Kaplan 2016). Here, it may be useful to ask about 
the relation between the modern tribes in a state as well as the intensity of bonds. 
The second, aspirational tribalism, emerges when those born outside of the tribal 
system desire to be accepted by actual or virtual tribal actors (Kaplan 2016). 
Their engagement in contentious politics in the member states of the Eurozone 
matters, in particular, if the citizens are put in jeopardy.
 Merle Kling claims that when non- political agencies of socialization work by 
implanting violent role models into people, a culture of political violence origi-
nates (1963, 129–130). The phenomenon to be explained, a culture of political 
violence is the configuration of the use of physical political violence and the 
acceptance of violence as a legitimated means to take on the role of the ruling 
subject (Kling 1963, 121). The configuration is homomorphic, and Kling made 
no suggestion about its transposition potential. Then, non- political agencies of 
socialization are family, Church [sic], and less formally organized institutions 
(Kling 1963, 129). According to Kling, they push people to commit political 
violence and to accept its perpetration in the mechanisms of the change of polit-
ical roles in a political structure.
 The impact of the non- political agencies of socialization on denizens of the 
contemporary states is, however, difficult to measure. It is even harder to assert 
unambiguously that exactly they and only they determine a particular culture of 
political violence. Furthermore, in 1963, when Kling created the model, an array 
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of influential agencies of socialization did not encompass as many objects as it 
should nowadays. The new powerful actors are of comparable relevance to those 
mentioned by Kling. For instance, it is not impossible to exaggerate the role of 
social or mass media in political socialization (McAdam and Kloos 2015). These 
drawbacks undermine the framework’s empirical effectiveness to examine a 
contemporary political reality. Kling’s model does not account for the cultures 
of political violence in the Eurozone because the phenomenon to be explained 
did not occur in the form determined by Kling in the period under scrutiny in the 
European states. It is also of low utility to reveal the diversity of the cultures of 
political violence because of the flaws of the explaining indicators.
 The popularity and commonness of social media allow us to formulate one 
more argument against the existing explanatory frameworks of a culture of polit-
ical violence. Helen Dexter and Emmanuel- Pierre Guittet reckon that the fictions 
of political violence defined as the novels, short stories, plays, movies, or parts 
thereof, where political processes and political views are reasonably close to the 
surface contribute to a semantically undermined culture of political violence 
(2014, 380). Nevertheless, the political fiction is both widely disseminated and 
easily accessible because the internet removes most of the barriers in the member 
states of the Eurozone. Anti- austerity events were not the performance of any 
artistic scenario. The meaning of a culture of political violence might have 
decreased the explanatory potential of the model, but it was necessary to adopt 
any definition in the light of the absence thereof in Dexter and Guittet’s 
framework.
 Atte Enyenihi Okwong contends that when the youths’ engagement in elect-
oral violence emerges in a state, an unspecified culture of political violence orig-
inates there (2012, 129). According to the data gathered by the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES 2017a), electoral violence, understood 
as any harm or threat of harm to any person or property involved in the election 
process, or the process itself, during the election period (IFES 2017b), did not 
take place in the member states of the Eurozone in the period analyzed. Thus, 
the young people did not have the opportunity to engage in electoral violence 
and to make any contribution to a culture of political violence in the meaning 
accepted in the research. Once again, the absence of the semantic field of the cat-
egory to be explained in the model limits its explanatory power.
 Jaime M. Pensado’s model consists of the internationalist spirit of the 1960s, as 
the explaining factor, and an undefined culture of political violence as the phenom-
enon to be explained (2013, 14). It is highly contextual and does not provide any 
theoretical assumptions applicable to account for the diversity of the cultures of 
political violence in the member states of the Eurozone between 2007 and 2015. 
Nevertheless, one may see the framework as an incentive to examine the history of 
European social movements, including those launched after the outbreak of the 
youth protest in 1968 (Horn 2007; Horn and Kenney 2004). Has the process of the 
1968 protests been reflected in the post- 2008 activities of the European anti- 
austerity movements? Has the rebellious spirit survived? Has the Spirit of ’68 left 
its mark on the societies’ cultures of political violence? (Horn 2007, 190).
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What More Is to Be Done to Account for the Cultures of 
Political Violence
The analysis of the current explanatory frameworks proves that they only explain 
to a low extent why stakeholders of the post- 2008 anti- austerity movements had 
particular patterns of a culture of political violence. Although the theories which 
produced the structures of the models worked in the particular time and territory 
contexts, they turned out to be hardly empirically effective to approach the Euro-
zone cultures of political violence. Being a middle- range theory is obviously not 
a limitation. Most of them just have a limited explanatory power to inform other 
models. However, some provide us with the inspiring hints of how to account 
for the sources of cultures of political violence and both the similarities and dis-
similarities between them.
 The fixed set of the intrastate, regional, and colonial indicators are not applic-
able to explain the diversity of the cultures of political violence because there is 
no significant statistical correlation between the variables at the 0.05 level. 
Nevertheless, Ayele’s proposal has an explanatory potential. Although it is not 
important if all the indicators occur in a state, it matters in what configuration 
they emerge. In this case, the correlation coefficient equals 0.651, indicating a 
strong positive linear correlation, and it shows that the coefficient is significantly 
different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.012, which is substantially lower 
than 0.05 and proves a statistically significant correlation at the 0.05 level.
 Furthermore, it may be of relevance to delve analytically into the structures of 
the configurations of the indicators which typify the particular patterns of a 
culture of political violence. The proceedings and results of the intrastate, 
regional, and colonial indicators manifestations are worth taking into considera-
tion. The research has indicated that if in the history of a state the set of the 
intrastate and colonial indicators occur as well as the regional one does not take 
place, a placid pattern may originate. More violent patterns show up in the states 
where the intrastate indicator appears. In fact, this feature typifies the hector- led 
and militant types, but it is the only feature that characterizes the former. The 
latter may also originate when the full set of the intrastate, colonial, and regional 
indicators entered the state history, or just the configuration of the intrastate and 
regional was observed there. In one state, however, the research has identified no 
explaining indicator, which reduces the explanatory power of the framework. It 
encourages us to the further looking for the stronger and more appropriate expla-
nation that may be informed by Ayele’s inspiring and promising model.
 The frequency and intensity of the events may also be meaningful (McAdam 
et al. 2008). The point is, nonetheless, that there is an urgent requirement to 
determine precisely a conceptual framework which would apply to approach 
what contributes to the paradigms of the use of political violence and how, and 
the differences between them.
 What the research incontestably has revealed in addition is that the fixed and 
undivided explaining set of the war, civil war, and revolution indicators is also 
far from being empirically effective. Its correlation with the types of a culture of 
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political violence is not significant statistically at the 0.05 level. The various 
configurations of the explaining indicators are applicable to the research on the 
Eurozone cases to a higher extent than LaPorte and Worley’s original model to 
account for the placid, hector- led, and militant cultures of political violence. The 
Sig. 2-tailed level is there 0.044, which is considerably lower than 0.05. It sets a 
statistically significant correlation at the 0.05 level.
 When in the history of a state, only the war indicator makes an appearance, it 
is likely that a placid pattern of a culture of political violence enters this state. 
The complete configuration of the war, civil war, and revolution indicators is the 
feature of the more violent patterns. When the full set appears, it is probable that 
a hector- led or militant type originates. Nevertheless, the combination of the war 
and revolution indicators is the feature of no pattern. The results may challenge 
the students of cultures of political violence to adopt the model in a modified and 
extended form and to make further changes to bolster its empirical effectiveness.
 Onslow’s explanatory model incentivizes a researcher to concentrate on the 
details of the war indicator, but Ayele’s, LaPorte and Worley’s indicators and 
contentious politics are not to be forgotten (Onslow 2011; Tarrow 2015; Tilly 
and Tarrow 2015). Just as in Ayele, it may be effective to explore the frequency 
and intensity of the events in the states’ history and to determine their features 
potentially significant to the development of cultures of political violence 
(McAdam et al. 2008). Finally, they are not the only types of the contentious 
politics worth including in an explanatory framework (Tilly 1978). It may also 
be worthwhile to consider looking at violence in economic, cultural, and social 
spheres rather than focusing merely on the political phenomena as the explaining 
indicators of a culture of political violence (Steenkamp 2011; 2005).
 Gerwarth’s explanatory framework, assuming that a culture of political viol-
ence is a result of the noisy and turbulent politics of the street, the town square, 
and the factory, in which socioeconomic grievances, hostility to state authority, 
and new and recycled dreams of a purified community are expressed, is invul-
nerable to explain the differences between the types of a culture of political viol-
ence. Not unlike Eubank and Weinberg, it is too general to deal with the nature 
and roots of the complex phenomenon. The explaining indicators occurred in 
each state over the continuance of the post- 2008 anti- austerity movements. The 
events being the empirical manifestations of the indicators were common and 
did not contribute to our understanding of the sources of the cultures of political 
violence. Despite the premises made by Gerwarth, it would be useful to shed 
light on the intensity and frequency of the indicators. It may be of vital relevance 
to analyzing the relative deprivations of the political subjects engaged in conten-
tious politics to empower the model. Beyond argument is the requirement to 
develop the model by proposing the conceptual framework which would enable 
a researcher to address significant differences between the expressions of the 
indicators.
 The other models involved the following explaining indicators: the situation 
when the highly mobilized and urbanized civil society, in the developed Latin 
Amer ican states with strong democratic traditions, identified with the state which 
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does not confine its militaries to the narrowly constitutional role and ruthless and 
determined military governments threatens at length the civil society (Theobald 
1999), the tribal and religious loyalties (Waldman 2007), the non- political agen-
cies of socialization (Kling 1963), the youths’ engagement in electoral violence 
(Okwong 2012), the fictions of political violence defined as the novels, short 
stories, plays, movies, or parts thereof, where political processes and political 
views are reasonably close to the surface (Dexter and Guittet 2014), and the 
internationalist spirit of the 1960s (Pensado 2013).
 Nonetheless, there was no need to conduct empirical tests to state that they do 
not work under the theoretical and methodological assumptions made by their 
authors when the Eurozone cultures of political violence are to be accounted for. 
Their rejection has drawn on the history of the states and essential features of the 
context in which the anti- austerity movements acted. Some of them have an 
explanatory potential, such as those which point out tribal and religious loyalties, 
but they have to be elaborated according to state of the art. They also spur us to 
think about the role of elections and political campaigns in the process of shaping 
the cultures of political violence, but they avoid establishing directions to do so.
 This part of the research has shown that much is to be done to develop the 
explanatory frameworks of the cultures of political violence. It is not very likely 
that a single indicator will account for its types. More likely is that the configu-
rations of indicators will provide the more plausible research results concerning 
similarities and differences between them. Undoubtedly, delving analytically 
into the previous contentious politics in particular states may be useful to inform 
the future conceptual and explanatory frameworks.
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4 Looking for the Immediate 
Aftermaths of Cultures of 
Political Violence
Cultures of Political Violence and Making Things Happen
The previous chapter has scrutinized the possible sources of the cultures of polit-
ical violence that emerged in the member states of the Eurozone in the times of 
austerity. In this chapter, the attention moves over to the after- effects of their emer-
gence. Chapter 3 has tested empirically all the explanatory frameworks identified 
in the literature review that present a culture of political violence as the indicator 
to be explained. In Chapter 4, on the other hand, the explanatory frameworks 
showing a culture of political violence as the explaining indicator undergo tests. It 
concentrates entirely on the cultures’ implications estimated through the current 
research results revealed in the substantive literature review. The goals are as 
follows: to examine the foregoing explanatory frameworks by working with the 
cases of the post- 2008 incidents in which anti- austerity movements’ stakeholders 
participated for a theory- verification purpose, to shed some light on expectations 
towards an explanatory framework meeting the correctness criteria, and to discuss 
the explanatory potential of the cultures of political violence which stemmed in the 
age of austerity for going towards a theory- generation purpose.
Methodology for Verification of the Theories that Consider a 
Culture of Political Violence as the Explaining Thing
The chapter solves the third research problem of the extent to which current 
explanatory frameworks account for the results of patterns of a culture of polit-
ical violence had by stakeholders of the post- 2008 anti- austerity movements. To 
deal with the problem, it verifies the third central hypothesis: current explanatory 
frameworks probably to a low extent account for the results of patterns of a 
culture of political violence had by stakeholders of the post- 2008 anti- austerity 
movements. The current explanatory frameworks are the theoretical approaches 
identified in the literature review and already evaluated in the correctness criteria 
and general applicability to empirical studies. The analysis formulates the spe-
cific theory- driven hypotheses and tests them in the subsequent parts of the 
chapter. The methodology for the tests designated to assess the empirical effec-
tiveness of the explanatory models does not differ from the methodological 
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assumptions introduced in the chapter concerning a culture of political violence 
as the indicator to be explained.
 The research employs the statistical analysis method. The Pearson correlation 
technique allows us to compute the type and strength of linear correlations between 
the explaining indicator and the indicators to be explained. A two- tail test estab-
lishes the statistical significance of the correlations. The scales to interpret the 
research results are not different from those introduced in the previous chapter. 
Nevertheless, the major theoretical category has a variant role here. A type of a 
culture of political violence is the independent variable which carries three values 
of its patterns located on a simple ordinal scale: placid, hector- led, and militant 
types. A placid type is aggressive narrowly (1), hector- led – moderately (2), and 
militant – sublimely (3). Let us bring it back that whereas Estonia and Slovakia had 
the placid cultures of political violence, Austria, the Netherlands, and France – the 
hector- led patterns, and Finland, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, Italy, 
Greece, Spain, and Ireland – the militant patterns. In the previous chapter, it was 
the point to explain their diversity. By contrast, this chapter makes an attempt to 
account for what may be explained by their variety. The statistical analysis pro-
vides us with remarks on the opportunities to increase the explanatory power of the 
theoretical approaches towards the aftermath of the cultures of political violence.
 When there is no need to calculate, the explanatory models undergo the 
causal- process observations that allow us to handle the data- set observations or 
they are rejected by critical argumentation. The choice of a set of methods, tech-
niques, and tools heavily depends on a type of data either qualitative or quant-
itative as well as on a quest for research process optimization. The theory- based 
explanatory frameworks undergo tests in their existing forms, adjusted and 
extended if necessary, or rejected if unmodifiable and unemployable to examine 
empirical phenomena. It contributes to the systematic and methodic evaluation 
of their explanatory effectiveness. The shifts made in their content do not 
encroach upon the hard core of the models.
 The models under empirical tests treat a culture of political violence as the 
explaining indicator. They differ no more than slightly in the meanings of 
the category, but the research underlines and discusses the dissimilarities within 
the definitional assumptions for the sake of methodological clarity. The frame-
works are much more diversified in terms of the beings, phenomena, and pro-
cesses involved to function as the indicators to be explained. Dependent 
variables come from the theories identified in the literature review. Thus, the 
indicators or sets of indicators, recognized as the potential outcomes of a culture 
of political violence, whose validity is to be tested are as follows: the pattern of 
political culture: between the parochial and subject political culture, close to the 
former (Ayele 2011); violence of culture identified with the culture of masculin-
ity and the political violence of culture (Ayele 2011); conditions in which the 
provocation and organization of violence are not the sole domain of professional 
soldiers (Kling 1963); bringing about revolution to being able to carry out the 
function of an election (Kling 1963); electoral violence (Omotola 2010); post- 
election violence, a substantial proportion of the population participating in 
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protests and a reality that may be attributed to the snowball effect of grassroots 
mobilization (Forti and Maina 2012); problems to electoral democracy (Obi 
2011); minimization of the chances of peaceful democratic rules establishment 
(Waldman 2007); death of democracy (Le Vine 2000); democratic breakdown 
(Le Vine 2000); breakdown of democracy (Siniawer 2008); creation of the con-
ditions under which militaries and paramilitaries are routinely deployed against 
dissidents as well as basing a political regime on the army to cope with opposi-
tion, and harassing and killing critics of the regime in a formally democratic 
state (Theobald 1999); the political situation which undermines democracy 
(Njoku 2010); promoting riots (Taylor 1981); production of the context in which 
ruffianism is tacitly accepted as a routinely used tool of political life (Siniawer 
2012); the political situation in which people are killed, maimed, disfigured, 
beaten, tortured, incarcerated and exiled because of political goals (Coleman 
1998); enormous public distrust in the capacity of the major parties to come out 
of the destructive political legacy and usher in a new political alternative 
(Moniruzzaman 2009); undermining the secular and nationalist foundations of a 
moderate state (Gohel 2014); and the institutionalization of young activists of a 
movement into party politics  (Siniawer 2008).
 The research makes use of a qualitative method of written sources analysis to 
gather data sufficient and necessary to verify the main hypothesis. The research 
technique of data collection is a content analysis of secondary sources. The 
pieces of data derive from the Eurostat, the Freedom House reports, the Global 
Gender Gap Reports, and the secondary specialist literature concerning the indi-
cators involved in the explanatory frameworks. They are especially helpful to 
determine exactly what values the indicators or the sets of indicators took on in 
the particular states. The data- set observations present the pieces of data. These 
databases are the original contribution of this research to the studies on the cul-
tures of political violence. For the purpose of empowering the basis of argu-
ments, the analysis employs theoretical sampling and adopts sources 
triangulation. The research tool is an instruction to review the secondary data.
 The research generates comments on the possibilities to enhance the empiri-
cal effectiveness of the frameworks. It verifies the central hypothesis by weigh-
ing up the arguments and counterarguments formulated throughout the chapter 
in the process of verifying the specific hypotheses.
Breakdown of Democracy
The first type of the explanatory models adopting a culture of political violence 
as an explaining indicator is employable to examine democracies. In drawing on 
the history of the world, Victor T. Le Vine assumes that a culture of political 
violence leads a state to either a democratic breakdown (2000, 277–278) or the 
end of democracy (2000, 276). Eiko Maruko Siniawer supports his theory by 
claiming that the breakdown of democracy in Japan in 1930 was predominantly 
caused by a culture of political violence (2008, 73, 179). Cyril Obi argues that 
the phenomenon created seminal problems to electoral democracy in Nigeria 
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(2011, 373). Alphonsus O. Njoku sustains this model by asserting that it changed 
a political situation in Nigeria. The shift consisted in the evisceration of demo-
cracy (2010, 16). Le Vine, Obi, and Njoku understand the category accounting 
for the change in the trajectory of political regime continuance as the use of 
extensive physical political violence. This meaning generally agrees with the 
semantic field of the militant patterns adopted in the research. In turn, Siniawer 
defines it as the context in which the use of physical force is viewed by political 
actors as the viable and acceptable strategy. It is dynamic, altering, and helps 
political subjects tremendously perpetuate a violent brand of politics (Siniawer 
2008, 2, 75, 2012, 629). This definition also corresponds closely to the militant 
types. It implies that the models have the meaning of the explaining category in 
common.
 In drawing upon the theories, the specific hypothesis states that when a 
militant culture of political violence emerges, the breakdown of democracy 
might occur. The pieces of existing data from the Freedom House reports have 
been gathered in Table 4.1 to show the values of the following indicators: 
Freedom Rating (FR), Civil Liberties (CL), and Political Rights (PR) (Table 
4.1). On an original scale, the values range from 1 to 7. The 1 marks the states to 
the highest extent democratic, whereas the 7 characterizes the states to the 
highest extent non- democratic. The breakdown of democracy occurs when a 
state obtains the 3. Then, the state starts to be partly free.
 The choice of the Freedom House reports as the source of data justifies a 
need for statistically comparable information about the quality of democracy 
in 14 states and how the regimes changed over time in each case (Armstrong 
2011). It provides the sufficient and necessary details about the indicator which 
were gathered by applying a systematic and the same methodology. Impor-
tantly, the Freedom House publishes reports for each of the states involved in 
the research once a year, and they are easily accessible (Szewczak 2011). As a 
result, it was manageable to identify what exactly the values of the indicators 
before, during, and after the occurrence of the explaining indicators were. The 
fellowship of both a cultural field and a historical period blunts the critics on 
the a- cultural and a- historical dimension of the measures (Giannone 2010; 
Koelbe and Lipuma 2008).
 The data concerns all the member states of the Eurozone in 2001–2016 
(Freedom House 2017). The dates of the first use of political violence by stake-
holders of all the anti- austerity movements were between 2010 and 2014, includ-
ing the caesurae. It means that 2001 and 2016 determine sufficiently broad 
temporal boundaries to verify if the appearance of militant cultures of political 
violence contributed to the breakdown of democracy in the countries (Table 4.1). 
It also gives the opportunity to investigate how exactly the values of the indi-
cators changed in comparison to the cases with the placid and hector- led pat-
terns. The causal- process observation allows us to delve analytically into the 
data- set observations and assess whether the values of the indicators altered 
pending or after the dates that were significant from the perspective of the cul-
tures of political violence examination.
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Table 4.1 Freedom House indicators in the member states of the Eurozone 2001–2016
d 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
i FR CL PR FR CL PR FR CL PR FR CL PR FR CL PR FR CL PR FR CL PR FR CL PR
Placid cultures of political violence
EE 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SVK 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hector-led cultures of political violence
AT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
NL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FR 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Militant cultures of political violence
FI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BE 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DE 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
PT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SI 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IT 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
GR 2 3 1 2 3 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1
ES 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
d 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
i FR CL PR FR CL PR FR CL PR FR CL PR FR CL PR FR CL PR FR CL PR FR CL PR
Placid cultures of political violence
EE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SVK 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hector-led cultures of political violence
AT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
NL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Militant cultures of political violence
FI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
PT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IT 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1 1 1 1.5 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
GR 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 1.5 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
ES 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Source: Author’s study on the basis of the Freedom House reports.
Notes
FR – Freedom Rating (1 – to the highest extent democratic, 7 – to the highest extent non-democratic).
CL – Civil Liberties (1 – to the highest extent democratic, 7 – to the highest extent non-democratic).
PR – Political Rights (1 – to the highest extent democratic, 7 – to the highest extent non-democratic).
EE – Estonia, SK – Slovakia, AT – Austria, NL – the Netherlands, FR – France, FI – Finland, BE – Belgium, DE – 
Germany, PT – Portugal, SI – Slovenia, IT – Italy, GR – Greece, ES – Spain, IE – Ireland.
Grey color marks – the date of the first use of political violence by stakeholders of an anti-austerity movement.
d – date.
i – indicators.
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 In the states with the placid and the hector- led cultures of political violence, the 
values of the indicators did not change over the time pivotal to the theories. The 
same invariance made an appearance in most of the states with the militant pat-
terns. Nevertheless, it was not the full invariance. Greece was the only exception 
because the FR increased slightly from 1.5 to 2 and the PR from 1 to 2. Those 
alterations cannot, however, be classified as the symptom of the breakdown of 
democracy because Greece did not reach 3 on any scale. Regardless of a type of a 
culture of political violence, the significant shifts of the FR, CL, and PR values did 
not enter the Eurozone. No breakdown occurred in the period under elaboration. 
Not to put too fine an edge on it, the indicator to be accounted for, in keeping with 
the theories, did not make an appearance within the research field.
 The specific hypothesis is rejected because no relationship between a type of a 
culture of political violence and a breakdown of democracy existed. Accordingly, 
the theoretical approaches maintaining that the relationship exists and the cultures 
of political violence play a role of the explaining indicator in that relationship are 
of scant explanatory power to studies on the member states of the Eurozone.
 The Freedom House reports enable us to verify a specific hypothesis formulated 
on the basis of Thomas Waldman’s theory. The theory offers the second type of 
the explanatory frameworks, and it concerns the political regimes which are cur-
rently non- democratic but in tandem on the way to becoming democracies. To put 
in another way, it focuses on the states that make use of their regime transposition 
potential to transpose themselves into democracies. Just like Siniawer, Le Vine, 
and Obi, Waldman’s explaining indicator is the use of extensive physical political 
violence. The meaning of a culture of political violence is equated with the seman-
tic field of the militant pattern. In drawing on the qualitative case study of Iraq, 
Waldman considers a culture of political violence to be an explaining indicator of 
the minimization of the chances of the establishment of peaceful democratic rules 
(2007, 70). A culture imposes limitations on the use of the transposition potential. 
But does the model explain the changes in political regimes in different states? Or 
is it restricted merely to Iraq? The hypothesis phrased in pursuance of Waldman’s 
theory is that when a militant culture of political violence originates, the peaceful 
establishment of democratic rules might fail to take place.
 Nevertheless, no member state of the Eurozone was a non- democratic polit-
ical regime before, over, and after the occurrence of any pattern of a culture of 
political violence in 2001–2016. It means that the hypothesis is rejected due to 
the absence of the relationships between the explaining indicator and the indi-
cator to be explained in Waldman’s meanings.
 The third type of the explanatory models approaches the formally democratic 
political systems which do not satisfy the primary criteria of democracy and as such 
are of non- democratic quality. As Robin Theobald claims, the creation of the con-
ditions under which Latin Amer ican militaries and paramilitaries are routinely 
deployed against dissidents, basing a political regime on the army to cope with 
opposition, and harassing and killing critics of the regime of Carlos Menem in for-
mally democratic Argentina were the tangible results of a culture of political viol-
ence (1999, 153). Although Theobald avoids defining a culture of political violence, 
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he adopts its classic meaning, that is, the use of extensive physical political violence 
in a political structure to achieve political objectives. Just as in the already discussed 
models, the explaining indicator is the militant pattern, according to the research 
conceptual framework. The specific hypothesis formulated on the grounds of Theo-
bald’s theory is: if a militant culture of political violence makes an appearance, the 
following phenomena might occur: the deployment of militaries and paramilitaries 
to fight with the political opponents, the stabilization of a political regime by using 
the army, and the abuse and murders of the critics of the political system.
 In the period under scrutiny, however, militaries and paramilitaries were not 
routinely employed against dissidents in the member states of the Eurozone. The 
ruling subjects did not deploy the army to establish political relations with the 
opposition and to stabilize political systems. Subordinate political subjects per-
formed the function of the ruled in the relation of public power. The critics of 
the regimes were neither scourged nor murdered. It means that the crucial com-
ponents of Theobald’s explanatory model did not originate over and after the 
occurrence of not only the placid and hector- led types but also the militant pat-
terns. The hypothesis is, therefore, rejected. The empirical effectiveness of The-
obald’s model to examine cultures of political violence in the Eurozone of the 
times of austerity is low because the phenomena to be explained by a culture of 
political violence did not enter the European states.
 Although the explanatory frameworks by Siniawer, Le Vine, Njoku, Obi, 
Waldman, and Theobald were useful to account for the results of the cultures of 
political violence in the specified territorial and temporal contexts, they have not 
withstood the empirical tests. The explaining category proved to be scarcely 
employable to examine the member states of the Eurozone because the occurrence 
of its forms was not followed by the theory- driven phenomena and processes to be 
explained. The models often functioned in the literature as the labels created just to 
describe in a highly general manner all the possible sources of the transposition of 
political regimes. Sometimes no methodological assumption supported their 
application. The research reveals what the results of the cultures of political viol-
ence in Europe were not, but it avoids showing any promising explanations.
Culture of Masculinity
According to Negussay Ayele, a culture of political violence contributes to the 
violence of culture identified with the culture of masculinity and the political 
violence of culture (2011, 226). As already discussed, a concept of a culture of 
political violence in Ayele’s perspective is of low applicability to empirical 
study because of its semantic ambiguity and contextuality. Its essential feature 
is the overindulgence of physical political violence over a prolonged period in 
a political structure. The militant pattern proposed in the conceptual frame-
work of the research has the proximate understanding to Ayele’s culture of 
political violence. Thus, the research applies that meaning of the explaining 
indicator. In turn, it recognizes the culture of masculinity by a size of gender 
equality. Obviously, it is not a one- value variable, and its expressions differ in 
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terms of an extent of equality. The smaller the size is, the higher the extent of 
a culture of masculinity emerges. In drawing upon Ayele’s theory, the specific 
hypotheses are formulated.
 H0: There might be no correlation between a culture of masculinity in a state 
and a pattern of a culture of political violence of stakeholders of an anti- austerity 
movement in the state.
 HA: When a militant culture of political violence of stakeholders of an anti- 
austerity movement makes an appearance, a culture of masculinity might 
originate in the state where the movement acts. The more violent the culture of 
political violence is, the more intense the culture of masculinity is.
 A gender gap indicator describes a culture of masculinity. The sufficient 
and necessary data to determine its values comes from the 10 Global Gender 
Gap Reports released in 2001–2016 (Hausmann et al. 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 201, 201, 2016). The analysis selects this source of 
existing data because it provides comprehensive and comparable information 
on gender inequality in the member states of the Eurozone in the period signi-
ficant for the research. It was an important criterion for selection due to the 
missing pieces of data in the most popular databases. For instance, the Eurostat 
lacks details concerning a gender pay gap in Ireland and Greece (Eurostat 
2017).
 The World Economic Forum quantifies in the Global Gender Gap Reports the 
magnitude of gender disparities and traces their progress over time with a spe-
cific concentration on the relative gaps between women and men across four key 
areas: health, education, economy, and politics (Hausmann et al. 2016). The 
subindexes structure the key areas and contribute to the primary index. The first, 
the Economic Participation and Opportunity subindex covers five variables: 
female labor force participation over male value; wage equality between women 
and men for similar work (survey data, normalized on a 0-to- 1 scale); female 
estimated earned income over male value; female legislators, senior officials and 
managers over male value; and female professional and technical workers over 
male value. The second, the Educational Attainment subindex encompasses four 
variables: female literacy rate over male value; female net primary enrolment 
rate over male value; female net secondary enrolment rate over male value; and 
female gross tertiary enrolment ratio over male value. The third, the Health and 
Survival subindex embraces two variables: sex ratio at birth (converted to 
female- over-male ratio) and female healthy life expectancy over male value. The 
last, the Political Empowerment subindex consists of three variables: females 
with seats in parliament over male value; females at ministerial level over male; 
and number of years with a female head of state (last 50 years) over male value 
(Hausmann et al. 2016).
 The analysis interprets gender gap index (ggi) on the scale proposed by the 
World Economic Forum. The extreme points are 1 and 0. The 1 is the highest 
possible score that means equality or better for women, except for lifespan, 106 
percent or better for women. The 0 is the worst possible score and indicates no 
equality. The scale is:
ggi = 1.00 – full equality
1.00 > ggi  ≥ 0.90 – almost full equality
0.90 > ggi  ≥ 0.85 – a very high extent of equality
0.85 > ggi  ≥ 0.80 – a high extent of equality
0.80 > ggi  ≥ 0.75 – a moderately high extent of equality
0.75 > ggi  ≥ 0.70 – a moderate extent of equality
0.70 > ggi  ≥ 0.65 – a moderately low extent of equality
0.65 > ggi  ≥ 0.60 – a low extent of equality
0.60 > ggi  ≥ 0.55 – a very low extent of equality
0.55 > ggi  ≥ 0.50 – almost no equality
0.50 > ggi  ≥ 0 – no equality
According to the World Economic Forum, a situation is alarming when the indi-
cator takes on a value lower than 0.70. It indicates the occurrence of a culture of 
masculinity. The value of 0.70 and higher signify a culture of non- masculinity. The 
range 0.70 > ggi  ≥ 0 is indeed relatively broad and thus it may be explored to deter-
mine the distinct patterns of a culture of masculinity, according to a next newly built 
and original scale. A moderately low extent of equality typifies a soft culture of 
masculinity; a low extent of equality – a mild type; a very low extent of equality – a 
harsh type; almost no equality – a fierce type; and no equality – an aggressive type. 
The analysis adopts this scale to interpret data and verify the specific hypothesis.
 The data derived from the reports allows us to verify the hypothesis step by 
step (Table 4.2). The analysis shows that in the states with the placid patterns, a 
culture of political violence did not contribute to the appearance of a culture of 
masculinity. In Estonia, the gender gap indicator was 0.6977 in 2012, when 
stakeholders of an anti- austerity movement used political violence for the first 
time. The indicator had an upward tendency because in 2013 it was 0.6997, 2014 
– 0.7017, 2015 – 0.749, and 2016 – 0.747. The indicator started to fall earlier, in 
2006 (0.6944) and increased in 2007 (0.7008), then declined in 2011 (0.6983), 
and went up in 2012 (0.6977). It means that before, during, and after the occur-
rence of the explaining indicator, in Ayele’s meaning, a culture of masculinity 
existed and had the soft form. In other words, the placid culture of political viol-
ence did not contribute to any change in the Estonian culture of masculinity.
 Similarly, in Slovakia, in 2010, the gender gap indicator was 0.6778. Until 
this date, the indicator was escalating from 0.6757 in 2006 to 0.6845 in 2009. 
After 2010, there was a constant growth from 0.6778 in 2010 to 0.6857 in 2013, 
then, the loss was in 2014 (0.6806). The indicator was 0.6797 in 2011, 0.6824 in 
2012, 0.6857 in 2013, 0.6806 in 2014, 0.675 in 2015, and 0.679 in 2016. Before 
2010, the indicator to be explained had a higher value, but the appearance of the 
explaining indicator did not contribute to its reduction. Directly after 2010, the 
rise of the gender gap indicator made an appearance. During the whole analyzed 
period, a soft culture of masculinity lingered. Therefore, the placid culture of 
political violence did not make a shift of the Slovak culture of masculinity. The 
relationships between the indicators in Estonia and Slovakia confirm that the 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Aftermaths of Cultures of Political Violence  163
 When the hector- led pattern emerged in Austria, the Netherlands, and France, 
a culture of masculinity was not present in those states. In Austria, a phenom-
enon to be explained did not occur since 2006 (0.6986) when a soft type existed. 
In the Netherlands, it did not appear in 2006–2016. In France, a soft pattern 
made an appearance in 2006 (0.6520), 2007 (0.6824), and 2012 (0.6984). Never-
theless, it was not observed before, over, and after 2010, the year of the first use 
of political violence by stakeholders of the French anti- austerity movement. 
Moreover, after 2012, a culture of masculinity was not identified. The hector- led 
cultures of political violence are, therefore, the least useful explaining indicators 
here because the indicator to be accounted for followed their occurrence in 
no case.
 Ayele’s model concentrates its attention directly on the relationship between 
a militant pattern of a culture of political violence and a culture of masculinity. 
In 2006–2016, the latter was not present in five of the nine states with the 
militant cultures of political violence: Finland, Belgium, Germany, Spain, and 
Ireland, which was 55.56 percent of cases from between the militant cases. It 
provides an argument against a high value of Ayele’s framework explanatory 
potential.
 In Portugal, a soft culture of masculinity last asserted itself in 2007 (0.6959) 
in the period involved. 2011 was the year of the first deployment of political 
violence by stakeholders of the Portuguese anti- austerity movement. Hence, the 
militant pattern did not influence a culture of masculinity there, which generates 
one more argument against the explanatory model. Similarly, in Slovenia, a 
culture of masculinity failed to be distributed after 2009 (0.6982). After the 
occurrence of the soft pattern to the end of the period under scrutiny, a culture of 
masculinity was not instanced, including 2012, when the explaining indicator 
made an appearance. It shows another limitation of Ayele’s model to explain the 
results of the European cultures of political violence.
 In the determined period, in Italy, a soft culture of masculinity existed from 
2006 (0.6456) to 2014 (0.6973). The situation altered, however, in 2015, when 
the indicator increased to 0.726. Nevertheless, the militant type occurred in 
2010, when the score was 0.6765. A year before it was 0.6798, and a year after – 
0.6796. The culture of political violence did not make a contribution to a soft 
pattern due to its continuance over time. Moreover, after 2010, the indicator 
slightly increased. It means that Ayele’s explanatory framework is not empiri-
cally effective enough to examine the Italian case.
 A soft culture of masculinity existed in Greece in the whole period 
2006–2016. In 2011, the year of the first use of political violence by stakeholders 
of the Greek anti- austerity movement, the indicator was 0.6916. A year before – 
0.6908, a year after – 0.6716, and two years after – 0.6782. It reveals that after 
the emergence of the militant pattern, the value of the indicator slightly 
increased. Nonetheless, a soft pattern did not transform into a mild type. 
Additionally, even more importantly, the change did not take the form of trans-
position from a culture of non- masculinity to a culture of masculinity. Then, 
Ayele’s model does not work here as well.
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 As a result of the empirical study, the null hypothesis has not been rejected at 
the 0.05 level and, thereby, the alternative one cannot be accepted. The Pearson 
correlation between a gender gap indicator and a type of a culture of political 
violence coefficient equals 0.386, indicating a medium positive correlation, and 
it states that the coefficient is not significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed 
level is 0.173, which is considerably higher than 0.05. Therefore, a statistically 
significant correlation does not exist between the variables at the 0.05 level. It 
means that, outside Ayele’s research field, or at least in the member states of the 
Eurozone, the militant culture of political violence does not contribute to a 
culture of masculinity. A researcher should not overestimate the influence of 
anti- austerity mobilization on gender equality (Cullen and Murphy 2017; Durbin 
et al. 2017).
 Ayele’s model is hardly useful to explore the austerity- driven political reality 
of the member states of the Eurozone. The explaining indicator, the militant type 
of a culture of political violence does not account for a culture of masculinity. Its 
explanatory power is too weak to apply it to account for the results of stake-
holders of the post- 2008 anti- austerity movements’ cultures of political violence 
effectively.
Political Culture: Between the Parochial and Subject 
Patterns
Ayele offers another explanatory model that accounts for a qualitatively different 
phenomenon than the above theory. Nonetheless, in the second theoretical 
approach, the meaning of the explaining indicator is the same. Ethiopian culture 
of political violence is the source of political culture (Ayele 2011, 219) in 
Gabriel A. Almond, Sidney Verba, and Lucian W. Pye’s view (1972). Just like 
Almond, Verba, and Pye, Ayele defines political culture as the set of the specifi-
cally political orientations that are the attitudes towards the political system and 
its parts as well as the attitudes towards the role of the self in the political regime 
(Almond and Verba 1972, 12). In Ayele’s explanatory model, the pattern of 
political culture: between the parochial and subject political culture, close to the 
former is the result of a culture of political violence (2011, 219). The reconstruc-
tion of the semantic field of the categories is crucial to determine the distinctive 
features of the indicators to be accounted for.
 In Almond and Verba’s traditional meaning (1972, 16–17), the parochial 
pattern typifies the absence of specialized political roles and expectations of 
change initiated by the political system. The parochial type counts on nothing from 
the regime. A relatively pure type is likely to emerge in simpler traditional systems 
with minimal political specialization. In more differentiated systems, parochialism 
is likely to be effective and normative rather than cognitive. If the feelings towards 
the political regime originate, they are uncertain or negative. The members of 
society do not internalize norms to regulate the relations with the system.
 Almond and Verba (1972, 17–18) assume that the subject political culture is 
marked with a high frequency of orientations towards the differentiated political 
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system and towards the output facets of the system, but orientations towards spe-
cifically input objects and the self as an active political subject do not exist at all. 
Although the subject is aware of specialized governmental authority, their orien-
tation is of an affective nature. They perhaps take pride in it, dislike it, and 
evaluate it as either legitimate or not. The passive relationship is towards the 
regime on a general level, and towards the output, administrative, or downward 
flow side of the system. A political competence is limited severely. The pure 
subject orientation is likely to make an appearance in the society in which there 
is no differentiated input structure. In political structures with democratic institu-
tions, it is affective and normative rather than cognitive.
 Let us underscore that according to Ayele’s framework, after the occurrence 
of a militant culture of political violence, a participant pattern of political culture 
does not appear. Within the meaning of Almond and Verba (1972, 18), a parti-
cipant pattern exists when the members of society strive for being explicitly ori-
ented towards the political system as a whole and to both the political and 
administrative structures and processes. The input and output facets of the 
regime are in the spotlight. Individual members of the participant polity favor-
ably or unfavorably orient towards the diverse classes of political objects. They 
aim directly to play an activist role of the self in the polity, even if their feelings 
and evaluations range widely from acceptance to rejection.
 Unsurprisingly, the empirical studies on the cultures of political violence have 
shown that the cultures do not emerge in their pure form, but they are the 
complex combinations of the parochial, subject, and participant patterns 
(Blokker 2008). In fact, this is of an asymptotic nature of the ideal types which 
create Almond and Verba’s model. Ayele discerns this feature and uses Almond 
and Verba’s theory to formulate the indicator to be explained in his model by 
adopting the symptomatic linkage of the parochial and subject patterns, in which 
the former dominates. Ayele’s model informs the anticipation that a militant 
culture of political violence produced by stakeholders of anti- austerity move-
ments might have contributed to the appearance of Ayele’s hybrid type of polit-
ical culture. It is followed by the specific hypothesis: if a militant culture of 
political violence emerges, a hybrid type of political culture produced with the 
ascendant parochial and subject patterns might occur.
 This hypothesis cannot, however, be accepted because the elements of the 
participant type did not disappear in the member states of the Eurozone over the 
presence of the militant cultures of political violence. Furthermore, there was no 
difference between the occurrence of the placid, hector- led, or militant types and 
the participant pattern appearance. Indeed, the model explains little mainly 
because of its excessively simplified approach towards political culture (Lane 
1992).
 Though Ayele’s model explained Ethiopian political culture in its strictly 
determined temporal boundaries, it proved empirically ineffective to examine 
the Eurozone cases. Nevertheless, we are not the proponents of forsaking the 
attempts to build political culture into the studies on a culture of political viol-
ence. Instead, we are in support of making use of more nuanced frameworks 
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than Almond and Verba’s theory. In their current form, the superficial ideal 
types do not allow a researcher to point out sharply the differences between the 
contemporary political cultures in the Eurozone (Bhambra 2016). Thus, we 
would stand for approaching the category from the perspective of a more com-
prehensive conceptual framework employable to empirical research (Welch 
2013). Note should be taken, however, that the application of the frameworks 
which would be able to capture subtle differences between political cultures 
demands to deploy a survey methodology. In the case of this study focused on 
the past events, the ex- post facto evaluation is hardly enforceable (Paine 2016). 
The test of Ayele’s framework reveals the weakness of not only the explaining 
indicators but also the structures of relationships between them. We would argue 
that the direction of the causal relation orientation should not be taken for 
granted. Hence, a tool for analyzing a causal complexity is also to be devised.
From Electoral Violence to Revolution
In case studies of African states, Shola Omotola assumes that a culture of political 
violence in the classic meaning contributes to electoral violence (2010, 70–71). 
Nevertheless, as stated in the previous chapter, according to the data gathered by 
the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES 2017a), electoral viol-
ence, defined as any harm or threat of harm to any person or property involved in 
the election process, or the process itself, during the election period (IFES 2017b), 
did not take place in the member states of the Eurozone after the occurrence of the 
anti- austerity movements. The absence of the indicator to be explained in the Euro-
pean states indicates that Omotola’s model avoids shedding light on the results of 
cultures of political violence in non- African context.
 Merle Kling’s explanatory framework finds the use for studying states in 
Latin America. As it assumes, a culture of political violence triggers off the 
potential of revolution. Thus, the revolution achieves the ability to carry out the 
function of an election (Kling 1963, 131). Irrespective of an adopted definition 
of the explaining indicator, Kling’s model does not account for the indicators to 
be accounted for because they did not appear in the member states of the Euro-
zone after the emergence of the anti- austerity movements. In the post- 2008 
Europe, there has been no revolution and, therefore, it could not have done 
double duty as an election.
 As a result of the research on Latin America, Kling offers one more explan-
atory model. The researcher claims that a culture of political violence produces 
conditions in which the provocation and organization of violence are not the sole 
domain of professional soldiers (Kling 1963, 126). Kling defines a culture of 
political violence as the political behavior which is manifestly violent and the 
acceptance of violence as a legitimate means for the pursuit of power (1963, 
121). The explaining phenomenon and the phenomena to be explained share a 
semantic field partly, as in Stan Taylor’s model that indicates that a culture of 
political violence contributes to the promotion of riots (1981, 170). When stake-
holders of anti- austerity movements participated in angry anti- austerity protests 
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in the Eurozone, the provocation and organization of violence were not the 
exclusive area of professional soldiers. The same situation was in the states 
where the protests against austerity measures did not occur. There, an anti- 
ACTA demonstration, strikes (Koorits 2012; Raun and Kund 2012), and protests 
of various occupational classes took place (Boyd 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). Simul-
taneously, the ordinary people who assumed roles brought under professional 
soldiers behaved in a blatantly violent way. The fundamental characteristic of 
the explaining category employed to delve analytically into the research field 
provides an additional argument against Kling’s model. In the member states of 
the Eurozone, during and after the operation of the anti- austerity movements, the 
acceptance of violence as a legitimate measure to change the relation of political 
power did not emerge. Kling’s explanatory framework is, therefore, of the low 
applicability to address the consequences of cultures of political violence in the 
European context.
 M. Moniruzzaman’s model points out that a semantically undetermined 
culture of political violence spawns enormous public distrust in the capacity of 
the major parties to come out of the destructive political legacy and usher in a 
new political alternative (2009, 96). However, as has already been described, 
anti- austerity movement participants expressed no confidence in party politics, 
and more broadly political elites. They blamed institutions and politicians for 
destructive consequences of austerity measures. Other research on political mis-
trust after the 2008 financial crisis confirm the absence of confidence (Muro and 
Vidal 2017). The mistrust fueled arguments for the use of political violence in a 
public sphere. Thereby, the framework is of low applicability to account for the 
results of cultures of political violence in the Eurozone.
 Those arguments also support the criticism of Daniel Forti and Grace Maina’s 
explanatory framework. As the researchers assume, the post- election violence, 
substantial proportion of the population participating in public protests, and a 
reality that may be attributed to the snowball effect of grassroots mobilization 
are the after- effects of an undefined culture of political violence (2012, 74). As 
just stated, the post- election violence did not emerge in the member states of the 
Eurozone after the activities of the anti- austerity movements (IFES 2017a, 
2017b). The broad- based participation of the population in mass protests took 
place pending anti- austerity events. The mobilization was present also before the 
first use of political violence by stakeholders of the movements. The anti- 
austerity activities often took the form of the mobilization of street protests and 
grassroots campaigns. Forti and Maina’s model contributes to the explanation of 
the European political reality to an infinitesimal extent.
 Eiko Maruko Siniawer shows that, in Japan, a culture of political violence 
produces the context in which ruffianism is tacitly accepted as a routinely used 
tool of political life (2012, 629). Siniawer defines a culture of political violence 
as the context in which the use of physical force is viewed by political actors as 
a viable and acceptable strategy (2012, 629). Hence, in Siniawer’s model, the 
explaining indicator has the classic meaning which is a militant pattern, accord-
ing to the conceptual framework adopted in the research. Nonetheless, the 
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 phenomenon to be accounted for did not make an appearance in the member 
states of the Eurozone over and after the occurrence of the anti- austerity move-
ments. Siniawer’s theoretical design is, therefore, not applicable to handle the 
problem of the aftermath of the cultures of political violence in Europe.
 Another Siniawer’s model is also a result of studies of Japan. According to 
the framework, a culture of political violence makes a contribution to the institu-
tionalization of sōshi, young activists of the Freedom and People’s Right Move-
ment into party politics (2008, 73, 179). Those idiosyncratic phenomena were 
not present in Europe obviously. The names are anchored in the historical 
context, but if we generalize their key components, we identify the theoretical 
categories. Notably, the anti- austerity movements were heterogeneous rather 
than created merely by the youth. Then, a militant culture of political violence 
may be viewed as the phenomenon leading to the institutional setting of a social 
movement into a party politics. The occurrence of the explaining indicator 
(2011) was followed by the rise of Podemos in Spain (2014) (Rodríguez-Teruel 
et al. 2017; Stoehrel 2017) and the Coalition of the Radical Left known as the 
SYRIZA in Greece (2012) (Nikolakakis 2017; Spourdalakis 2014). It is thought 
that it also empowered the Five Star Movement (2009) in Italy founded a year 
before the occurrence of the Italian anti- austerity movement (2010) (Bordignon 
and Ceccarini 2014; Natale 2014; Passarelli and Tuorto 2017). Nonetheless, a 
militant culture of political violence did not lead to the transposition of the social 
movements into party politics in the remaining Eurozone states (Mosca 2014b).
 Not all of the explanatory indicators mixed into Stephen Coleman’s explan-
atory framework occurred in the Eurozone. Coleman’s model presents an unde-
fined culture of political violence as a source of the political situation in which 
people are killed, maimed, disfigured, beaten, tortured, incarcerated, and exiled 
because of political goals (Coleman 1998). The occurrence of the set to be 
explained was not confirmed in the Eurozone states. Therefore, although Cole-
man’s model depicted the political situation in Northern Ireland in the historical 
period, it failed to find a use for dealing with the consequences of political cul-
tures in different territorial and time contexts.
 According to Sajjan M. Gohel, a semantically unestablished culture of polit-
ical violence undermines the secular and nationalist foundations of moderate 
Bangladesh (2014, 88–89). Let us skip a contextual reference to the state and 
focus on the undermining the secular and nationalist foundations. This indicator 
to be explained did not occur in most of the cases: Estonia, Slovakia, Austria, 
the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Portugal, Slovenia, Italy, Spain, and Ireland 
(Torfs 2010). Although Germany does not have a state church, the relationships 
between the state and the religious communities are established as a partnership 
(Torfs 2010). In Finland, the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland and the 
Finnish Orthodox Church have the right to collect church tax from their members 
in conjunction with governmental income tax (Ketola et al. 2014). Furthermore, 
businesses also pay taxes for the church. Finally, the Greek Constitution recog-
nizes Eastern Orthodoxy as the prevailing faith of the country (Diamantopoulou 
2012; Mavrogordatos 2003). The militant cultures of political violence did not 
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make a contribution to the relationships between the states and the church 
(Molokotos- Liederman 2016). The absence of the explaining indicator reveals a 
low extent of applicability of Gohel’s model to explore the aftermath of the 
Eurozone cultures of political violence.
Culture of Political Violence as a Whipping Boy
The research tests the models that avoided introducing operationalizable defini-
tions of a culture of political violence after the adoption of the authorial concep-
tual framework. Those offering the full explanatory frameworks have undergone 
a test in their existing forms. Then, if the meanings proposed in the theories were 
consistent with the proposed in the research, the analysis accepted the latter to 
provide the semantic consistency in the analysis. Thereby, the validity of the test 
is not blunted by the use of the new conceptual framework to describe the cul-
tures of political violence. All the methodological choices were indeed discussed 
and justified in the research process.
 Regrettably, however, no explanatory model has turned out to be empirically 
effective enough to introduce the resonance of the explaining indicator. In most 
cases, the beings, phenomena, and processes to be accounted for in line with the 
frameworks did not make an appearance in the member states of the Eurozone. 
It precluded dealing with the relationships between the cultures of political viol-
ence and their results determined by the existing theories. They proved utterly 
useless to explain the violent behavior paradigms of stakeholders of the anti- 
austerity movements in the context designated territorially and temporally.
 The theories somewhat accused a culture of political violence of contributing 
to beings, phenomena, and processes assessed by the authors of the theories neg-
atively. The category was deployed to play a role of a label of the undesired 
events. It often did double duty as an umbrella term, but it was not clear what 
was concealed under the umbrella of the label. Nevertheless, it has to its name 
being the agent undermining democracy or forbidding the establishment of 
democratic regimes (Le Vine 2000; Njoku 2010; Obi 2011; Siniawer 2008; The-
obald 1999; Waldman 2007), leading to the occurrence of the hybrid of the paro-
chial and subject political culture (Ayele 2011), creating the violence of culture 
identified with the culture of masculinity and the political violence of culture 
(Ayele 2011), producing the conditions in which the provocation and organiza-
tion of violence are not the sole domain of professional soldiers (Kling 1963), 
bringing about revolution to being able to perform the function of an election 
(Kling 1963), triggering electoral and post- election violence (Forti and Maina 
2012; Omotola 2010), sparking the context in which ruffianism is tacitly 
accepted as a routinely used tool of political life (Siniawer 2012) and in which 
people are killed, maimed, disfigured, beaten, tortured, incarcerated, and exiled 
because of political objectives (Coleman 1998), inciting enormous public dis-
trust in the capacity of the major parties to come out of the destructive political 
legacy and usher in a new political alternative (Moniruzzaman 2009), eroding 
the secular and nationalist foundations of a moderate state (Gohel 2014), and 
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starting the institutionalization of the corruptive social movements into party 
politics (Siniawer 2008).
 Nevertheless, the research has found no evidence that the models work when 
applied to account for the consequences of stakeholders of the anti- austerity 
movements’ cultures of political violence. The explanatory frameworks might 
have been empirically effective to examine other empirical political contexts, but 
in most cases, they were not the results of research conducted by using strong 
methodological assumptions. They were more than often developed by drawing 
on the commonsense discussion on political violence. However, the theoretical 
approaches are worth underpinning because they may become the theories of 
medium range.
 Last but not least, we do not accept the value- laden treating a culture of polit-
ical violence like a whipping boy. Instead, we stand for working on a new 
explanatory framework of the aftermath of its patterns without making premises 
that they have to be negative. It is also interesting whether there is a mechanism 
that differentiates the sources of the indicators to be explained that are expressed 
through the dissimilarities from among cultures of political violence. Indeed, it 
would be useful to trace and compare the history of the member states of the 
Eurozone after the activity of the anti- austerity movements to find out how a 
political reality changed in the states with diverse cultures of political violence.
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Conclusions and Discussion on the 
Limitations of the Research
The comprehensive literature review has shown that a culture of political viol-
ence is a forceful but understudied issue. Although most of the works under 
scrutiny have been neither widely cited nor commonly known, their elaboration 
has allowed us to see the broad range of promising scientific approaches towards 
the use of the term in empirical studies. The analysis of its definitions, classifica-
tion schemes, and explanatory frameworks considering it to be either the 
explaining indicator or the indicator to be explained has uncovered the methodo-
logical challenges for the researchers who might want to employ them effect-
ively to their empirical studies. Indeed, this research has made use of its 
exploratory and explanatory potential by developing a theoretical framework of 
a culture of political violence and putting it into work on the research field 
of stakeholders of the post- 2008 anti- austerity movements in the member states 
of the Eurozone.
 The hard core structuring and organizing the theoretical framework is the cat-
egory of a culture of political violence defined as a paradigm of using political 
violence in a political structure, which is determined by the temporal, subject, 
and subject matter indicators. This paradigm indicates who takes advantage of 
the use of political violence, what their mutual legitimation to the use is, how 
they justify and account for the deployment, what forms of violence they 
employ, and how intense physical political violence is. The definition has been a 
foundation of an original conceptual framework applicable to describe and 
analyze cultures of political violence. The model, however, may and should be 
refined according to state of the art and empirical demands of particular research 
fields to enhance its empirical effectiveness.
 The application of the conceptual framework of a culture of political violence 
to the empirical study enabled us to verify the first main hypothesis. When the 
post- 2008 anti- austerity movements acted, their cultures of political violence 
were undifferentiated in the political subjects that employed violence to achieve 
political goals over the duration of the movements. They were, nevertheless, 
diversified with respect to the values of its remaining four essential features: 
mutual legitimation to use political violence, modes of the legitimation of the 
perpetration, the intensity of the use of physical political violence, and forms of 
political violence.
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 Furthermore, the structure of the conceptual framework allowed us to 
approach the problem of a classification scheme in a qualitatively different 
manner than social movements have been addressed thus far. The simultaneous 
and joint application of the five critical criteria paved the way for the typology 
which consists of seven patterns of a culture of political violence: placidly 
observing, placidly rationalizing, hector- consenting, hector- acknowledgement, 
indulgingly militant, obstreperously militant, and aggressively militant. The 
qualitative comparative analysis enabled us to identify similarities and differ-
ences between them and contributed to our knowledge of the variety of the cul-
tures of political violence among stakeholders of the anti- austerity movements in 
the member states of the Eurozone.
 The analysis has shown that whereas the hector- led and militant types pre-
vailed on the European political scene, the peaceful patterns were in the 
minority. It indicates the constantly developing civil society willingly deploys 
physical force to perform its political goals. Worth pursuing are, therefore, 
studies on the mechanisms and dynamics of radicalization and deradicalization 
of not only terrorist groups but also a priori non- violent interest groups.
 This part of the study might be criticized for not providing a detailed descrip-
tion of some events under scrutiny, which the method of observation would have 
allowed to generate. If the research had not been conducted from the ex- post 
2008–2015 anti- austerity mass political mobilization perspective, it would have 
offered a detail- rich presentation of the activities of the anti- austerity movements 
in which their stakeholders engaged. Then, the presentation of the cultures of 
political violence would have been more vivid. The goal of the chapter was not, 
however, to describe public actions of political subjects in the times of austerity. 
Much more important was to glean the pieces of data relevant, necessary, and 
sufficient to verify the hypothesis. Therefore, mass media conceptual qualitative 
content analysis has been carried out.
 The content analysis of the existing written sources allowed us to access the 
information concerning the inevitably bygone past. They were nonreactive and 
did not influence the researcher. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind a poten-
tially selective continuance of the sources. The authors of sources might not 
have captured some pieces of information relevant to the cultures of political 
violence. They also might have decided to publish some news due to such 
reasons as political correctness, mass media profile, or particular interest, and 
ignore other facts, which contributes to the effect of media attention. We cannot 
sweep aside misinterpretation of events and their actors by a journalist. Further-
more, the sources are incomplete due to the archival longevity of particular titles. 
Their content may be partial, inaccurate, and inadvertently or deliberately distor-
tional (Basu 2017; Raynor 2016). The researcher’s unintended misinterpretation, 
interpretation, or omission of some details might have undermined the research 
results as well. Data are inherently composite if we take a look at the content of 
all the sources needed to verify the hypothesis as a whole.
 The substantive information, the pieces of data from public, commercial, and 
social media often differed widely in the number, for instance, of political 
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 subjects involved in anti- austerity events, detained, arrested, and injured, the 
types of objects deployed as weapons, the narratives developed by political sub-
jects, the tenor of their activities, and the intensity of physical political violence. 
Not to contribute to the conclusion contorting and thus undermining research 
results, the study excogitates analytical tools by excluding from the subject 
matter field the potential distortion factors which were not necessary to examine 
cultures of political violence.
 The researcher devised data by applying the conceptual framework to 
approach the cultures of political violence methodically, systematically, and 
intersubjectively. Additionally, she took measures to verify if data are reliable 
because there was no practical alternative to the sources. First, she confronted all 
the details relevant to determine the patterns of a culture of political violence 
from the media with other media information from at least five different sources 
published in native for the states and foreign languages. Thus, the researcher 
rejected the unsubstantiated claims of journalists. Second, she sent official letters 
to the police stations located in the states involved in the research to request for 
documentation of police and riot police actions and statistics from December 1, 
2007 to December 31, 2015.
 In contrast to the first highly effective precaution measure, the second was 
only moderately effective. On the one hand, the data from police stations 
allowed us to verify the solidity of the data concerning Estonia, Germany, Slov-
enia, and Spain due to the information facilitated by the Police and Border Guard 
Board (Guralnik 2017), the Federal Police (Müsgen 2017), the Slovenian 
National Police (Durić and Žibret 2017), and the Spanish National Police 
(Horsman 2017) respectively. Thus, data considerably contributed to the hypo-
thesis verification and accelerated the discovery process. On the other hand, a 
number of the police stations that decided to provide the pieces of data was rel-
atively low. The Polícia de Segurança from Portugal refused to send the 
requested data for undetermined legal reasons (Freitas 2017). In similar tone was 
the response of the Federal Police from Austria that claimed they did not have 
the competence to make data available (Jedelsky 2017). The Politie from the 
Netherlands denied access to the police information by quoting having other pri-
orities in their work (Politie 2017). Irish An Garda Síochána referred the 
researcher to the Garda Research Unit which, in turn, after asking the researcher 
for completion of an application form for access to data, stated that the unit must 
prioritize operational requests for data and did not provide the access (Copeland 
2017a, 2017b; Kavanagh 2017). The Hellenic Police from Greece declined to 
answer the request because of its “unclear substance” (General Policing Division 
2017). Finally, the other police entities from Belgium, Finland, France, Slovakia, 
and Italy took a rain check.
 Additionally, guided by the research problem and emerging directions in the 
analysis, the researcher collected a set by set of data. According to the principle 
of theoretical sampling, the theoretical developments that occurred in an analysis 
of previously gathered data led the following stages of data collection. The cycle of 
alternation between data collection and analysis did not stop at two repetitions 
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but continued until theoretical saturation was gained: in other words, until new 
pieces of data were not introducing the exemplifications of new theoretical ele-
ments but instead were confirming what the research already discovered.
 The media discourse was crucial to establish what stakeholders of the anti- 
austerity movements acted in the given set of states and to make sense of the 
structures of relationships between them. The analysis of data enabled us also to 
formulate arguments concerning mutual legitimation of political subjects to 
commit political violence. Information was accessible about the details of how 
political subjects reacted to the misuse and perpetration of mental, and active 
and passive physical violence and to what extent they were prone to accept each 
other’s violent behavior. It was used to place the cases on the continuum estab-
lished by the maximum extent and the total lack of mutual legitimation. Further-
more, data provided us with information on how political subjects explained and 
justified their violent action, which was vital to explore modes of the legitima-
tion of the use of political violence. The intensity of physical political violence 
was tough to measure because of limited data. The information was, however, 
adequate to observe if the threat and active physical force were in use, if political 
subjects crossed the qualitative line between active and passive physical viol-
ence within a political structure, and, if so, which stakeholders of the anti- 
austerity movements did so. It enabled us to place the cases on the continuum 
determined by constant and maximally intense use of political violence and its 
abandonment. Although the fragmentariness of data inhibited the comprehensive 
assessment of how political subjects deployed mental political violence, it 
proved to be sufficient to estimate the general types of configurations of forms of 
political violence. The evaluation of if and how political subjects made use of 
mental, passive and active physical violence served to locate the cases on the 
continuum determined by soft and hard power approaches.
 Police data was of equal relevance to the media discourse in achieving plausi-
bility of the process of theoretical sampling through theoretical saturation. It 
showed how police stations legitimated their use of political violence springing 
from political roles and its actual usage over anti- austerity events. The discursive 
creation indicated how a particular type of representatives of state apparatuses 
accounted for and justified their aggressive behavior. It also neatly revealed how 
and to what extent they delegitimated the perpetration of political violence by 
movement participants. The police perspective allowed us to complete data from 
the media discourse to evaluate mutual legitimation of political subjects to act 
violently. Thereby, it contributed to locating the cases on the continuum deter-
mined by the maximum extent and the total lack of mutual legitimation. Further-
more, it was useful to identify and elaborate the modes of the legitimation of the 
use of political violence. The properties of authorization and rationalization were 
stated by policemen, and as such, they provided details relevant to apply effect-
ively Theo van Leeuwen’s typology of legitimation (2007, 92) to the analysis of 
the cultures of political violence.
 The existing data were, however, insufficient to adopt a more specific tool to 
identify and compare modes of the legitimation of the use of political violence. 
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Van Leeuwen’s typology of legitimation (2007, 92), which consists of authoriza-
tion, moralization, rationalization, and mythopoesis, allowed us to analyze how 
political subjects justified and accounted for resorting to violent means while 
they were creating relationships within political structures. It turned out, 
however, to be moderately vulnerable to observe any critical differences between 
political discourses. Although it appeared useful to determine three general clus-
ters of the modes, two of them contained no more than one case. Whereas in 
Slovakia, the configuration of authorization and rationalization occurred, in 
Estonia, the set of authorization, rationalization, and mythopoesis was in use. 
The variety of the cultures of political violence in Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, 
and Italy shared authorization, rationalization, and moralization but the character 
of the three- element set for particular types remained unapproached. Future 
studies should put emphasis on how to deal with the similarities and dissimilari-
ties of the placid, hector- led, and militant patterns in the discursive creation of 
justification and explanation of the deployment of political violence. The 
restricted choice of methods applicable to generate useful data and the existing 
evidence makes this challenge demanding.
 One may argue against the comprehensiveness of the research by claiming 
that it has not dealt with mental political violence in depth, or it has understudied 
the types of relationships between representatives of state apparatuses and move-
ment participants (della Porta and Reiter 1998; Tarrow 2012). The counter-
argument is that protest policing has not been the exact research field, even if it 
potentially might have enriched the view of the cultures of political violence. 
Moreover, the intensity of mental political violence might have been examined 
like physical political violence. However, it would be hardly possible to generate 
necessary and sufficient data to identify and compare the extents of intensity 
from the ex- post facto perspective. For instance, it is hindered to determine an 
extent of the vulgarity of verbal and non- verbal communication used during anti-
 austerity protests and other collective actions initiated by movements’ stake-
holders because of the elusive nature of their physical media such as banners or 
comments on web pages. No database contains information on the key features 
of the category exemplifications which emerged in social media. The chance of 
studying this aspect of a culture of political violence should not be abandoned in 
planning future studies if data are accessible. Overall, the validity of the research 
results may and ought to be discussed critically as long as it leads us to the 
development of the field.
 Criticism may also flow directly from the thesis of the research that a culture 
of political violence is a forceful theoretical category to explore and explain 
violent behavior in austerity- driven Europe. The thesis circumscribed the scope 
of the tested theories to those literally coping with a culture of political violence. 
On the one side, the assumption has established what explanatory frameworks 
are to be verified, which spawned a more intersubjective selection of theories 
than any other criterion. On the other side, it inevitably left several potentially 
forceful theories behind. It would be particularly interesting to see in future 
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research how the theoretical approaches concerning a culture of violence, not 
only and exactly political violence, compete while explaining why some anti- 
austerity movements turned to violence and others did not (Rak 2017b). The 
research perspective of cultures of violence deals with a question of why soci-
eties are more or less violent, and it may challenge a researcher to adopt a 
broader understanding of violence that may carry a political meaning but do not 
have to be political by its very nature.
 Furthermore, although an attempt to include political culture in the studies on 
a culture of political violence occurred in the specialist literature, the causal rela-
tion suggested by its author has not been empirically confirmed by this study. 
Social science methods do not offer a reliable means to assess the direction of 
influence in the relationships between those two categories. It may be of import-
ance in the field to look at political culture as a theoretical category and use it to 
examine the differences and similarities within political structures created by 
stakeholders of anti- austerity movements and, then, to explain sources and con-
sequences of different patterns of political cultures. A relationship between the 
categories and the empirical expressions of a culture of political violence and 
political culture is still puzzling.
 It may also be analytically challenging to determine the categories of nar-
rower and broader semantic fields than a culture of political violence, and verify 
their empirical effectiveness by following the methodological assumptions pro-
posed in his research changed in the core category organizing a research process.
 The second main hypothesis relates to what accounts for a culture of political 
violence. The research tested the explanatory frameworks identified in the liter-
ature review by using statistical analysis, causal- process observation, and critical 
argumentation. The current theories of cultures of political violence have 
informed the research process. On the one hand, the study has shown that the 
existing explanatory frameworks to a low extent explain why stakeholders of the 
post- 2008 anti- austerity movements had the particular patterns of a culture of 
political violence. On the other, it has established a new avenue into accounting 
for the sources of their diversity.
 The particular configurations of the explaining indicators have turned out to 
have greater explanatory power than individual indicators or their full fixed sets. 
Interestingly, the combo of the intrastate, regional, and colonial indicators is not 
applicable to explain the diversity of the cultures of political violence because 
there is no significant statistical correlation between the variables. Nonetheless, 
the Negussay Ayele proposal has an explanatory potential. Although it is not a 
major issue if the three indicators originate in a state in the fixed set, it matters in 
what configuration its components emerge. In this case, the correlation coeffi-
cient equals 0.651, indicating a strong positive linear correlation and letting us 
see that the coefficient is significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 
0.012, which is substantially lower than 0.05 and proves a statistically significant 
correlation. The research has indicated that if in the history of a state both the 
intrastate and colonial indicators occur as well as the regional one does not take 
place, it is probable that placid cultures of political violence originate in the 
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state. More violent patterns show up in the states where the intrastate indicator 
appears. This feature typifies hector- led and militant types, but it is the only 
feature that characterizes the former. The latter may also originate in the states 
where the full set of the intrastate, colonial, and regional indicators or just the 
configuration of the intrastate and regional made an appearance in the state 
history. In one state, however, no indicator occurred, which undermines the 
model.
 It seems to be promising to delve analytically into the structures of the con-
figurations of the indicators which typify particular cultures of political violence. 
The proceedings and results of the already recognized intrastate, regional, and 
colonial indicators are worth taking into consideration. The frequency and 
intensity of the events may also be meaningful (McAdam et al. 2008). For the 
purpose of empowering the empirical effectiveness of the model, it would be 
advisable to determine precisely a conceptual framework applicable to approach 
what contributes to the paradigms of the use of political violence, and how, and 
the differences between them.
 Let us draw one more conclusion on other explanatory frameworks. As the 
research has pointed out, the war, civil war, and revolution indicators as the fixed 
and undivided explaining set are far from being effective because its correlation 
with the types of a culture of political violence is not statistically significant. 
More importantly, however, the various configurations of the explaining indi-
cators are to a greater extent applicable to explain placid, hector- led, and militant 
cultures of political violence than Norman LaPorte and Matthew Worley’s ori-
ginal model. The Sig. 2-tailed level is there 0.044, which is considerably lower 
than 0.05, and it sets a statistically significant correlation. The analysis has 
revealed that when in the history of a state only the war indicator makes an 
appearance, it is likely that a placid pattern of a culture of political violence 
enters this state. Perfectly in the line of LaPorte and Worley, the complete con-
figuration of the war, civil war, and revolution indicators is a feature of more 
violent patterns. When it appears, it is probable that a hector- led or militant type 
originates. Nevertheless, the set of war and revolution indicators is a property of 
no pattern. The results may encourage a researcher to adopt the model in a modi-
fied and extended form and to make further changes to reinforce its explanatory 
potential.
 Here, it is worth discerning that Sue Onslow’s explanatory model challenges 
a researcher to concentrate on the details of the war indicator but, note should be 
taken, other indicators are not to be left aside. Just as in Ayele, it may be 
effective to explore the frequency and intensity of the events in the states’ 
history and to determine their features potentially significant to the development 
of the cultures of political violence (McAdam et al. 2008).
 Robert Gerwarth’s explanatory model, assuming that a culture of political 
violence is a result of the noisy and turbulent politics of the street, the town 
square, and the factory, in which socioeconomic grievances, hostility to state 
authority, and new and recycled dreams of a purified community are expressed, 
is invulnerable to explain the differences between the cultures of political 
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 violence. Not unlike William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg’s, Gerwarth’s 
model is too general to deal with the nature and roots of the complex phenom-
enon. The explanatory indicators occurred in each state pending the measure-
ment of the cultures of political violence. It was purposeless to verify just the 
straightforward occurrence of the indicators because their empirical mani-
festations were common in Europe. In spite of Gerwarth’s assumptions, it would 
be useful to shed light on their intensity and frequency. It may be of vital import-
ance to analyzing the relative deprivations of political subjects engaged in con-
tentious politics to empower the model. Beyond argument is the requirement to 
develop the model by proposing the conceptual framework which would enable 
a researcher to address significant differences between expressions of the 
indicator.
 The other models involved the following explaining indicators: highly mobil-
ized and urbanized civil society, in the developed Latin Amer ican states with 
strong democratic traditions, identified with the state which does not confine its 
militaries to the narrowly constitutional role and ruthless and determined military 
governments threatens at length the civil society, tribal and religious loyalties, 
non- political agencies of socialization, the youths’ engagement in electoral viol-
ence, the fictions of political violence defined as novels, short stories, plays, 
movies, or parts thereof, where political processes and political views are reason-
ably close to the surface, and the internationalist spirit of the 1960s. Nonetheless, 
there was no need to conduct statistical analysis to state that they do not work 
under their original theoretical and methodological assumptions to account for 
the Eurozone cultures of political violence. Their rejection was justified mainly 
by drawing upon the history of the states and essential features of the context in 
which the anti- austerity movements acted. Although some of them have an 
explanatory potential, such as those which point out tribal and religious loyalties, 
they have to be elaborated according to state of the art to develop their empirical 
effectiveness. They also inspire a researcher to think about the role of elections 
and political campaigns in the process of shaping cultures of political violence, 
but they avoid establishing directions to do so.
 This part of the research has pointed out that much is to be done to elaborate 
explanatory frameworks of a culture of political violence. It is not very likely 
that a single indicator will account for its types. More likely is that the configu-
rations of indicators will provide more plausible research results. Undoubtedly, 
it may be useful to inform future conceptual and explanatory frameworks by 
delving analytically into the previous contentious politics in the particular states.
 The third hypothesis focuses on the empirical effectiveness of the current 
explanatory frameworks that treat a culture of political violence as the explain-
ing indicator. Unfortunately, no explanatory model has turned out to be useful to 
introduce the resonance of the explaining indicator. In fact, in most cases, the 
beings, phenomena, and processes to be accounted for in line with the frame-
works did not make an appearance in the member states of the Eurozone. It pre-
cluded dealing with the relationships between patterns of a culture of political 
violence and their results determined by the existing theories. The current 
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explanatory models are empirically ineffective to explain violent behavior para-
digms of stakeholders of the anti- austerity movements in the Eurozone.
 The study has uncovered that the authors of the frameworks fixed the blame 
on a culture of political violence for contributing to the beings, phenomena, and 
processes recognized by the researchers as having an adverse influence on 
society. The term served as a label of the undesired events. It often served as an 
umbrella term, but what the umbrella of the label concealed was unclear. Never-
theless, a culture of political violence is often blamed as the agent of under-
mining democracy or forbidding the establishment of democratic regimes, 
leading to the occurrence of the hybrid of the parochial and subject political cul-
tures, creating the violence of culture identified with the culture of masculinity 
and the political violence of culture, producing the conditions in which the pro-
vocation and organization of violence are not the sole domain of professional 
soldiers, bringing about revolution to being able to perform the function of an 
election, triggering off electoral and post- election violence, sparking the context 
in which ruffianism is tacitly accepted as a routinely used tool of political life 
and in which people are killed, maimed, disfigured, beaten, tortured, incarcer-
ated, and exiled because of political objectives, inciting enormous public distrust 
in the capacity of the major parties to come out of the destructive political legacy 
and usher in a new political alternative, eroding the secular and nationalist 
foundations of a moderate state, and starting the institutionalization of the cor-
ruptive social movements into party politics. As the discussion on the explan-
atory framework has underscored, the scientific approaches towards a culture of 
political violence are often biased because of treating the category as a whipping 
boy. It is a result of the value- laden determination of relations between the 
explaining indicator and the indicators to be explained.
 The research contributes to social sciences by proposing and testing a non- 
traditional research design built around a methodologically structured literature 
review. It formulates the sets of problems and correctness criteria which are of 
universal applicability to evaluate theories in terms of their methodological 
effectiveness. The extensive literature review of works on cultures of political 
violence is the first attempt to put scientific ways of thinking about that phenom-
enon in order. It informed the creation of a semantic universe of a culture of 
political violence and its types. As a result, the study offers an operationalizable 
definition of the category and generates its new conceptual framework. Their 
application to qualitative comparative analysis methodologically shaped a com-
parison distinguished by the use of the category. The analysis of the cultures of 
political violence of stakeholders of the anti- austerity movements in the member 
states of the Eurozone contributes to comparative politics by showing the crucial 
patterns of similarities and differences between the cases.
 The literature review allowed us to determine methodically and intersubjec-
tively two sets of explanatory models with the potential to develop our know-
ledge of the cultures of political violence. The research has tested the empirical 
effectiveness of the models which treat the category either as an explaining indi-
cator or an indicator to be explained by employing a unique blend of statistical 
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analysis, causal- process observations, and critical facts- driven discussion. Some 
theories have been found to be ineffective to account for the Eurozone cultures 
of political violence which were beyond their original research fields. Others 
have turned out to have explanatory power, and they marked out ways for 
delving analytically into the sources of the cultures of political violence. They 
also have revealed potentially exact directions for future studies in the field. As 
the research results indicate, the most important are the issues of the intensity of 
contention and the frequency, features, and dynamics of intrastate, regional, 
colonial, factors in the history of states.
 The volume presents original databases for 14 states formulated especially for 
the research, but they may be successfully employed in other studies on anti- 
austerity movements. They contain the dates of the occurrence of the anti- austerity 
movements, patterns of the cultures of political violence, characteristics of stake-
holders of the anti- austerity movements – who they are, forms of political viol-
ence, modes of the legitimation of the perpetration, mutual legitimation to the use, 
and the intensity of physical political violence – and explanatory indicators – intra-
state, regional, colonial, experiences of war, civil war, revolution, noisy and turbu-
lent politics, breakdown of democracy, and culture of masculinity.
 The research contributes as well to our knowledge of the context- determined 
cultures of political violence, which is of relevance for the state plans of crisis man-
agement in protest policing, the role of state police as stakeholders of social move-
ments, the impact of the police on increasing and decreasing violent behavior, the 
means employed by representatives of the state apparatus within the relationships 
with movement participants. The analysis provides decision- making authorities 
with information about the patterns of violent behavior whose specificity has to be 
taken into consideration to prevent the transposition of the less violent cultures of 
political violence into the more aggressive types. As the research points out, negoti-
ations of the standards through discursive and actual legitimation of representatives 
of state apparatuses and movement participants to perform their political roles and 
not deploy peaceful means mirrored the processes of fueling and quenching polit-
ical violence. It reveals the meaning of responsibility for earning the standards of 
demeanor and co- operation in times of social mobilization.
 The non- traditional research design may cause a backlash in conservatively 
oriented circles of social scientists, but constructive criticism is very welcome to 
pave new avenues for future research in the field. In fact, the work does not chal-
lenge the empirical effectiveness of traditional research designs. Rather, it 
encourages us to rethink our insight into how a given analysis should and should 
not be structured and conducted. It offers one of many formulas to come to grips 
with why some anti- austerity movements turned to force when others did not, 
and how it influenced political structures. Despite not being free of a drain on 
the research results, the study proposes a new way for investigating the cultures 
of political violence. As long as the category is about how political subjects see 
themselves and each other in their political roles within political structures, how 
they perceive, justify, and explain the deployment of political violence, and how 
they make use of it, we cannot take its structure for granted. Instead, we have to 
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elaborate individually for every research field its conceptual framework struc-
tured with theoretical categories, a classification scheme to discern differences 
between its expressions, and explanatory frameworks to account for its sources 
and results. We should generate up- to-date empirical evidence that leads the 
design of any theoretical framework to discover the very nature of the change-
able cultures of political violence.
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